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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Kahnawake Iroquois were a group of Iroquois Indians
converted by Jesuit missionaries and invited to emigrate from
their homeland to a mission community just outside of Montreal
starting in 1667.

This dissertation focusses on them from

that beginning to the Seven Years' War and closes in 1760 with
the demise of the French in North America.
from

1667

to

1760

is tied to the

Kahnawake history

colonial

and

imperial

struggle in the colonial Northeast between the English, the
Iroquois, and the French, so the defeat of the French meant
that their subsequent history differs dramatically and is not
in the scope of this study.

While there have been community

studies written by Jesuit apologists about these Indians, the
Kahnawakes have never been studied in the context of the
diplomatic-military struggle between the English, the Iroquois
League, and the French, but have been dismissed as probably
being under the heel of the French.1

The purpose of this

dissertation is to demonstrate that they were not mere puppets
of the French,

but that there was a real power struggle

between the Kahnawakes and New France, as well as between the
Kahnawakes and New York, and even between the Kahnawakes and
the Iroquois League.
Although the Kahnawake people originated in an era of
struggle

and

warfare,

they

survived

and

developed

as

a

1Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune (New York: Norton,
1987), p. 190.
v
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distinct group.

They maintained their identity in the face of

strong pressure from both the Iroquois League and the French.
Although
managed

overseen by Jesuit missionaries,
to

retain

determination.

much

of

their

the Kahnawakes

independence

and

self-

They also held their kinfolk of the Iroquois

League at arm's length when it suited their purposes.

Even

with their factional splits, the Kahnawakes forced the French,
the English, and the Iroquois League to deal with them as a
separate

power

America.

They are an example of a native group which adapted

to

changing

in the

geopolitics

circumstances

but

of

kept

northeastern

control

North

over

the

adaptations they made and changed in ways which kept their
identity and automony intact.
This

argument

alters

the

interpretation

of

colonial

history in the Northeast because the Kahnawakes have never
been studied as a separate group.

A few community studies

have been written about the community of Kahnawake, either by
Jesuit

apologists,

ignored pertinent
findings to

antiquarians,
evidence

critical

and

analysis.2

or
have

activists
not

who

havee

subjected

their

Moreover,

the Kahnawake

people have never been analyzed within the context of the

2E. J. Devine, Historic Cauqhnawaqa (Montreal: Messenger
Press, 1922); Henri Bechard, The Original Cauqhnawaqa Indians
(Montreal: International Publishers, 1976); David Blanchard,
"Patterns of tradition and change; the re-creation of Iroquois
culture at Kahnawake," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago, 1982).
vi
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politics of the colonial Northeast.3 The assumption has been
made that since they emigrated to a Jesuit reserve within New
France,

they

did

the

bidding

of

the

French,

and

were

mercenaries for them when hostilities between the French and
the English broke out.

But more than a superficial reading of

the documents reveals that the situation was more complicated,
and this dissertation examines those complications.
The significance of my findings impinge on the existing
picture of power relationships in the colonial Northeast.

If

it is true that the Kahnawakes were a force to be reckoned
with,

then

power

was

more

interpretations have shown.

widely

shared

than

past

Within the past few decades,

scholars have shown that the Iroquois League was not just a
mercenary

force

for

the

English

against

the

French.4

Likewise, other Indian groups were important as independent
players

and

at

times

pivotal.

The

Kahnawakes

were

an

3Thomas R. Agan made a start in this direction with his
Master's thesis, "The Caughnawaga Indians and their influence
on English-Indian relations to 1763," (Unpublished M.A.
thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1965).
4For instance,
see Richard Aquila,
The Iroquois
Restoration: Iroauois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier.
1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983);
Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Empire: The Covenant Chain
Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its
beginning to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York: Norton,
1984); Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change
and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier,
1609-1720"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984);
Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, eds., Bevond the
Covenant Chain: The Iroauois and Their Neighbors in Indian
North America. 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University
Press, 1987).
vii
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indispensible fighting force for the French, but the French
had to send embassies to their village to convince them to
participate in expeditions.

Once on the warpath, Kahnawake

warriors often determined the strategy and outcome of the
fighting.

For

instance,

they singlehandedly decided the

outcome of the Battle of Lake George in the Seven Years' War
by sabotaging the French effort.

Therefore, we must refigure

our interpretation of power relationships in the period of
English-French-Iroquois conflict in the late seventeenth and
the

eighteenth

centuries

to

take

other

groups

into

consideration; the Kahnawakes were a group which, although
small in number, cannot be overlooked when writing the history
of the colonial wars.

Also, they are significant in their

project of cultural re-genesis.

They successfully developed

a distinct sub-culture which was a mixture of traditional
Iroquoian and European Catholic traits.

And they creatively

manipulated their situation instead of surrendering their
autonomy to European overlords.
One reason why no scholars of the colonial Northeast have
isolated these Indians for study is that they appear in the
historical documents, both in English and in French, by a wide
variety of names and therefore are difficult to trace or even
notice as a distinct group.

For the first few years of their

existence as a group separate from the Iroquois proper, they
were known as "praying Indians," "French praying Indians" (by
the English only), "domiciliated Indians," "mission Indians,"
viii
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"mission Iroquois," or other variations.
They
location,

soon

came

however.

to

be

Their

known
first

by

their

destination

geographical
on

leaving

Iroquoia was La Prairie, a tiny outpost settlement south of
Montreal.

After nine years, the mission village moved two or

three miles west to a place called Sault Saint-Louis, or the
St. Louis Rapids.

After one more move of the village site a

few miles west again but still near these rapids, the Indians
developed a name in the Mohawk language for Sault Saint-Louis
—

"Kahnawake," or "Caughnawaga," with many variations on

these

spellings.

Most nineteenth-

and twentieth-century

antiquarians used the "Caughnawaga" orthography but the m o d e m
reserve community has chosen "Kahnawake" as the name of their
place and their people.

In seventeenth- and eighteenth-

century documents the French came to call them "Sault (St.Louis) Indians" or "Sault (St.-Louis) Iroquois," to be more
specific than "mission Iroquois" since by the 1720s there was
a neighboring mission village inhabited by Iroquois as well as
Nipissing and Algonquin Indians.

I use the terms "Kahnawake"

and "Sault Iroquois" interchangeably, and "mission Iroquois"
when it is possible that some of these neighboring Indians
were included.
All translations of documents in French are mine.
The first chapter provides background on Iroquois history
and culture to 1667, the second chapter traces the exodus of
Iroquois people to the new mission community, and the third,
ix
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fourth, and fifth chapters trace Kahnawake relations with the
Iroquois

League

(Five/Six Nations), the

English from the 1680s to 1701.

French,

and the

Chapter Six continues with

the history of Kahnawake foreign relations to 1760.

Chapter

Seven outlines and analyzes the role of Kahnawakes in trade
from the 1680s to 1760.
Eight

analyzes

the

As a concluding chapter, Chapter

extent

of

cultural

change

among

the

Kahnawakes in the eighteenth century and summarizes their
effect on the diplomatic, military, and economic landscape of
the colonial Northeast.

This study could not have been undertaken without the
assistance of many people.

Professor James Axtell provided

much leadership, advice, and editorial help from beginning to
end.

Professor Cornelius Jaenen of the University of Ottawa,

and Professors John Selby, Kevin Kelly, and Thomas Sheppard of
the College of William and Mary,
helpful

critiques.

undertook thoughtful and

Other people who

generously provided

information and expertise were Professor Louise Dechene of
McGill

University,

Raotitiohkwa
Tailleur

Shirley

Cultural

Scott

Center

of the Archives

du

at

of

the

Kahnawake,

Kanien'kehaka
Rev.

Seminaire de Quebec,

Laurent
Michel

Wyczynski of the National Archives of Canada, Bill Gorman of
the New York State Archives, and Gil Kelly and Frederika Teute
of the Institute of Early American History and Culture.
profitted greatly

from giving

I

a colloquium paper at the

x
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ABSTRACT
This study focusses on the Kahnawake Iroquois Indians, a
collection of individuals who emigrated from the Iroquois
homeland to a Jesuit mission community, or reserve. outside of
Montreal, starting in 1667.
Their history and development as a people is traced from
the beginnings in 1667 up to the end of the French power in
Canada, at the end of the Seven Years' War in 1760. Through
the topics of diplomacy, warfare, and trade, these Kahnawake
Indians are examined and it is determined that they were
important players in the power politics and military balance
between the English, the French, and the Iroquois proper from
the 1680s to 1760.
They became a pivotal group within the French military
machine in northeastern North America, but forced the French
to meet them on their own terms, refusing to become subject to
French authority. They initiated and sustained an illegal but
highly important trade in furs and European blankets, defying
the mercantilist rules of both the French and the English
imperial authorities in New France and New York.
Culturally, the Kahnawake people developed a distinct
identity, successfully blending elements of both traditional
Iroquois and European Catholic culture.
B o m in an era of
struggle, they thrived and maintained their distinct identity
and culture in the face of imperial powers and the designs of
their Iroquois relatives.
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CHAPTER ONE
IROQUOIS HISTORY TO 1667
Centuries ago, across what is now New York State, five
Iroquois nations, the "people of the longhouse" or the "Ho-deno-sau-nee," formed a League which aided them in becoming a
powerful

people.1

These

five

tribes

were

Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and the Senecas.
center of the League was at Onondaga.

the

Mohawks,

The political

The Onondagas would be

the keepers of the council fire, since they were at the center
of the longhouse (the longhouse representing the geography of
Iroquoia, along an east-west axis across what is now central
New York State), the Mohawks would be the keepers of the
eastern door of the longhouse, since they were the easternmost
nation, the Senecas the keepers of the western door.

Younger

brothers to these doorkeeper and firekeeper nations,

the

Cayugas and Oneidas, would take their place on either side of
Onondaga and help to keep the balance between the three older

1 Dates assigned to the founding of the League vary from
1400 to 1600. William N. Fenton says that Horatio Hale and
Lewis Henry Morgan judged it to be in the mid-fifteenth
century, and that William Beauchamp and J.N.B. Hewitt revised
it to the late sixteenth century.
Fenton argues that
archaeological evidence increasingly supports an earlier date.
(William N. Fenton, "The Iroquois in History," in Eleanor
Burke Leacock and Nancy 0. Lurie, eds., North American Indians
in Historical Perspective (New York: Random House, 1971), p.
133. See also Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois,"
in Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution, 1978) [William Sturtevant, ge.
ed.], Volume 15, Northeast. Bruce G. Trigger, ed. (1978), pp.
418-422; and James W. Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga
Iroauois: Accommodating Change. 1500-1655 (Syracuse University
Press, 1987), pp. 43, 105-106.)
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brothers of the longhouse.

These two "sides" or moieties of

Elder and Younger Brothers were the mechanism by which the
longhouse people worked out problems and condoled each other.
When a Mohawk chief died, his "side” (the Mohawks, Onondagas,
and Senecas) became the mourning side, and their opposite, the
Younger Brothers, became the clear-minded side,

so-called

because their minds were not clouded with the grief of a
kinsman's death.

The clear-minded side condoled the mourning

side in a ritual which became the identifying ceremony of the
Great

League.

The

spirit

of

the

deceased

chief

was

requickened in a newly installed chief, and the "requickening
address" was made to the mourning side by the clear-minded one
as part of the condolence ritual.

The Great League was not

strictly a political institution, but partly a religious and
cultural one as well.2
The ritual of the condolence was the main mechanism by
which the League would function.

Chieftainships were to pass

through groups of families (clans) but their titles did not
belong to the men who bore them.

The right to choose them was

hereditary, and heredity was traced through the female line.
Therefore, a man's son did not belong to his father's family
or even clan.

Men were identified through their mothers'

families, and therefore the chiefly titles —

of the Great

2See Christopher Vecsey, "The Story and Structure of the
Iroquois Confederacy," Journal of the American Academy of
Religion LIV (1986), p.90.
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League of Peace as well as at other levels of political
organization —

belonged to the women of the family or clan.

In fact, the word in Mohawk for family, ohwachira. translates
as maternal family, or as some have interpreted it clinically,
the uterine family.3 When a League (federal) chief died, the
women in his ohwachira met together to appoint a candidate,
submitted the nomination to the council of male elders, and
the latter either agreed or vetoed the choice.

When the

choice was finalized, a condolence ceremony took place to
condole the "side" of the League from which the deceased had
come and in the requickening address to "raise up" or install
the new chief who would take his place.4
With all of its chiefly offices filled, the Great League
could carry on the business for which it was formed: the
mediating of disputes between member tribes or villages.
However, this political forum differed from its counterparts
in European cultures.

Since Iroquois society was tribal and

not a "state society," the Longhouse people had neither the
3J.N.B. Hewitt, "A Constitutional League of Peace in the
Stone Age of America: The League of the Iroquois and its
Constitution," Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution
for 1918. p. 530.
4George S. Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace: A
Sociological Analysis of Iroquois Warfare," (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. University of Pennsylvania, 1948), pp. 11-18;
Tooker, "League..." in Handbook of North American Indians
15:426; A.A. Goldenweiser, "Iroquois Work, 1912," in Elisabeth
Tooker, ed., An Iroauois Source Book 3 vols. (New York:
Garland, 1985), Vol. 1, p. 468; William N. Fenton, ed.,
Parker's "Constitution," in Fenton, ed., Parker on the
Iroauois (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968),
pp. 91-92.
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5
technical ability nor the inclination to coerce or enforce any
policy, and held a different concept of leadership.5 A person
installed in a political position guided rather than ruled.
He or she had only the prerogative to speak, deliberate, and
cajole his or her peers, but never to decide anything on their
behalf.6

Iroquois politics worked by consensus; a motion

stayed on the floor until every person present agreed, or the
motion was dropped.
conflict,
difficult.

because

The Longhouse people tended to minimize
reaching

unanimous

agreement

Instead of remaining in disagreement,

was

so

a group

might rather split off and physically leave their home to
start a new community, as happened numerous times in Iroquois

^William N. Fenton, Introduction to Lewis Henry Morgan,
League of the Iroauois. pp. 67-73; Daniel K. Richter, "The
Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 33.
^ s e of "she" here is guarded; there is much debate over
the actual role of women in politics, and the disagreement is
partly due to a change over time.
Ethnologists in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries noticed that women were
only marginally involved in politics, whereas Father Joseph
Frangois Lafitau, the French Jesuit, in the 1710s observed a
prominent presence in politics for women. (Joseph -Frangois
Lafitau s.j., Customs of the American Indians Compared with
the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols. [William N. Fenton and
Elizabeth Moore, trans. andeds.] (Toronto; Champlain Society,
1974-77) 1:71, 293-295. This is significant, especially since
he was observing at Sault Saint-Louis, the Jesuit mission
community, which one can assume was heavily influenced (fortyodd years old at that point) by French Catholic gender role
models, and he still found women to be very prominent. There
has been a great change since; see David Blanchard, "Patterns
of tradition and change; the re-creation of Iroquois culture
at Kahnawake" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1982) on twentieth-century Kahnawake Iroquois women
in politics.
Twentieth-century ethnologists find no overt
involvement for women in ceremonies, speaking, etc. (George S.
Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace— ," p. 16.
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history.7

Lafitau noticed this attitude among the Iroquois:

"Each one, regarding others as masters of their own actions
and themselves, lets them conduct themselves as they wish and
judges only himself."8

When the League of the Five Nations was first formed, the
business conducted at the council fire concerned internal
disputes between tribes or nations.
century,

the

Iroquois

had

to

outsiders, native and European.

But by the seventeenth

develop

a

policy

toward

The European newcomers posed

a diplomatic challenge to the longhouse people.9

From the

beginning they had caused conflict among the five tribes of
the Ho-de-no-sau-nee.

The first information that the Five

Nations had of them came in the form of the strange materials

7William N. Fenton (in "Locality as a Basic Factor in the
Development of Iroquois Social Structure," in Elisabeth
Tooker, ed., An Iroauois Source Book. Vol. 1, p. 52) mentions
examples of this, such as the Oneida split in the nineteenth
century over religious issues. Some Oneidas went to Wisconsin
and some to the Thames River in western Ontario.
The 1838
Buffalo Creek Treaty split the Senecas — Complanter1s group
left for Pennsylvania. The American Revolution brought about
a split between those who sided, however nominally, with the
Loyalists and removed to Canada, and those who stayed in New
York. The small Gibson reserve near Owen Sound, Ontario was
the result of a split among the Oka Iroquois near Montreal.
8Lafitau, Customs... 1:300. Snyderman also mentions the
Iroquois respect for individual freedom to either abide, or
not to abide, by decisions taken by the group. (In "Behind the
Tree of Peace...," p. 13.)
9Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga Iroauois. p. 187;
Fenton, Introduction to Morgan, League of the Iroauois. p. 66;
Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 27; Snyderman,
"Behind the Tree of Peace," p. 27.
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they used for tools, trinkets, and textiles.

Iron, European

copper, and glass beads were known to the Iroquois long before
the first white person ever set foot on their soil.

They were

psychologically prepared for the intruders by the advance
information they received from coastal peoples and by their
own experience using European materials which they traded for
with their neighbors to the east.
These eastern tribes were the Algonquins, Montagnais,
Micmacs, and the Abenakis, peoples situated at or near the
North Atlantic coast.

They were the first North Americans to

absorb the shocks of cultural contact, the first to be shot at
with firearms, the first to taste liquor, the first to suffer
from European diseases,

the

first to

see

and trade

trinkets, iron and copper ware, and European cloth.

for

They were

also the first to deal with the pretensions of the bearded
Europeans to their land; they observed the cross being planted
in the ground in the Gaspe by Jacques Cartier, the profession
of sovereignty by Cartier at Stadacona (Quebec City), and this
nervy Frenchman's kidnapping of Donnacona's sons in 1534.

The

Iroquois were shielded by geography from these first contacts.
Aside from these occasional intrusions, most of the sixteenth
century was a period of relative stability among tribes of the
eastern woodlands.

Most groups were locally self-sufficient,

with little need for external trade for subsistence materials.
Long-distance trade was limited in most cases to luxury items
such as marine shell and Great Lakes copper, and intertribal
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warfare was common but mostly symbolic.
low.

Casualty rates were

The aim of warfare was to display one's bravery and to

keep the numbers of wounded and killed at a minimum.

Surprise

was everything; to frighten the enemy, not to kill him, was
the goal.

Warfare was to change greatly within the next

century.10
The chief exception to the rule of local self-sufficiency
and limited trade was the Huron Confederacy.

This group of

Iroquoian-speakers (linguistically and culturally related to
the Iroquois tribes) native to the area north of Lake Ontario
and east of Georgian Bay had been entrepreneurs for several
centuries before Europeans came to North America.
the

northern

edge

of

the

horticultural

belt,

Situated at
they

took

advantage of their position between agricultural and huntergatherer peoples on either side of them and developed a
broker's role between the two types of economies.
exchanged

the

(Algonquins,
farmers

products

Ottawas,

further south

of

the

northern

Nipissings,
(Eries,

hunter-gatherers

and Montagnais)

Westoes,

They

Petuns,

to

the

Neutrals,

perhaps the Iroquois as well).
The Hurons were well-placed, both geographically and by
inclination, to take advantage of a broker role in the trade
which was to develop once the French established themselves on

10Bruce G. Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with
Europeans," in Handbook of North American Indians 15:344;
Snyderman, "Behind the Tree of Peace," p. 7.
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the St. Lawrence River.11 But at the turn of the seventeenth
century, the groups benefitting from direct contact with the
French and able to drive the hardest bargains in peddling the
novel

items

to

inland

groups

were

the

Montagnais

and

Algonquins who lived along the northern shore of the St.
Lawrence.

Around 1600, Iroquois raiding parties were able to

penetrate as far downriver as the spot where Quebec City would
soon be built, but could not get all the way to Tadoussac,
where the French had established a seasonal trading post.
Montagnais Indians were blocking their way.
Iroquois began to resort to violent raids.

Therefore, the
They made it

difficult for St. Lawrence Valley Indians to fish in the river
for fear of a Mohawk attack.

More contact and travel, but

also more warfare, were the results.12
When

Samuel

de

Champlain,

the

French

explorer

and

venturer, decided to settle permanently on the St. Lawrence in
1608,

he

colony's

envisioned
economy.

furs
He

as

the prime

therefore

commodity

cultivated

his

in the
existing

relationship with the Montagnais and Algonquins in order to
tap their hinterlands for furs, knowing that the Iroquois
11Bruce G. Trigger, "Settlement as an Aspect of Iroquoian
Adaptation at the Time of Contact," American Anthropologist
LXV (1963), pp. 90-97.
12Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History
of the Huron People to 1660 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1976), passim; Trigger, "Early Iroquoian
Contacts with Europeans" in Handbook of North American Indians
15:347; Fenton, "The Iroquois in History," in Leacock and
Lurie, eds., North American Indians in Historical Perspective,
pp. 140-142.
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would bring neither the number nor the quality of peltries
which their adversaries to the north could provide.
inadvertently

plugged

himself

into the

Champlain

rivalries already

established between these groups and became a natural enemy of
the

Iroquois

when

the Montagnais, Algonquins,

and

their

recently allied neighbors, the Hurons, suggested an expedition
against the foe to the south.
making the St. Lawrence

Champlain had an interest in

safe as a highway for trade.

Since

among the Five Nations the Mohawks were the main -foes of these
easterly people, the war party was to attack just the Mohawks,
and in the summer of 1609 a group of Mohawks met musket fire
for the first time, on recently renamed Lake Champlain.
were

easily

and

psychological
The

noise

quickly

routed, more

They

because of

the

effect of the firepower than its actual damage.

and

smoke

from

the

muskets

were

disorienting and the standard wooden armor was

no

doubt

instantly

outdated.13
If Champlain had travelled a few miles farther south to
the confluence of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers, he would have
met fellow Europeans Hendrick Hudson and his crew sailing for
the Dutch.

Hudson and his mate Robert Juet were having their

own cross-cultural experiences with the Mahicans, neighbors of
the Mohawks to the east.

The latter did not meet any Dutch

newcomers face-to-face until the following Dutch visit in
13H.P. Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain. 6
vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-1936) , Vol. 2, pp. 82101 .
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1614, but also did not succeed in becoming preferred trading
partners with these entrepreneurs of the Hudson River area.
The Mahicans became the primary trading partners of the men at
the Castle Island outpost (at a site now in modern Albany, New
York).

The longhouse people, particularly the Mohawks, were

obstructed from trading with both European powers recently
established on nearby soil.
The

Iroquois

response

was

to

continue

raiding

and

blockading, so they turned the Ottawa River into a war zone by
attacking Hurons or any other Indians who came down that river
with peltries headed for the St. Lawrence. By 1615, Champlain
and his allies again decided to humiliate the Iroquois and
travelled south of the St. Lawrence along the eastern shore of
Lake Ontario,

attacking a large Onondaga,

Oneida, village.

or possibly an

This was not as successful as the earlier

ambushes of the Mohawks; the Iroquois had prepared and were
able to withstand the assault.

The psychological advantage

which firearms had given Champlain and his allies a few years
earlier had evaporated.

These Indians were ready and forced

the invaders to withdraw after only three hours of fighting.
The advantage of guns was not so great after all.

Champlain

himself was wounded twice in one leg and had to be carried
back to friendly territory.14

This victory for the Five

Nations was a much needed boost after the unfortunate events
14Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain 3:63-77;
Bruce G. Trigger, "Champlain Judged by his Indian Policy,"
Anthropoloaica XIII (1971), pp. 85-114.
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of 1614.

In that: year, the Dutch returned to the Hudson River

and established formal trade relations with the Mahicans.
This Mahican monopoly was a great disadvantage to the Mohawks,
who set about a policy of near-incessant hostilities against
their eastern neighbors until in 1628 they finally drove them
out of the Hudson River Valley into the Connecticut Valley.15
Understandably, the Dutch were not happy with this outcome
because they had supported the Mahicans against the Mohawks;
they had to tread lightly around the latter for years to
come.16
In 1624, the Five Nations enjoyed a short truce with the
French and concentrated on developing trading ties with the
Dutch.

The latter offered goods which the French did not

have, such as wampum, manufactured on Long Island and along
Delaware

Bay.

Copper kettles,

iron hatchets,

hoes,

and

duffels (which were becoming standard sources of attire in
Iroquoia) were important trade items at the Dutch post.
year

the

trading

post

became

an

outpost

of

That

permanent

settlement as well when the first shipload of settlers sent by

15J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Narratives of New Netherland.
1609-1664 (New York: 1909), p. 89; Allen w. Trelease, Indian
Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca,
N.Y.; Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 32, 47; Bruce G.
Trigger, "The Mohawk-Mahican War (1624-28): The Establishment
of a Pattern," Canadian Historical Review 52 (1971), pp. 276286.
16Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna, trans. and
eds., A Journey into Mohawk and Oneida Country: The Journal of
Harmen Mevndertsz Van den Bogaert (Syracuse, N.Y.; Syracuse
University Press, 1988), pp. xvii-xviii.
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the West India Company arrived at Castle Island and renamed it
Fort Orange,

six years later, these strange newcomers began

farming, although not with methods familiar to the Iroquois,
on the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck.

This was a manor on

which the owner, Nicholas van Rensselaer,
farmers.

installed tenant

The people of this patroonship soon became involved

in the Indian trade and much friction was to develop because
of unfair trading practices and brutality to the Indians who
did business with these people.

Two particularly potent trade

items which became important in the next few decades were guns
and

liquor.

Technically

these

commodities,

especially

firearms, were not to be sold at all to Indians, but abuses
and illegalities were rampant.17
At least officially, however, Dutch-Iroquois relations
were friendlier because the Iroquois were able to trade with
the Dutch unobstructed by other native groups.

Nevertheless,

Europeans saw the Iroquois as hostile because the policy of
the Longhouse seemed to be one of sustained hostility toward
all neighboring tribes from at least the 1610s on.
Lafitau's

observation

made

just

after

the

turn

Father
of

the

eighteenth century could just as well have been made by a
European observer a century earlier:
exercise for the Iroquois,
which

people

have

in

"War is a necessary

for, besides the usual motives

declaring

17Trelease, Indian Affairs
Seventeenth Century, pp. 93-97.

it

against

troublesome

in Colonial New York:
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neighbours..., it is indispensible to them also because of one
of their fundamental laws of being."18 In the mid-eighteenth
century Cadwallader Colden also remarked that "it is not for
the Sake of Tribute...that they [the Iroquois] make War, but
from the Notions of Glory, which they have ever most strongly
imprinted on their Minds."19

Numerous Jesuits echoed these

impressions in the Jesuit Relations throughout the seventeenth
century;

whether true or not, European newcomers perceived

the Iroquois as the fiercest tribe on the continent.
In the 1630s the Five Nations abandoned their brief peace
with

the

French

and

their

native

allies

assaulted all comers to the St. Lawrence.20

and

once

more

Trade patterns

caused anxiety within the Iroquois confederacy as well; the
Oneidas were angry at the Mohawks for monopolizing the Dutch
connection.

They wanted equal access to Fort Orange, despite

the fact that the Mohawks were geographically in a position to
dictate the upper tribes' access to the Dutch trading post.
This was the underlying problem found by a Dutch barbersurgeon in 1634 who was sent into Iroquois territory by his
colony to learn more about these tribes.

Harmen Meyndertsz

van den Bogaert found that the Oneidas

(and probably the

Onondagas as well, although he never visited them) had been
18Lafitau, Customs... 2:98-99.
19Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian
Nations of Canada... 2 vols. (New York: Allerton, 1922,
reprinted from the London 1747 ed.), Vol. 1, p. xix.
20Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain 6:3-6.
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trading with the French before 1634 and had developed a
habitual place

of meeting with them downriver

Ontario, in Onondaga country.21

from Lake

The Mohawks could not have

looked kindly on this arrangement but could do nothing to stop
it, short of declaring war on fellow kinsmen of the League.22
Despite

the

lack

of

documentation,

this

was

probably a

situation in which the League was a major force in keeping the
longhouse alliance intact under great pressure.

The Dutch did

not encourage the upper Iroquois trade with the French, but it
was ironically advantageous to the French that the Mohawks had
eliminated their Mahican competition for the Dutch trade and
were now controlling access to Fort Orange, even though the
French were enemies of the Mohawks.

It meant that the Mohawks

would not allow any northern tribes such as the Algonquins,
Montagnais,

Hurons,

or Ottawas

(recent

additions

to the

French-Indian alliance) to do business with the Netherlanders.
The French trade had already reached a profitable level, with
10,000 to 12,000 pelts changing hands each year.23
In addition to his observations on trade, Van den Bogaert
noticed the effects of devastating epidemics on the longhouse
people.

The early 1630s had brought much death, probably

21Gehring and Starna, eds., A Journey into Mohawk and
Oneida Country, pp. 13, 19.
22Trelease, Indian Affairs
Seventeenth Century, p. 54.

in Colonial New York;

The

^Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans," in
Handbook of North American Indians 15:349-351.
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through smallpox, to the eastern Iroquois, as well as to the
Hurons.24

By the early 1640s, the population of the Five

Nations was halved by the diseases Europeans had unwittingly
imported.25

This nightmare brought on a sense of spiritual

crisis within all the tribes affected.

For the Huron people

the crisis was exacerbated or highlighted by the advent of
Jesuit missionaries, who first entered Huronia in 1625 and
opened

permanent

missions

among

them

in

1634.

The

religious/cultural crisis which the death of so many people
caused was aggravated by the simultaneous intrusion of the
religious revolutionaries from France.26
No Jesuits visited the longhouse people this early, but
the Ho-de-no-sau-nee went through their own traumas in dealing
with the large loss of population,
political rifts over trade policy.
"mourning war"

in addition to their

Epidemics had brought the

(war in which the deaths of kinsmen were

avenged by replacing them with adopted captives) new meaning.
The period of severe epidemics coincided with the era of
massive

Iroquois war against both traditional

and recent

24Gehring and Starna, eds., A Journey into Mohawk and
Oneida Country, pp. 4, 32; William A. Starna, "The Oneida
Homeland in the Seventeenth Century," in Jack Campisi and
Lawrence M. Hauptman, eds., The Oneida Indian Experience; Two
Perspectives (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,
1988), p. 16.
^William A. Starna, "Mohawk Iroquois Populations: A
Revision," Ethnohistorv XXVII (1980), pp. 371-382; Richter,
"The Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 73.
26See Trigger, The Children of Aatentsic. Ch. 8.
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enemies.
the

The sporadic attacks on Indians laden with furs for

French market

warfare

in which

gave way
the

Five

to

comparatively

Nations

large-scale

proceeded

to

try

to

annihilate, not just cripple, their enemies: the French, the
Algonquins

and

Montagnais,

the

Hurons,

Petuns

(Tobacco

People), Neutrals, Eries, Ottawas, Susquehannas, and others.
For the

first

time

in

1642,

the

Iroquois

set

about

to

completely destroy an entire village rather than just surprise
it, take a few prisoners and some booty, and perhaps claim a
few casualties on the way.

Jesuit observers were shocked at

the extent of hostilities:

" a band of...Iroquois having

surprised one of our [Huron] frontier villages, spared neither
sex, not even the children, and destroyed all by fire, except
a score of persons.”27
This series of serious wars waged by the Iroquois have
traditionally been called the "Beaver Wars" by historians and
anthropologists because they believed the hostilities were
economical

motivated.28

Recently,

however,

it

has

been

suggested that the wars were not motivated by the need for
hunting territory for peltry procurement, nor by the desire to

27Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 86-87;Reuben
Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents
73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901) (hereafter cited as
JR) 24:271-273, 26:175 (quotation), 181.
28See George T. Hunt, The Wars of the Iroouois (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1940) ; Charles Howard Mcllwain,
"Introduction," in Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian
Affairs in the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. ed. Charles
Howard Mcllwain (New York: Blom, 1968, reprint).
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take over the role of middleman between the French and remote
Indian groups in the trade.

Rather, they were the result of

the loss of population from the epidemics and from the past
few decades of warfare in which casualty rates had escalated.
The Iroquois people needed to bolster their numbers, so they
waged war,

it is argued,

in order to take captives

for

adoption into families by the matriarchs of each ohwachira.
This

vast

increase

in

adoption,

according

to

the

new

interpretation, caused additional social and political change.
The position of women in politics and village events expanded
in the first half of the seventeenth century because of their
role in deciding whether to adopt captives, which had become
an important occupation in Iroquois society.29

The Mohawks declared a truce with the French in 1645 amid
the escalation of war with Indian groups.

In the following

year Jesuit Isaac Jogues ventured into Mohawk territory to
confirm the armistice and to survey the possibilities of
founding a mission among these belligerents.

Unfortunately,

he got himself involved in a Mohawk-Onondaga feud and, by
insisting on visiting the more friendly Onondagas on his way

29JR 45:207; Richter, "Ordeals of the Longhouse," in
Beyond the Covenant Chain, pp. 19-21; Snyderman, "Behind the
Tree of Peace," pp. 17-19, 80; Colden, History of the Five
Indian Nations 2:xix-xxi.
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back from his Mohawk trip, he incurred the wrath of the latter
group and they killed him.30
The Mohawks then returned to a war footing with the
French

and

joined

other

longhouse

brethren,

Senecas, in destroying whole nations of neighbors.

mainly

the

The first

nation to suffer this fate was the Huron, and the Senecas and
Mohawks accomplished the annihilation in 1649-1650 largely out
of defiance of the Onondaga attempts (motivated by hatred of
the Mohawks) to establish an alliance with the Hurons in 1647
and 1648.31

The destruction of Huronia probably involved

more captive-taking (which provided numerous adoptees) than
outright killing.

The Huron nation was almost destroyed; the

few refugees who had escaped with their missionaries took
asylum at first on an island in Georgian Bay and later in a
small settlement near Quebec City called Lorette.

Other

Hurons survived in large numbers to be adopted into Iroquois
families so that they lost their

identity as a separate

people, but often constituted a sizeable faction (often pro-

30Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga Iroouois. pp.
182-183.
The Onondagas were much more pro-French at this
point than their eastern neighbors, and were leaning toward
actual alliance with both the French and their Huron allies in
the 1640s.
31Bradley, The Evolution of the Onondaga Iroquois, p. 184?
Trigger, The Children of Aatentsic. Volume 2.
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French and pro-Christian/Jesuit) in a number of Five Nations
villages.32
The demolition of Huronia was followed in 1651 by the
same fate for the Neutral Indians who lived southwest of Huron
territory.

The

Petuns,

or

Tobacco

People,

also

were

eliminated and the survivors absorbed into Ho-de-no-sau-nee
families as individuals.

In 1655 came the end of the Erie

people as a distinct group, two years after a large-scale
attack on the Iroquois by the Ottawas, Nipissings, Sauteurs,
and remnants of the Huron people.

These Indian groups were

fighting back against the massive hostility of the longhouse
people.

In 1653 the Onondagas had concluded a genuine peace

with the French authorities, after which this tribe warned the
French of a Mohawk attack —

an indication of seriously

strained relations between these two brother tribes as well as
the sincerity of the peace agreement.
came to Onondaga territory

Jesuit missionaries

(what is now central New York

State) following the rapprochement and established a mission
complete with craftsmen near present-day Syracuse, New York in
1656.

Two years later, however, this along with fledgling

establishments among the Oneidas had to be abandoned by the
Black

Robes

because

of

overwhelming

hostility

from

the

32JR 44:151; Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois:
Jesuit Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 16421686," Ethnohistorv XXXII (1985), pp. 1-16.
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Mohawks.

Mohawk-Onondaga tensions

ran high

in the

late

hostilities

with

1650s.33
Conflicts

between

member

nations,

virtually all surrounding peoples,

and on-going epidemics

throughout the 1650s exhausted the Five Nations by 1660.

Only

two years later they were to suffer from an unprecendented
smallpox epidemic, which wiped out a thousand people in one
year alone.34

Fortunately, they were able to withstand this

decimation of their population

(which was about 10,000 to

11,000 in 1660)35 largely because of their policy of adopting
conquered peoples.

In 1668, fully two-thirds of the Oneida

population were Algonquins and Hurons who had been captured in
war.36

Other nations with which the Iroquois or various

tribes of Iroquois had been in conflict since the 1650s were
their

eastern

neighbors

the

Abenakis,

the

Sokokis,

the

Maliseets, and the Mahicans (again). These were mostly Mohawk
conflicts.

The Senecas had been busy with tribes to the west

of Iroquoia, in the upper Great Lakes region and the Ohio

33JR 40:165, 44:149-151.
34Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans,"
Handbook of North American Indians 5:352; Starna in Campisi
and Hauptman, eds., The Oneida Indian Experience, p. 16.
35Based on Jerome Lalement's estimate in 1660 of an
Iroquois warrior population of 2,200. (CTR 45:207.)
Fenton
suggests a multiplication of five times from a warrior
population to find the total population of Iroquois people.
(In "Problems Arising..." in Tooker, ed., An Iroouois Source
Book Vol 1, p. 233.)
36JR 51:123, also 43:265, 45:207, 51:187.
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Valley.

The Susquehannas to the south had been a favorite

target of all five longhouse tribes, although by 1655 this
southern

nation

had

made

peace

with

the

Mohawks

and

concentrated its efforts on the four upper tribes.
One of the reasons the Iroquois were able to carry on all
of this military activity in addition to the conquest of other
groups was their initial comparative advantage in weaponry;
throughout the 1640s and 1650s they were more heavily armed
than other Indian groups.

But by the 1660s, other tribes were

obtaining guns in greater numbers from the Dutch, French, or
English,

and the Iroquois technical advantage evaporated.

Proof of the chink in Iroquois armor was the flight of Cayuga
communities

north

of

Lake

Ontario

in

1663,

fleeing

the

depredations of the Susquehannas who were now armed with
muskets.

Also in that year the upper nations of the Ho-de-no-

sau-nee wisely made a formal peace with New France, steered by
Garakontie, the Onondaga diplomat.

This policy was prudent

because the French colony that year was taken over by the
royal government (it had formerly been under the management of
a company) and was now managed with an eye to its long-term
welfare.

The French government's main goal was to make the

settlement along the St. Lawrence safe from Iroquois attack,
and a crack regiment of government troops soon arrived to
attempt to solve the Iroquois problem and to make the colony
permanently stable.

Government control of the colony meant

much greater intervention,

and the Five Nations could no
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longer afford to attack at will.

Still defiant of the new

regime in New France, however, were the Mohawks, who refused
to make peace with the French in 1663-1664.
At the same time, a change of administration occurred in
New Netherland along the Hudson River.

The fledgling colony

was taken over with the arrival of English ships in the harbor
off Manhattan Island, and Dutch officials returned to their
motherland, replaced by English administrators.

But most of

the Dutch settlers remained in the colony and watched it
become a strategic part of the English empire in North America
over the next few decades.

Within two years, changes in the

type of government of New Netherland (now New York) and New
France signalled the shift from a primarily economic emphasis
in

colonial

development

and

Indian

diplomacy

to

a

predominantly imperial frame of mind.37
Although the four upper nations sent representatives to
Quebec to conclude peace talks

in 1665 and even to talk

optimistically of the possibility of inviting Frenchmen to
live among them,
French.

the Mohawks remained unimpressed by the

Instead they continued raiding French outposts and

Algonquin bands and waited until Daniel de Remy de Courcelles
arrived with six hundred French troops at Schenectady to react
to French power.

The Dutch community offered supplies to the

French when they learned that the invaders had come to attack
37See Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany. 1630-1710; The
Dutch and English Experiences (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1990).
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the Mohawks.

Military confrontations between the French and

the Mohawks continued through the first half of 1666, with no
sign of Mohawk capitulation in sight (although some chiefs
favored surrender).

In September the sieur de Tracy arrived

with reinforcements from the Carignan-Salieres regiment of
almost one thousand troops to aid Courcelles' effort.

Having

heard of their approach, the Mohawks fled their villages and
the French army satisfied itself with burning all the Mohawk
villages and fields and destroying stockpiles of food.38
The June 1667 negotiations between the eastern Iroquois
tribe and the French went smoothly.
Mohawks

agreed

to

all

of

Having been humbled, the

Tracy's

terms,

which

involved

returning hostages and preparing to accept Jesuit missionaries
among their people as soon as possible.
peaceful

Iroquois-French . relations

Two decades of

followed

the

1667

capitulation, but it was not a pax Irocruoia. The Five Nations
now had to accept the shift in power relations which existed
in the 1660s and after; the upper nations had merely acceded
to it earlier, taking the path of least pain.
to involve more direct contact —

The new era was

both friendly and hostile —

between the Iroquois and Europeans.

Other tribal groups were

no longer their main concern in external relations.

The

period after 1667 was to be that of the French peace and of
growing English power adjacent to the longhouse people.
immediately important,

Most

the path was now open for serious

38Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 122-125.
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Jesuit proselytizing of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee and for Iroquois
Christian migration to the south shore of the St. Lawrence
River.

The Jesuits had many zealous converts in the Oneida
village in 1667, and Gandeaktena was one of these.

Flushed

with the spirit of the new religion brought by the Jesuit
"Black Robes," she and a few others at Oneida decided to seize
the opportunity to see the settlements from whence the Jesuits
had come.

Gandeaktena was ready to leave Iroquoia.

She had

not been b o m among the Oneidas anyway, as had several of her
companions on the winter 1667 trip.

When the Iroquois had

destroyed Gentagega, the main village of the Erie nation, in
1655, they had spared many of their captives' lives, including
hers.

Adopted into the Oneida nation involuntarily, she now

chose to be adopted by the Catholic Church and perhaps by the
French colony.
Tensions between Christians and traditionalists at Oneida
were

rising

and

Father

Jacques

Bruyas

agreed

that

the

neophytes would be better able to pursue their prayers and
devotions away from such hostility and temptation.

Family

members, clan members, had been growing apart from each other,
at

first

calmly,

as

a

whisper,

but

then

much

more

vociferously, until insults escalated to stone-throwing.

It

looked as if the clans would disintegrate, with mothers and
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daughters, sisters and brothers, husbands and wives, wrenched
apart by these disagreements.39
Although it was late 1667 and time for the first snow,
the

small

group

of Oneidas

assistant, Charles Boquet.

set

out with

Father Bruyas'

If the travellers took the Lake

Champlain route rather than the Lake Ontario route to New
France, they would have passed by Mohawk villages on their way
east.

The Mohawks now had a population of about two thousand,

half of what it had been thirty years earlier.

They had

barely rebuilt their longhouses, inside still charred skeletal
palisades, since the fierce attack of the French the preceding
year.

The travellers then would have by-passed the confluence

of the Mohawk and Hudson rivers to avoid the Dutch-English
settlements

of

Schenectady,

Albany,

and their hinterland

outposts and finally turned north toward the lakes named
Saint-Sacrement and Champlain.40
Eventually, after many days of travel past the Adirondack
Mountains, the travellers reached the plain, with its scrubby,
squat trees.

Montreal then lay only a few days' journey to

the north and La Prairie was even closer.
stretch

of plain

lay directly

This aptly named

in the path

to Montreal,

situated along the bend in the St. Lawrence River which seemed
to curve in order to make room for the island of Mont Royal,
39See Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," Ch. 5.
40JR 51:147; Starna in Oneida Indian Experience, p. 20;
Fenton, "Problems Arising..." in Tooker, ed., An Irocruois
Source Book Vol. 1, p. 207.
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on which French men and women had settled in 1642.

it was to

be the western edge of French settlement for most of the
seventeenth century.
On the south side of the great river at La Prairie, there
had been as yet no white men or women willing to settle the
land,

for

the

French

fear

of

the

Mohawks

had

been

an

impediment to habitation until the military blow was struck
from which the Mohawks were still reeling.

But Father Bruyas

and many of the other Black Robes who had been in Montreal in
the summer of 1667 had known that Father Pierre Raffeix was
going to examine La Prairie and its surrounding lands, which
had been granted to the Jesuits decades earlier.
plan

had

been

to

provide

a

retirement

The Jesuits'

place

for

their

missionaries as well as a seigneury for French habitants
(censitaires). But Father Raffeix also extended an invitation
to Indian converts to stay on the south shore.

Concessions on

the seigneury were being parcelled out to the habitants. many
of whom, soon to arrive, were ex-soldiers in the CarignanSalieres regiment, fctmed for taming the Mohawks in 1666.41
In the winter of 1667-1668, the small group of Oneidas,
having arrived with Charles Boquet safely to the St. Lawrence,
wintered at La Prairie with Father Raffeix and a few French
families who would soon settle down on farms.

Just as Father

41JR 48:295, 50:215-217, 51:149, 167-169, 55:33-35;
Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la Nouvelle-France au
XVIIe siecle d'aores beaucoup de documents ineditsr — 1 3
vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1895), Vol. 2, pp. 418-419.
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Bruyas had done at Oneida,

Father Raffeix instructed the

natives in the mysteries of Christianity and the priest,
habitants, and Indians shared a hastily constructed shed
through the months of snow and cold.

These pioneers of the

plow and the cross waited together for spring and its promise
of warmer weather and the chance to start building their
respective communities.

This was the inauspicious beginning

of the Iroquois mission which would later develop a few miles
west at Kahnawake.42

42JR 63:151, 153. Some details of the 1667-1668 founding
of the mission at La Prairie are unclear, as various Jesuit
accounts (the only evidence available) contradict each other.
This account is composed from the most trustworthy sources —
those written most recently after the event — and using only
details which could be verified in at least two accounts.
Gandeaktena and some or all of her companions on the
pilgrimage may have picked up interested Mohawks along the
way, and may have gone to Quebec some time in the winter or
early spring to be baptized, returning to La Prairie later.
This could not be verified, however.
It is difficult to
separate myth from fact in the Jesuit accounts of the 1667
founding. See also Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse,"
pp. 179-180. Richter suggests that accounts of these events
written in 1679 and in 1686, twelve and nineteen years after
they took place, may have changed because of a tendency to
exaggerate the zeal and saintly character of Gandeaktena, whom
the Jesuits designated as the foundress of the mission
community.
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CHAPTER TWO
"OFF TO LA PRAIRIE:"
LIFE AT THE NEW COMMUNITY
"Among the iroquois, this saying became a proverb, 'I am
off to la prairie,' - that is to say,
polygamy.'"1

So

Father

Claude

'I give up drink and

Chauchetiere,

the

Jesuit

superior, explained the massive exodus of Five Nations people
from their homeland to the Christian community in New France.
But what had become a flood by the time Chauchetiere commented
on it in 1686 started nineteen years earlier as a small
trickle with Gandeaktena and her group of a dozen or so, and
did not increase significantly until the

1670s.

Only a

handful of converts appeared each year after the initial group
had arrived at Father Pierre Raffeix's threshold, but they
were zealous.

The Jesuits who planned the new settlement as

a vacation spot and retirement home for missionaries began to
see

that

there

development.

might

be

another

use

for

this

outpost

The French in general would come to like the

idea of an Indian village at this place, nearer than any other
French soil in North America to their potential and real
enemies.2

The

Indian community could

serve as a buffer

protecting the Montreal region from neighboring belligerents,
1Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901),
63:167. (Hereafter cited as JR.)
2Pierre F.-X.
de Charlevoix,
History and General
Description of New France
6 vols., John G. Shea, ed. and
trans. (New York: Harper, 1866-1872), Vol. 3, p. 164. Later
on, the French court thought this Indian reserve advantageous
for imperial reasons. (Vol. 3, p. 193.)
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either Indian or white.
As early as 1668,

Father Raffeix was given official

charge of the fledgling group of Indians at La Prairie, and he
reported that pilgrims who came in these early years were
baptized as soon as possible.3

Children and adults on their

deathbed were also baptized.4 These first few years were not
only a sort of utopian religious experience for the neophytes,
but

also

an

experiment

in

cross-cultural

living.

Since

Indians and French combined numbered fewer than a hundred and
accommodations were scant, close quarters were inescapable and
cooperation necessary.5

With only one building in 1667-68,

everyone stayed under one roof.
Pierre

Tonsahoten,

It was not until 1669 that

Gandeaktena's

husband

(who

took

the

baptismal name Frangois-Xavier) built a house, and began the
separation of the two communities.

The following year, a

makeshift chapel was built to serve the entire community, and
the placing of individual dwelling buildings was determined by
the central location of this chapel: Indians built longhouses
on one side, and French built European-style houses on the

3There was
no mention of extensive catechetical
preparation in these accounts; emphasis was placed on the
haste with which these inductions into the religion were made.
4JR 63:155, 51:145. By 1675, however, criteria for
baptism were much more stringent.
Two to three years of
catechism were necessary before baptism, according to Father
Fremin, who was at La Prairie in the mid-1670s. JR 59:259.
5JR 55:33.
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other.6

In 1672 the little church was divided into two

sections,

one

for

the

French

and

one

for

the

Indians.

Chauchetiere, who reported this change, did not explain why it
was done.

He only disclaimed any problem between the two

groups by saying that the church was separated "although the
french and savages all acted as one body, as was seen in the
public rejoicings, and in the visits and the little services
that they rendered one another."7

It is unclear whether the

practice of separating worship facilities for French and for
Indians was a Jesuit policy, or the result of pressure tactics
by the French or the Indians at La Prairie.

And linguistic

considerations may have been involved in the decision.

The

Jesuits had long believed in segregating their Indian converts
from French settlers in New France, but this has always been
seen as an attempt to shelter Indians

from the negative

influences of Europeans, especially from their eau-de-vie. It
may have been the reason for an early separation in the chapel
of Indians and whites.8
^enri
Bechard,
The
Original
Caughnawaga
(Montreal: International Publishers, 1976), p. 81.

Indians

7Later in the same Relation. Chauchetiere revealed
evidence of a segregationist policy: the Indians "formerly
held mass, or rather were merely present at mass and at
vespers, which were sung by the french; but now they do
everything themselves in their chapel." JR 63:209. (1679) See
also E. J. Devine, Historic Caughnawaga (Montreal: Messenger
Press, 1922), p. 43.
8Already in 1672, some
attempting to profit from
among Indians for brandy.
establishment of taverns

French settlers at
a ready-made and
The Jesuits there
so close to the

La Prairie were
growing market
frowned on the
Indian utopian
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In

addition

to

the

complications

of

interracial

relations, the native community itself was a mosaic of ethnic
origins.

Oneidas and some Mohawks from the lower Mohawk town

were the first arrivals, but even they were more ethnically
diverse than they appeared.

Many were captives who had been

adopted into Iroquois families after wars of conquest over the
Hurons,

Eries,

Neutrals,

Petuns,

Susquehannas,

Ottawas,

Montagnais, Algonquins, Nipissings, Mahicans, Abenakis, and
other peoples.

Thus the Jesuits noticed right away that the

mission contained a mixture of over twenty tribal groups.9
Some Iroquois people came to La Prairie not from their native
land at the instigation of Jesuit missionaries there, but from
the Ottawa River where some Iroquois had moved to hunt.

In

1669 many of these Ottawa River hunters heard of the new
community and came to find out what it was like.

They stayed

and converted to Christianity and in turn went out on hunting
trips with the added motive of meeting non-Christian hunters

community.
JR 63:175.
The French habitant population was
growing each year; by 1668, forty concessions had been
parcelled out on the Jesuit tract of land at La Prairie. JR
51:149. On Jesuit segregationist policy, see James L. Axtell,
The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures on Colonial North
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) Ch. 4, and
John Webster Grant, Moon of Wintertime: Missionaries and the
Indians of Canada in Encounter Since 1534 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1984), Ch. 2-3.
9JR 58:75, 57:73, 55:35, Joseph Frangois Lafitau, Customs
of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive
Times ed. and trans. William N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, 2
vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974-77), l:xxxi.
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and

convincing

them

to

come

to

the

mission

south

of

Montreal.10
The early years at La Prairie were known for the extreme
devotion practiced by native zealots.

Hunting trips were not

a chance to escape from the liturgical and devotional rigor of
the chapel; prayers were said on the trail, and daily mass was
still celebrated whenever possible.

The women were known for

their piety, for saying prayers and devotional exercises in
the woods.11

Some women formed the nucleus of a society for

the particularly devout led by Father Philippe Pierson.

The

purpose of this society was spiritual guidance of others, the
promotion of piety among each other, and works of charity done
in the community.
a

large

decades.12

The Confraternity of the Holy Family became

organization,

whose

membership

over

the

The mission Iroquois sent at least one of its

daughters to Montreal to become a nun.13
were

grew

patiently

memorized

by

the

Prayers and psalms

neophytes

-

Jesuit

10JR 63:159, 58:249; F. de Montezon and F. Martin, eds.,
Relations inedites de la Nouvelle-France 2 vols. (Paris, 1861)
1:185.
11Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change
and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier,
1609-1720"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984),
pp. 171-172, 190.
12Confrerie de la Sainte Famille du Sault St. Louis, in
Caughnawaga parish registers, Vol. 2. (Archives de Quebec a
Montreal).
Membership lists of this group attest to the
mixing of cultural identity; names such as Marguerite
Tiia8eton (first name Christian, last name Iroquois) are the
norm.
13JR 62:179.
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catechetical techniques did not include teaching Indians to
read

and write.

Pictures

and mnemonic

devices

such

as

rosaries were ideal tools for teaching by rote, and music was
also important.
hothouse.1,14

The atmosphere was that of a "religious

In the village,

each day was defined by the

observance of religious exercises; prayers were said in the
chapel at morning and at night, as well as in each longhouse
by individual families, and mass was said daily in the chapel.
Several catechism classes for adults were held every day, as
well as religious instruction for children.

Even a Jesuit

priest judged the rigors of everyday religious life at La
Prairie to have been excessive.15
In 1670, after only three years, there were eighteen to
twenty Indian families at La Prairie, and Father Claude Dablon
realized that the mission was a great success even without
much effort by the Jesuits.

He spoke of the "throng" of

Indians at La Prairie and the great demand for priests who
14JR 55:35, 63:175, 231, 58:77-83; William Ingraham Kip,
trans. and comp, The Early Jesuit Missions in North America
(New York: 1847), p. 107; Axtell, Invasion Within, pp. 120,
124-127; Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada:
Correspondance Generale,
1540-1784,
122 vols.),
5:49v
(hereafter cited as C11A);
Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix,
Journal of a Vovaae to North-America 2 vols. (Reprinted from
the London 1761 edition: Ann Arbor: University Microfilms,
1966), 1:269-272; Grant, Moon of Wintertime, p. 59 (quote);
John G. Shea, History of the Catholic Missions Among the
Indian Tribes of the United States. 1529-1854 (New York: P.J.
Kennedy, 1854), p. 300.
1SJR 55:35;
Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la
Nouvelle-France au XVIIe siecle d'apres beaucoup de documents
inedits r
1. 3 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1895), Vol.
3, p. 379.
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could speak Iroquois languages and say mass for the neophytes.
But he also recognized that some may have been "attracted by
the beauty and advantages of the site [as well as] by the
facilities for receiving the instruction necessary for their
salvation."16

Another Black Robe admitted in 1674 that La

Prairie was strategically located, "a real crossroads - hardly
a band of Indians stops at it without some of them being
induced to stay."

Within fifteen months in 1673 and 1674, the

mission welcomed more than 180 newcomers.17
them

could

community.

have

come

expressly

Father Fremin,

to

live

now residing

But not all of
in

a

Christian

at the mission,

explained in 1672 that "upon the arrival of a stranger, the
first thing our Indians do is to instruct him, and urge him to
ask for Baptism."

If an Indian had come with conversion in

mind, she or he would not need to be convinced of the need for
baptism.

Fremin also said that "all Indians who come here,

either to dwell or to visit their friends, resolve to become
Christians, or pretend to be such, well knowing that otherwise
they would not be welcome."18
The

La

Prairie

Jesuits

had

some

help

from

their

colleagues in the Mohawk Valley and in other missions across
Iroquoia. Father Jean De Lamberville wrote from La Prairie in
1673 of "the coming of nearly Fifty persons, who started from
16JR 55:35.
17JR 58:249.
16JR 56:21.
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a single Iroquois village on The faith of a promise given Them
by

Father

Bruyas,

on

behalf

of monsieur

de

Courcel

and

Monsieur Talon,19 that They would be in want of nothing when
they should have reached here,11 and marvelled that "The mere
promise to take care of them here upon Their arrival has had
such

an

effect

upon

Them."

Lamberville

attributed the

swelling ranks of Indians at La Prairie in 1673 to "The
prayers of good people, And the slight assistance which we
lead Them to hope for."20

This "slight assistance" may have

been as powerful a motivator as the lure of the gospel.

The

Jesuits at La Prairie provided food and clothing on arrival at
the Mission of Saint-Frangois-Xavier-des-Pres (the official
name of the mission) and also provided land and housing for
newcomers so that within a year or two they were able to
provide

for themselves.

La

Prairie

was

also

closer to

bountiful hunting and trapping areas than most localities in
Iroquoia had been.

Clearly, religion was only one motivation

for moving.21

19The governor and intendant of New France respectively.
20JR 57:71.
21See also the comments of Father Lamberville in JR 57:71.
Later Jesuit clerics writing about Jesuit missions admitted
that there were always ulterior motives for converting to
Christianity.
(See Father Nicolas Lancilloto's comments in
Manfred Barthel, The Jesuits: History and Legend of the
Society of Jesus. trans. and adapted by Mark Howson (New
York: William Morrow, 1984), p. 178;
John G. Shea, "The
Jesuits, Recollects, and the Indians," in Justin Winsor, ed.,
Narrative and Critical History of America 8 vols. (Boston,
1884-1889), Vol. 4, p. 285.)
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Another was freedom from the drunkenness which plagued
the Five Nations.

Frangois Dollier de Casson and Rene de

Brehant de Galinee noticed in 1669 that whenever a cask of
liquor arrived at an Iroquois village from some Dutch source,
domestic disasters such as murder followed.22 Indeed, by the
1670s, alcohol abuse was the premier social problem of the
longhouse people.23

Since it was well known to the Five

Nations people that the Jesuits frowned severely on the use of
alcohol

by

Indians,

they

could be

community of the devout would be dry.
to

viewing

the

mission

as

a

fairly

sure

that

the

Indeed, some testified

detoxification

center.

A

contemporary commented that this was "so well known that when
any one says, "I have made up my mind to go and settle at
Saint Xavier des Praiz," it is as if he said, "I have resolved
never to get drunk again."24

Kryn, or "The Great Mohawk" as

the English knew him, was a chief who was converted by his
wife and brought forty people with him to La Prairie in 1673.
He later told some New York provincial officials that one of
the reasons many Iroquois left their homeland for the New

22James H. Coyne, ed. and trans., "Exploration of the
Great Lakes, 1660-1670, by Dollier de Casson and Brehant de
Galinee," Ontario Historical Society Papers and Records IV
(1903), p. 29.
^Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian
Nationsr...1 2 vols. (Reprinted from the London 1747 edition,
New York: Allerton, 1922), Vol. 1, p. xl.
24JR 55:37.
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France

reserve

was

the

policy

of

temperance

practiced

there.25
This
Jesuits.

policy
When,

was

self-enforced,

not

imposed

by

the

in 1671, there were enough Indians at the

Jesuit outpost of La Prairie that it was decided to make the
settlement

permanent,

the

Indians

set

about

governing

themselves, using a mechanism of appointing chiefs based on
the political tradition of their homeland.

Of the two chiefs

elected in 1671, one was delegated to deliberate over matters
of war and community sovereignty, and the other was to watch
over Christian practice and behavior.

This included some

general social guidelines such as abstinence from alcohol, the
prohibition of divorce and of traditional religious practices
such as dream observance and healing rituals.

The community

decided that no one would be permitted to live there without
promising to abstain from all of these, as well as without
promising

to

seek the

Catholic Church.26

Christian god

and baptism

in the

To anyone who had been terrified by the

social consequences of alcohol in Iroquoia, La Prairie offered
25Edmund B. O ’Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany:
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887) (hereafter cited as NYCD), Vol.
3, p.
436. Sept.
1 1687. New York: Examination of
Adandidaghkoa. Kryn contributed to the flood of migrants from
Iroquoia to the south shore of the St. Lawrence. In less than
two years (1672-73) two hundred souls were added to the
population of the reserve. In 1673, in less than seven years
since the mission had first begun, there were more Mohawk
warriors at La Prairie than in their own country. (JR 63:179.)
26JR 55:37, 63:163, 60:145-147, 58:75; Shea, History of
the Catholic Missions, p. 300.
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a safe haven from the drunken rages which resulted in flashing
knives or smashed heads.27

Father Vincent Bigot admitted

that many Iroquois came to the St.-Frangois-Xavier-des-Pres
mission because there was no drinking there.

However, such an

admission was probably unselfconscious because seventeenthcentury Jesuits

saw an Indian's decision to abstain from

liquor as a sign of Christian conversion.

The two issues were

inextricably related in the missionary mind.28
Indeed,

Jesuits used the degree of temperance at an

Indian reserve as a yardstick of piety.

One lamented in 1673

that

community

alcohol

had

ruined the

Sillery

(no doubt

because of the close proximity to whites who sold liquor to
Indians)

but not the La Prairie Iroquois.29

Father Fremin

boasted in the preceeding year that "since I have been here,
there has not come into their cabins, so far as I know, a
single drop of the liquor which causes so many disturbances
among the Indians."

He was also proud of their will power in

the face of temptation: "For more than three weeks the people
here have had a dramshop at their very doors, but not a man

27JR 56:21, 57:73; NYCD 3:436. The mission community may
generally have been much more stable socially than Five
Nations villages in the homeland, in which traditional social
norms seemed to be breaking down.
(Richter, "The Ordeal of
the Longhouse," p. 196.)
28JR 61:239-241. See also 63:131, 175, and Cornelius
Jaenen, Friend and Foe: Aspects of French-Amerindian Cultural
Contact in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 110-116.
29JR 58:83.
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has thought of setting foot inside it," a not inconsiderable
feat, given that, according to Fremin, fifty or sixty of these
teetotalers had once been hard drinkers.30

However, three

weeks was not a very long time to have gone dry to prove one's
long-term abstinence.

The habitants of La Prairie did not

help; it was they who set up dramshops under the Indians1
noses.

The chapel segregation may indeed have been initiated

in order to minimize contact between thirsty Indians and
peddlers of liquor.

La Prairie whites wanted a tavern by the

mid-1670s, by which time their numbers would have supported a
public

meeting

temporarily

in

place.

But

convincing

the

the

Jesuits

current

had

succeeded

governor,

Count

Frontenac, to pass an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor
at La Prairie.

But this only lasted two or three years.

Since Frontenac despised Jesuits on principle and conspired
against

them

with

the

Recollects

and

Sulpicians,

his

protection against the traffic of alcohol was short-lived.31
Shortly after repeal of the ordinance, a tavern was opened in
the village of La Prairie.

This situation may have been a

reason for the Jesuit decision to move their Iroquois mission

30JR 56:19-21.
310n Frontenac versus the Jesuits, see Jean DeLanglez,
Frontenac and the Jesuits (Chicago: 1939), pp. 20, 129-133;
Henry Horace Walsh, The Church in the French era from
Colonisation to the British Conquest (Toronto: Ryerson Press,
1966), pp. 144-165. Also, Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et la
Nouvelle-France au XVIIe siecle d'apres beaucoup de documents
inedits r.. .1 3:389-391; Charlevoix, History. 3:192-193.
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in 1676, although the ostensible cause was soil exhaustion.32
Father Chauchetiere gleefully reported that Father Fremin
stopped the brandy traffic at La Prairie from ruining his
charges at the mission, but less than a decade later liquor
had become a severe problem at the Saint-Frangois-Xavier
mission, even after moving the site to the west away from the
growing white population of the south shore.33

At the new

village, a Frenchman offered his services as a gun repairman
for the mission Indians.

In 1679 they gave him a corner of a

longhouse in which to set up his workspace and equipment.

He

also set up a store in this space, in which he planned to deal
in brandy as well as more benign commodities.
situation

in the midst

of the village,

Alarmed at this

the missionaries

succeeded in petitioning Intendant Jacques Duchesneau to order
the man to leave after only one winter.34
32JR 63: 175, 181; Charlevoix, Journal 1:219.
In
Montezon, Relations inedits... 2:167, Father Claude Dablon
reported that the soil was bad, that the Indians had been
complaining about it.
However, in 1670-71, he had seemed
unqualifiedly optimistic about the soil, saying it was
wonderful and highly productive. (JR 55:33.)
The claim was
that it was too damp, but that would have been obvious enough
by 1671.
In 1673, the La Prairie Indians had saved up two
years' worth of corn. (JR 58:81.) Therefore, poor crop yield
because of the soil could not have been a reason for moving
only three years later.
33JR 63:181, 62:183.
34JR 63:215.
Similar enterprises by local whites were
initiated in New York; farmers sold liquor, among other goods,
to Indians, because it was a lucrative venture compared to
most in the limited colonial economy.
These whites pursued
such trade without thought of the consequences in terms of
inebriated Indians wreaking havoc on neighboring communities.
(See Thomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York.
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Political problems plagued the Indians of La Prairie
during the 1676 move.

These involved the various blocs of

ethnic groups within the community.

The early immigrants were

mainly Oneidas. some Mohawks, and a few Onondagas, but with
the coming of Kryn, the high-profile Mohawk headman, in 1673,
many more Mohawks than any other group started migrating
north.

Another reason that so many Mohawks moved was that the

Christian/anti-Christian factionalism and violence was much
worse among the Mohawks in Iroquoia than among tribes farther
west.

Soon the Mohawks and the Onondagas were the two largest

ethnic

groups,

while

the Hurons,

captives among the Iroquois,

most

of whom

had

constituted a third.

been
These

Hurons were able to stand as a separate group, and they seemed
to find they had little in common with the Ho-de-no-sau-nee
politically.
When chiefs were first elected or appointed35 in 1671,
the Hurons elected one and the Mohawks and Oneidas the other.
By 1676, the Mohawks, Onondagas, and Hurons each chose their
own chief.

But during the deliberations in that year for

chief selection, the Hurons stalled, refused to decide on a
candidate, and finally announced that they were leaving the
Jesuit mission.

They were negotiating with the Sulpicians to

set up a new reserve at the foot of Mount Royal on Montreal

1686-1776 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), p.
69.)
35It is unclear exactly how these chiefs were chosen.
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Island.36

Clues as to the nature of the dispute

lie in

Father Pierre Cholenec's letter in the Relation of 1676-77 in
which he stated that bad feelings existed between the Huron
captain and the other captains, or chiefs, of the original
mission.

Cholenec hinted that the Huron chief had once been

preeminent but had lately failed to gain the respect and
deference of the other chiefs.37

There had been little love

lost between the Huron people and the Black Robes since the
latter failed to defend their native refugees in the 1650s at

36JR 63:181
This mission was known as the Mission of the
Mountain, and was moved to the other side of the town of
Montreal at the Sault au Recollet in the 1680s.
Finally in
1717, the village moved again, incorporating some other Indian
groups such as a refugee group of Nipissing Indians, to Lake
of Two Mountains on the northwest side of Montreal.
The
mission was then also known as Kahnesetake, Oka, or "the
Mountain mission."
(See Olivier Maurault, "Les Vicissitudes
d'une mission sauvage," Revue Trimestrielle Canadienne XVI
(1930), pp. 121-149; and William Fenton and Elisabeth Tooker,
"Mohawk" in William C. Sturtevant gen. ed., Handbook of North
American Indians Vol. 15 Northeast, ed. Bruce G. Trigger
(Washington, D.C.: 1978), p. 472;
William Henry Atherton,
Montreal. 1535-1914 2 vols. (Montreal: S.J. Clarke, 1914),
Vol. 1, p. 267; E.R. Adair, "The Evolution of Montreal Under
the French Regime," Canadian Historical Association Annual
Report XXIII (March 1942), p. 37.) Some convert/refugees from
Iroquoia were to come to this Sulpician mission after it
opened, and some went to the (predominantly Huron) Jesuit
mission at Lorette near Quebec.
The St.-Frangois-Xavier
mission was only one of several possible destinations for
Iroquois migrants. This makes Iroquois depopulation even more
striking; not just one but several missions were being
populated at the expense of the homeland population in the
late seventeenth century.
(Richter, "The Ordeal of the
Longhouse," pp. 183-188.)
37JR 60:277-287.
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lie

d'Orleans

near

Quebec

from

being

abducted

by

the

Iroquois.38
A modern Jesuit historian of the Kahnawakes claims that
the real bone of contention may have been a dispute over the
allocation of space at the new site for the St.-FrangoisXavier mission one and a half leagues west cf La Prairie.
(The new site was near the Sault Saint-Louis

(St.

rapids)

River

about

ten miles

up

the

St.

Lawrence

Louis
from

Montreal.) The Huron Indians apparently were not given enough
arable land at the new site to grow their maize.39

The

separation was a painful one and not all Hurons joined the
dissenting group; some of them remained among the Iroquois
Christians.

At the new site at the Sault, there were twenty-

two longhouses, some of them inhabited by Iroquois and some by
Hurons.
as well.

There was still one Huron chief at Sault Saint-Louis
The old community attempted to mend fences and

invited the splinter group's chief to a feast in his honor.40
The Indians now at Sault Saint-Louis were having their

38Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History
of the Huron People to 1660 2 vols. (Montreal; McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1976) pp. 806-814.
39Bechard, Original Caughnawaga Indians, p. 51. He cites
Discours Des Hurons qui demandent des terres dans l 1Isle de
Montreal ou ils Demandent que l'on ne leur traitte point De
Boissons, 1676.
Photostat of an early copy of the original
document in Huron and French.
Archives du Seminaire de
Quebec.
The title of this document indicates that the old
problem of the liquor traffic was a sore point among the
Hurons as well.
40JR 60:277, 287.
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own problems at the new location.

They had difficulties

getting title to their new site from their old adversary,
Governor Frontenac.

The intendant, Duchesneau, finally went

over Frontenac's head and appealed to the king for the grant
of land, but not before the governor threatened the Jesuits
and Indians at the Sault with imprisonment for occupying lands
illegally.41

Moreover, the Jesuits'

accommodations in the

first few years at the Sault were meagre.

The superior of the

mission had to sleep in a corner of the small bark hut which
served as a makeshift chapel.

Yet Frontenac tried to prevent

them from building a substantial church of stone.
did not succeed, his constant hounding,

Although he

combined with the

attacks of Five Nations people on their c o m stores to try to
starve them out, must have given a sense of siege to the
community of Indians.42

An outbreak of smallpox in 1678 and

a severe storm two years later in which lightning struck the
chapel did little to dispel this feeling.43

However,

the

pens of the Jesuit Relations continued to report in glowing
terms the piety of the converts at the Mission of Saint41C11A 5 : 2 1 4 v ;
Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F5A
(Missions Religieuses, 1639-1782, 3 vols.) 2:12? JR 63:195;
Charlevoix, History 3:192;
Delanglez, Frontenac and the
Jesuits, p. 32. See also William J. Eccles, Frontenac. The
Courtier Governor. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1959) , p.
57. Frontenac may not have been wrong here; the Jesuits had
retained title to La Prairie de la Madeleine, despite the rule
that when Indians abandoned a mission site the title to the
land should revert to the Crown.
42JR 63:191-195.
43JR 63:205, 219.
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Fran<?ois-Xavier-du-Sault.

People were instructed daily by

their own doaioues. or lay spiritual leaders,
always by Jesuits.

instead of

The latter claimed this as an enlightened

policy of cultural relativism; dogicrues could be trusted to
teach each other.
A Mohawk woman later noted as being particularly devout
and capable of miracles, Kateri Tekakwitha, had emigrated to
the mission in 1677.
alike,

Well-known among Indians and whites

she took a pledge of lifelong chastity setting an

example which many young women at the Sault followed.

Kateri

also practiced extreme forms of penance, including the wearing
of sharp iron bands around her body, fasting for long periods,
and flagellating herself with leather rods.
Black

Robes

at

the

reserve

frowned

on

Although the

these

excessive

penitential practices, they were encouraged by her piety and
used her example to spur on the religious devotion of her
neighbors.44

When Kateri died in 1680, her death spurred on

a

revival

religious

among the mission

Iroquois.

Father

Chaumonot reported in the following year that "the fair mirror

44JR 62:175-179.
(Kateri Tekakwitha has recently been
beatified and her canonization is being petitioned.
See
Claude Chauchetiere, La vie de la b. Catherine Teqakouita...
(New York: 1887);
Nicolas-Victor Burtin, Vie de Catherine
Tekakwitha. vierqe iroouoise decedee en odeur de saintete a
l'ancien village—
(Quebec: 1894);
Ellen Hardin Walworth,
The life and times of Kateri Tekakwitha. the Lilv of the
Mohawks. 1656-1680 (Albany, N.Y.: 1929); F.X. Weiser, Kateri
Tekakwitha (Montreal: 1971); Beatifications et canonizations
servae Dei Catharine Tekakwitha virqinis Indianae f168Of
(Publication of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, Historical
Section, No. 38, Vatican City, 1938).)
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of chastity is so clean at the Sault that people there cannot
endure the least spot on it."45

A few years later, Bishop

St. Vallier visited the Indians of the Sault and remarked that
"the lives of all the Christians of this mission are very
extraordinary,
monastery."46

and the whole village would be taken for a
But by "all the Christians," St. Vallier may

not have meant all of the inhabitants; this may have been a
way to avoid mentioning that not all Sault Indians were model
Christians.

The

early

historian

of

New

France,

Pierre

Charlevoix, himself a Jesuit, indicated that there was cause
to doubt the piety and good behavior of at least some of the
mission Iroquois.47
In the first few years of every mission there is a
"honeymoon" period, and certainly La Prairie had one; the true
belief of the first
unquestionable.

few pilgrims

such as Gandeaktena is

Jesuit analogies to the early Christians and

the primitive church were undoubtedly apt in 1669.48

This

pattern mirrored Father Paul Le Jeune's glowing reports of the
45JR 63:227.
^Charlevoix, Journal 1:272.
47Charlevoix, History 4:198.
(He implied that the
behavior of some at the mission differed little from that of
non-Christians in Iroquoia.)
48JR 58:77, 87-89.
Even the stories of later "martyrs"
(of the 1680s and 1690s) among the Sault Iroquois are not
questioned, only that these people were representative, or
that all Sault Indians had the same motivation for living at
the mission. For some later martyr accounts see Kip, trans.
and comp., The Earlv Jesuit Missions in North America, p. 120131.
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early years of Sillery; he could report in 1638 that that
reserve was such a utopia that there had been as yet no
disputes of any kind among the Indian converts.

(This was

taken as a sign that they were all true Christian believers.)
But as James Ronda points out, Sillery's fall from grace was
not far off, and by 1663, the mission had entirely fizzled
out,

the

land

occupied

by

French

farmers.49

Christian

Indians were never a majority at Sillery; in 1646, the Jesuits
counted 120 Christians there, but the number of non-baptized
natives went discreetly unrecorded.50

The same approach can

be seen in reports on the Sault Indians in the Relations.
Father Cholenec announced that "all the neophytes belonging to
[this Mission], with the exception of two or three small
bands,

had

festival]."51

assembled

the

village

[for

a

Christian

The number involved in the two or three small

bands is unknown.
was high,

in

The public relations value of this report

since the Relations was a serial publication in

France put out by the Jesuits, one of whose purposes was to
solicit financial donations for their mission work.

Cholenec

made the statement in such a way that it was technically true
but

actually

misleading,

giving

the

impression

that

the

neophytes were the vast majority of the community when there
49James P. Ronda, "The Sillery Experiment: A Jesuit-Indian
Village in New France, 1637-1663," American Indian Culture and
Research Journal III (1979), p. 5.
50Ronda, "The Sillery Experiment," pp. 8-11.
51JR 61:63.
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is no evidence for such a claim.52

A report in the same

volume of the Relations of a Sault Indian delegation which
went to proselytize in the Mohawk Valley was similarly sly;
the effort was judged to be highly successful in that the
preachers "changed the aspect of our little church" in Mohawk
country.

Nothing was said of numbers converted.53

Daniel Richter has studied the Jesuit missions to the
Iroquois and found that there was an unmistakable link between
peace negotiations following an Iroquois defeat at French
hands and the desire of longhouse people for Jesuits to come
to

their

communities.

One

party's

missionary

could

be

another's hostage; the Five Nations may have wanted Black
Robes

in

treatment
success

their villages
of

as

Iroquois people

a

safeguard

against

in New France.54

any

ill

Moreover,

in warfare bred confidence in one's own cultural

values; the Iroquois may have shunned European religion as
long as they were winning battles but wondered if the gods
were really with them, or if theirs were the right gods, when
defeated.

It may be no coincidence that it was the Mohawk

tribe alone which was humiliated by the Carignan-Salieres

52See Richter's calculations (in "The Ordeal of the
Longhouse," pp. 165-167).
He concludes that only twenty
percent of the League Iroquois could have been sincere
converts to Christianity.
53JR 61:65.
54Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois: Jesuit
Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642-1686,"
Ethnohistorv XXXII (1985), p. 4.
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regiment in 1666-67, and also had a much greater proportion of
its people swayed by the Jesuits than any other of the Five
Nations.55
Iroquoia

In the early to mid-1670s,
were

encouraging

tribesmen

the Black Robes in
and

women

who

had

converted to leave their homeland for the reserve because of
violence from the traditionalist faction among their people.
The more people the Jesuits sent north, the more encouraging
the success of their missions appeared.
The Jesuits had retreated from the optimism of earlier
days; they were worried that the fragile conversion of many
Indians would easily be eroded in the face of traditional and
non-Christian influences in Mohawk villages, whereas at the
mission by the St. Lawrence the prevailing influence would be
Christian and the temptation to backslide into
"heathenism" would be minimized.

"sin" and

Gone were the days when the

Jesuits believed that their converts could in turn save the
rest of their kinsmen and neighbors
considered
themselves.

their

new

Catholics

as

from evil; they now
likely

to

regress

The Jesuit order was weary from their heroic

battles of the first half of the seventeenth century; they

55Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois," pp. 6-11, and
Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 158-160.
The
proportion of Mohawks among the mission Iroquois became so
great that the Sault St.-Louis Indians were often referred to
as the "praying Mohawks," or the "French Mohawks," (see for
example, NYCD 3:437) and Mohawk quickly became the dominant
language of the community.
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lowered their expectations accordingly.56
The most disheartening aspect of the Black Robes' battle
was

their

struggle against alcohol.

Despite Bishop

St.

Vallier's glowing praise of the Sault mission in 1688, other
evidence suggests cracks in the armor of piety and sobriety.
A letter to the government of New France on the negative
effects of alcohol indicated a need to "end the disorder which
is going on among the Coch[nawagas], other people of _____
[illegible]

at

the

door

of

the

churches

during

divine

services, which scandalize foreigners."57 Alexandre Berthier
and Pierre de Sorel, two seigneurs, made dishonorable mention
of the mission

Iroquois

in the consultative

assembly of

notables on the question of brandy trafficking of 1678.58
Some

time

in

the

1680s

an

Indian

from the

Sault

named

Tegaraoueron became drunk at Lachine (the small town directly
across the St. Lawrence from Sault St.-Louis), raped a small
56Charlevoix Journal 1:269-270; Richter, "Iroquois versus
Iroquois," p. 11.
57Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F3 (Collection
Moreau de Saint-Mery, 1540-1806, 270 vols.) 2:274v Letter on
the subject of the negative effects of alcohol. (Anonymous)
"Cochnawagas" referred to the Sault St.-Louis Indians; the
Mohawk name by which these people called themselves
(originally, the name they gave to the place by the rapids to
which they moved in 1676) was Kahnawake, Caughnawaga, and a
host of other spellings of the same. This name was taken from
the name of a Mohawk village site built after the 1667
demolition of the Mohawk towns by Tracy and the French troops.
58W.B. Munro, "The Brandy Parliament of 1678," Canadian
Historical Review II (1921), pp. 174-175. The liquor traffic
to Indians had become such a social problem by the 1670s that
a special assembly was held in Quebec to discuss the problem
and possible legislative solutions.
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girl and murdered her to prevent her from testifying.
the

girl's

father

wanted

the

Indian

When

prosecuted,

the

authorities told him this would be unwise; the danger of a
revolt of the Sault Indians was too great to risk stirring up
resentment

among

them.59

In

1685,

Father

Jacques

Bigot

reluctantly reported that "9 or 10 Cabins [longhouses] left
the Sault mission last year, because they said that they had
withdrawn

there

disorders

caused

solely
by

to

live

in

intemperance;

peace,
but

far

that

from

they

the

found

themselves as greatly annoyed by drunkards as they were in
their own country."60
Governor Denonville's memo ire to the king in 1685 smacked
of public relations gloss,

as he claimed that the Indian

village at the Sault, among other missions, "are a pleasure to
behold.

There are not, most assuredly, any towns or cities in

France

so

well

ruled,

than

in

all

these

places."61

59Joseph P. Donnelly, ed., " [Frangois Vachon de] Belmont's
History of Brandy," Mid-America XXXIV (1952), p. 54. William
J. Eccles also found instances of the authorities ignoring
major crimes such as murder, committed by Sault Indians, out
of fear of revolt or exodus; therefore they were free to act
however they wished. Not a few French cadavers were found,
with hints of Indian involvement, in Montreal and environs in
the late seventeenth century.
(Eccles,
"Sovereignty
Association, 1500-1783" in Essays on New France (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 214, ns. 52, 58. See also
C11A 5:344v-345;
Louise Dechene, Habitants et Marchands de
Montreal au XVIIe siecle (Montreal and Paris, 1974), pp. 3839.)
60JR 63:131. (Note again the mention of an advantage for
moving to the mission community from Iroquoia other than a
desire to live a Christian life.)
61C11A 7:9 Ov.
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Denonville may have toured these towns only on a sparkling
Sunday afternoon after mass; soldiers who saw the Sault people
in the heat of a night following the arrival of a cask found
"drunken [Indians] howling...and doing all the damage they can
on the road.

Some kill the stock which they find.

Others

break into the houses on the road to the Sault,.. .still others
violate French women."62

By 1721, Charlevoix reported that

Indians from the nearby missions made horrible spectacles of
themselves in the streets of Montreal,

a far cry from the

"veritable monastery" of which Bishop St. Vallier spoke.63
Much of the fall of the Sault Iroquois from at least the
appearance of grace took place because of a single event in
1689.

The town of Lachine and surrounding area was attacked

by the League Iroquois in that year;

the Sault St.-Louis

Indians were moved to a compound inside the city of Montreal
for their own protection against the invaders during this year
of siege.

Living in close proximity to the French of Montreal

and all the attendant vices (not the least of which was openly
available brandy), the Kahnawakes altered their behavior in
unappealing ways.

"In the seven or eight months that the

Iroquois of the Sault...spent at Montreal, after the massacre
of Lachine, they became unrecognizable, both as regards moral
piety, and there is no one who does not admit that if their
62Donnelly, ed., "Belmont's History of Brandy," p. 52.
^Charlevoix, Journal 1:219. Even the Jesuits admitted
in 1710 that alcohol had ruined the Sault St.-Louis Indians.
(JR 66:171-173.)
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fervour is no more than it was for so long, the edification
and admiration of New France, it is because they have had too
many relations with us."64

Small wonder it was that the

Jesuits preferred to keep their Indian charges away from their
own Christian countrymen.65
After

returning

from

their

stay

in

Montreal,

the

Kahnawakes moved their village site again, but only a short
distance, less than half a league to the west.

They were to

move again six years later, again to the west and only a short
distance, and finally in 1716, they moved again no more than
half a league, where they have stayed to the present day.
Various reasons were cited in the written records as to why
these sites were in turn abandoned, and the modern historian
Louise Dechene suspects Jesuit development of their holdings
for habitant
through

all

seigneuries had much to do with
these

housing materials

moves,

traditional

village

and styles were maintained.

it.66

But

layout

and

The bark

longhouses of the 1716 site resembled those of the Mohawk
^Charlevoix, History 4:198; Nicolas Perrot, Memoire sur
les moeurs coutumes et religion... (Leipzig and Paris, 1864),
pp. 311-313.
65See Axtell, Invasion Within. Ch. 4-6 on Jesuit strategy.
For opposition opinion in this debate, see NYCD 9:55; C11A
5:13, 8:44v;
Charlevoix, History 4:197-198.
See also
Delanglez, Frontenac and the Jesuits. Ch. 2. Lachine itself,
directly across the river from the Sault, was perhaps a worse
influence than the town of Montreal.
(See Robert-Lionel
Seguin, "Le Comportement de certains habitants de Lachine aux
environs de 1689," Bulletin des Recherches Historioues LX
(1954), pp. 187-193.)
^Dechene, Habitants et Marchands. p. 33.
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Valley, and traditional agriculture was still practiced, with
women sowing, planting, and harvesting crops of maize, beans
and squash grown in hills, instead of rows tilled Europeanstyle with farm animals.

There was some livestock at Sault

St.-Louis, but horses were apparently more of a nuisance than
anything else to the Indians and were used only by the Jesuits
in the 1600s, although they were in widespread use by the
1750s.

When

Father

Joseph

Frangois

Lafitau

wrote

of

conditions at the Sault mission in the 1710s, the Kahnawakes
were still using pre-Columbian methods of clearing fields;
having been shown the European method, they preferred their
own.

Stone axes were still in use in 1710.67

A few had

decided to try the French method of ploughing at Father
Chauchetiere's suggestion in 1682; they harvested French wheat
although it was foreign to the native palate and enjoyed it.
But despite the high yield which it produced, they decided to
return to maize

cultivation because

the amount of

labor

required for wheat was too great.68
The sexual division of labor was still traditional at
Kahnawake, despite the presiding Black Robes whose cultural
baggage

included

supremacy.

the

habits

of

patriarchalism

and

male

An obvious reason for Jesuit success in making

their mission community a popular place to live was that they

67Lafitau, Customs
Marchands, pp. 33-35.

2:70,

71;

Dechene,

Habitants

et

68JR 62:169.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56
did not force complete cultural change on the newcomers.
Women tended the fields and collected firewood in the nearly
forests,

while men cleared

fields,

built

longhouses,

and

continued their pattern of seasonal habitation at the home
base, with fall and winter hunting trips.

The rhythm of the

seasons remained as it had been in Iroquoia.69
Extended family longhouses persisted, a good gauge of
adherence to the old ways.
1682,

with

Father Chauchetiere counted sixty

longhouses

in

a

population

of

120

to

150

families.70

The popularity of the place was evident in its

growing population; by the late 1680s, its numbers had grown
to

almost

700.71

There

was

little

contact

with

the

surrounding community, except for some unfortunate incidents
involving violence.

Occasionally,

Sault

Indians went to

Montreal, a town "more like a hell than an orderly town" and
once in 1683, a group of them reported to have been drinking
for the past ten days committed "extraordinary disorders."
The intendant took this incident seriously, ordering that any

69JR 63:235; Dechene, p. 36.
70JR 62:173.
71This was an increase from around 200 fifteen years
earlier. (NYCD 3:394; Delanglez, Frontenac and the Jesuits,
p. 195 fn.) Frontenac reported to the King in 1679 that the
population of the mission was great, and Duchesneau had words
to the same effect for the minister in the same year.
(Rapport de L'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec 1926-27, p.
108; C11A 5:49v.)
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repetition would be cause for jailing the Indians involved.72
Although mission Iroquois occasionally went to Montreal,
they did not learn to speak much French.

The Jesuits did not

encourage them to do so, learning their languages instead, and
any schooling which Christian Indians had was conducted in
their own village in their own languages.

Even the liturgy of

the Mass was in a native language, Huron.

(Ever since the

Jesuit mission to the Huron people in the 1630s and 1640s,
Huron had de facto become the language of the liturgy in
eastern woodland Catholic missions.)

The Sault St.-Louis

Indians communicated with French officials on a few occasions,
in

a

pidgin

common

to

the

northeastern

fur

trade,

a

combination of Algonquian and French expressions and some
gestures.

Indians who used it believed it was the French

language (and vice versa); when Father Lafitau first arrived
from France, Kahnawake Indians spoke this hybrid dialect to
him thinking he would understand it.73

The Sault Iroquois

maintained ties with their kin and clan relatives in Iroquoia,
and the Mohawk language, which became the dominant language at
the Sault because of Mohawk predominance in the population,
was

retained

and

strengthened by

this

contact

with

the

^But the fact that he kept repeating this demand suggests
that it was not enforced by the local police.
(Archives de
Quebec, Ordonnances des Gouverneurs et Intendants. 1639-1706
2:39, 77-78. Quoted in Adair, "Evolution" p. 37.)
^Lafitau, Customs 2:261.
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homeland.74
Dress style at the Sault followed a pattern common among
tribes

in

fairly

frequent

contact

with

Europeans;

the

materials for clothing were borrowed from European sources and
incorporated

into

everyday

use,

traditional, as did functions.

but

the

styles

remained

Iroquois Indians wore European

shirts over their traditional garb instead of underneath —
they used them to shield their bodies from snow and rain, a
different function from that of Europeans.

Similarly, they

used shirttails as breechclouts.75
A nun noticed a distinctive dress style among Mission
Indians who came to Montreal in 1730; as opposed to other
Indians who walked the town virtually naked, they were vain of
dress: "the Iroquois [Christian Indians] put the shirt over
their wearing apparel,

and over the shirt another raiment

which encloses a portion of the head."76 Lafitau noticed the
Kahnawake adoption of new materials as an elaboration of a
traditional style:
blankets of wool,

"in place of their fur robes, they use
doghair,

or fine red and blue cloth,"

confirming that they "have changed only the material of their
clothing,

keeping

their

former

style

of

dressing."77

74There are still some Mohawk speakers today at Kahnawake.
^Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 68-69.
76From a manuscript letter of Soeur Ste. Helene quoted in
Atherton, Montreal 1:350.
^Lafitau, Customs 2:30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

Clearly, Kahnawake material culture had been only minimally
altered as a result of Jesuit oversight of the community.
Questions of moral code, ceremonialism,
adherence were another matter.

and religious

The missionaries did forbid

certain practices which had been taken for granted among the
Iroguois from time immemorial.

Even some converts themselves

questioned traditional practices and rituals, and probably
many of them were forbidden at Sault St.-Louis.

In Iroquoia,

Garakontie, the Onondaga zealot, refused to participate in
condolence

councils,

healing

rituals,

and

the

Midwinter

Ceremony at his Onondaga village which were an integral part
of the Iroquois identity.
because

of his

newfound

He stated plainly that this was
beliefs;

his

considered idolatrous and sinful.78

old habits

he

now

If such a bold stand was

taken within Iroquoia, the status quo at the mission community
along the St.

Lawrence must have been one in which most

traditional ceremonies were officially banned.
source,

the

although

one

Relations. reveals
Black Robe

claimed

little
that

on

The only real
this

subject,

traditional

burial

customs (burying bodies sideways instead of upright in the
grave, and placing grave goods and prized possessions with the
corpse) had been eliminated at Kahnawake.79
Some Christians in the Five Nations homeland lost their
political

status because of their beliefs;

one woman was

78JR 50:61-63, 60:193.
79JR 63:183.
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stripped of her agoiander status because she converted.80
From this, it is difficult to say how politics operated among
the Christian Iroquois community;

the

ceremonial

politics seems to have been called into question,

side of
but no

Jesuits suggested that the Indians at Sault St.-Louis had to
find new ways of conceptualizing their political offices and
means of appointing chiefs, matrons, agoianders, and others.
Lafitau's comments on political structure and function in the
1710s suggests nothing markably different from what is known
of League Iroquois politics at the time.81

Therefore, aside

from the (predictable) outlawing of shamanism and any form of
ritual with a religious connotation, it is difficult to guess
the

extent

of

cosmological/cultural

change.

Traditional

reciprocity seems to have survived the conversion intact; in
fact the mission Iroquois were famous for this, to the point
that the Jesuits in the community were distressed at the
amount of food and other commodities which were freely offered
to any comers to the village, even to groups as large as eight
hundred, which seemed to pauperize the inhabitants.82

Kin

relations seem also to have remained intact, despite the lack
of traditional ceremonies to reinforce these.

(They may have

been modified in conformity with Christianity.)

Longhouses

80Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 177.
agoiander was a political office in Iroquois society.)

(An

81See Lafitau, Customs 1:69-70, 285-300.
82JR 58:81.
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were still the standard form of housing,

indicating that

traditional ways of viewing kin relationships persisted.83
Many longhouse people were accustomed to going back and
forth between

the

Sault village

and

their homeland,

and

families were often only physically divided between the two
areas,

although at times they were also separated by the

Christianity issue.84

But secular political changes in the

early 1680s did not bode well for the Iroquois as a united
people.

Relations between the Five Nations and the French

were becoming strained, and the Jesuits were less welcome in
Iroquoia.

They were literally driven out of some Five Nations

villages.

The French had been flexing their muscles in the

Ohio and upper Mississippi valleys; the Iroquois League saw
this as an encroachment on their sphere of influence, where
they too had recently been active.

Rumors of war between the

two powers swirled in Kahnawake ears - what would they do?
Mission Indians were considered by the French (including the
Jesuits), to be subjects of the French king, as any inhabitant
of New

France would

be.85

But

they had built up

their

community along the St. Lawrence during a period of peace.

A

war footing between their own people and those among whom they

“ on Sault St.-Louis generosity, see also JR 55:35,
61:201, 63:195; Kip, trans. and comp, The Early Jesuit
Missions, pp. 92-93.
^Kip, trans. and comp, The Earlv Jesuit Missions, pp.
120-129.
85Dechene, Habitants et Marchands. p. 28.
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now lived was a new and cruel twist in their lives.

The

Relations reported that their fidelity to the French cause was
beyond doubt, and that a palisade around their village was
erected in 1684-85 to protect them against possible Iroquois
attack.

(It was unclear, however, whether the fortification

was a Jesuit undertaking or one originated and pursued by the
Indians

themselves.)86

The

League

Iroquois

made

their

mission counterparts' status clear at a war council held by
both groups at La Famine (on the southeastern shore of Lake
Ontario) in 1684.

According to the Jesuits, they denounced

the Catholic Iroquois and jeered them.
that

Chauchetiere indicated

it was after this meeting that construction of the

palisade was begun.87
The Black Robes reported that an open meeting was held at
Sault St.-Louis to decide a policy on the growing hostilities.
They were given three choices, Chauchetiere said.

They could

all return to Iroquoia, or remain at their new village by the
rapids but maintain a state of isolation from the surrounding
French colony —

a sort of neutral zone, or they could join

the French-Catholic cause.

According to the Jesuit source,

they rejected the first option because they felt they would
jeopardize their new religion,
second out of fear,

and likewise rejected the

not unfounded,

that the French would

86JR 63:241, 245.
87JR 63:245; William N. Fenton's introduction to Lafitau,
Customs (l:xxxii).
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become

suspicious

of

them.88

Chauchetiere

proudly

interpreted the decision to join the French cause as being
made because "having but one and the same faith with the
french, they wished also to run the same risks together."89
No matter how the decision was made, or even if there was a
group decision as Chauchetiere suggests, the Sault St.-Louis
community took on a new dimension after 1683.

Hostilities

were brewing and the inhabitants of the mission village were
caught in the middle.
The Jesuit missions in the Iroquois country effectively
ended four years later and the only remaining Black Robe after
that time in the territory adjacent to New York Province was
Father Pierre Millet, taken prisoner and held for years as a
hostage

among

the

Oneidas.90

Relations

continued

on

a

personal level between the Sault and the League Iroquois but,
at the same time, the mission village was becoming a bulwark
of

the

French

defense

against

the

Five

Kahnawakes started to serve the French,

Nations.

Some

giving advice and

important information about the geography of Iroquoia and
^Governor Frontenac had long regarded them as a fifth
column threat to New France.
89JR 63:241-243.
His is the only record available on
these events, so without confirmation, it must be viewed
sceptically.
There may have been pressure from the priests
and/or colonial officials to choose the pro-French option,
although some Sault Indians freely chose it.
90Shea, "The Jesuits, Recollects, and the Indians," in
Winsor, ed., Narrative and Critical History, p. 285; Lucien
Campeau, "Pierre Millet," Dictionary of Canadian Biography
2:473-474.
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environs.91

To gain Sault Indian cooperation, it helped that

Count Frontenac was no longer the governor of New France; La
Barre took over in 1683 and was much more positively disposed
towards the Jesuits and their reserves than his predecessor
had been.
Ogenheratarihiens, or Hot Powder (Cendre Chaude) as he
was

known

to

Europeans,

was

a

prominent

Kahnawake

symbolized French allegiance among his people.
1676

at the Sault

along with his wife

and

who

Baptized in
other

family

members, this talented politician soon became "fourth chief"
at the Sault, and within a couple of years had worked his way
up to the position of

"first chief."

He was

active in

proselytizing trips to the homeland in the late 1670s and set
the convert's example in 1683 of declaring, in his role as
chief, his allegiance to the French in the impending war with
the Iroquois.92 An indication that the Indian political mind
is inscrutable to whites lies in the fact that after this
time, the Oneidas in the homeland invited Ogenheratarihiens to
become their chief, and offered very conciliatory terms - he
would not have to renounce Christianity in order to take up
the offer.

But he chose to stay at the reserve when his

condition that all the League Oneidas embrace the Catholic
91Charlevoix, History 4:197; JR 63:243.
92Christianity was beginning to have these other
complicated connections; missionaries did not consider an
Indian to be truly Christian if the convert in question did
not actively support the French military-imperial cause, an
issue which was to come up often in the future.
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faith was turned down.
But this Christian Oneida politician did not blindly
support the French cause once he embraced it.

Unlike other

Christian chiefs from the Sault, in 1684 he refused to join
Governor Josephe-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre's
expedition against the Onondagas at La Famine.

(aborted)

Discriminating

in his support, he shared the sentiments of many in New France
that

La Barre was

replaced

by

Governor

Ogenheratarihiens
allegiance

an inept

to

was

the

leader;

Denonville
among

new

the

leader

when the
the

first
of

latter was

following
to

New

declare

year,
his

France.93

In

Denonville's 1687 campaign against the Senecas, the Oneida
headman served willingly and, along with two other Christian
Iroquois, was killed in action in July of that year.94
Ogenheratarihiens' life serves as a reminder that the
Jesuits' claims of mission Iroquois allegiance to the French
was not just wishful thinking and good copy for the readers
back in France.
allegiances.

There were individuals who transferred their

Bruce Katzer suggests that many did so because

they perceived that the hey-day of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee was
past, and that to side with a power on the rise was a smart,
self-preserving thing to do.

Furthermore,

Thomas Norton

93Regarding La Barre's ineptitude and loss of favor, see
Perrot, Memoire sur les Moeurs. p. 138.
94Bechard, The Original Caughnawaga Indians, pp. 123-124,
and Bechard, "Ogenheratarihiens," in Dictionary of Canadian
Biography 1:522-523.
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suggests that as early as the 1670s,

Five Nations people

perceived that they could profit from the unofficial and
illegal trade which was developing along the Lake Champlain
corridor if they moved to the Jesuit mission community along
the St. Lawrence.95
The

significance

of

Ogenheratarihiens

is

that

an

alternative Iroquois culture was shaped in the community on
the St. Lawrence River across from Montreal.

It had shed some

parts of its old cosmology and view of the world, and replaced
them with a central component of the European world view:
Catholic Christianity.

Even if all inhabitants of Kahnawake

were not truly converted, they had accepted a certain moral
and behavioral code which differed from their traditional one,
significantly in some aspects while only minimally in others.
Something in the Iroquois experience of the first half of the
seventeenth

century

—

political,

economic,

social/cultural, or a combination of all these —
significant

number

of

the

proud

Five

Nations

military,
caused a
people

to

emigrate and to join a vibrant new community in which bark
longhouses sat next to a stone chapel adorned with a bell
tower and crucifixes.

By all appearances,

the Kahnawake

^Bruce Katzer, "The Caughnawaga Mohawks: Occupations,
Residence, and the Maintenance of Community Membership"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1972),
pp. 37-38. David Blanchard echoes this argument in his
dissertation "Patterns of tradition and change: the re
creation of Iroquois culture at Kahnawake" (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 119-154.
(Norton, Fur Trade in Colonial New York, p. 122; Richter, "The
Ordeal of the Longhouse," p. 200.)
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community was a successful synthesis of two cultures and a new
element in the geopolitics of the colonial Northeast.
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Table l

These data vary considerably in quality and are sometimes
contradictory. Overall, total native population declined. Indians
were repeatedly decimated by European diseases and by wars,
in which they participated, between French and English and
later between English and Americans.

NATIVE POPULATION
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CHAPTER THREE
KAHNAWAKE-FIVE NATIONS RELATIONS IN THE 1680S
"When

[Iroquois]

Christians divorced themselves

from

ceremonies that had previously ratified their bonds to fellow
villagers,
people

they began to define themselves as a distinct

o.. Christians were no longer the traditionalists'

kinsmen.

They were, in some respects, their enemies."1

By

1684, when the League Iroquois disowned their Sault brethren
at

a

diplomatic

meeting

and

the

two

groups

exchanged

threatening words and insults, the cold war which set the Five
Nations in turmoil since the first Jesuit arrived in their
land began to take on serious national political dimensions;
the Sault Iroquois were now a distinct national group which
would have separate diplomatic relations with various powers.2
The feeling of separate communities had been growing for
years, but this was the first overtly institutional evidence
of it, brought on by growing hostilities between the League
Iroquois and the French.
The Sault Indians could not help having close ties to the
French administration in Quebec and Montreal, not only because
they were inside French territory, but also because of their
resident Jesuit missionaries who were looked upon by French

1Daniel K. Richter, "Iroquois versus Iroquois; Jesuit
Missions and Christianity in Village Politics, 1642-1686,"
Ethnohistorv XXXII (1985), p. 10.
2Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901) ,
63:245 (hereafter cited as JR) .
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civic officials as the governing authority in the mission
community.

From a European perspective,

it would seem a

logical development for the Sault Iroquois to view their
political, diplomatic, and military interests as being aligned
with those of the French administration, because their village
was potentially a target of hostilities by the enemies of the
French,

namely,

the

League

Iroquois.

French

military

protection, in the form of construction of a stone fort, was
probably seen by at least some Sault inhabitants as desirable,
but some may have seen it and its accompanying soldiers as an
occupying force.
The Christian faction among the Iroquois proper atrophied
when it lost its prominent leader, Garakontie, to the grave in
1678.

Opposition in Iroquoia to raids on western tribes in

the Illinois country faded without Garakontie's strong voice,
and the 1680 attack by some Iroquois on Fort St. Louis among
the Illinois Indians drew the sharp reproach of the French.
Large Iroquois armies of a thousand men

(mostly Senecas)

attacked Miami as well as Illinois hunters several times from
1680 to 1683.3 In the summer of 1683, an extremely aggressive
governor was appointed to New York.

Colonel Thomas Dongan,

although Catholic, was determined to erase the French Jesuit
influence among the Iroquois and to bring a stridently antiFrench tone to New York and her allied Indians.

He worked

3Louis Armand de Lom D'Arce de Lahontan, New Voyages to
North America (2nd ed.) 2 vols. (London: Bonwicke, 1735),
2:63-65.
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among the Five Nations to heighten their hostility toward the
French, openly encouraging them to conduct raids against the
colony to the north and its allied Indians, attempting to
break the French-Five Nations peace of 1665-1667.

Previous

New York governors had not done this.4
Indian-on-Indian attacks had always involved individuals
only,

and

had

factionalism.

been

seen

in

the

context

of

religious

Christian zealots were martyred at the hands of

their traditionalist counterparts for their refusal to give up
the new religion,

not simply because they were from the

community within New France's borders.

(A League Iroquois

could not assume that by merely residing at the Sault, an
Indian was a convert to Christianity.)

In another step toward

all-out hostility between the two communities, small groups of
League Iroquois had occasionally raided Kahnawake stores of
grain in the late 1670s.
But an open state of war between the Sault Iroquois and
the Five Nations was not yet a reality.

Even in 1683, people

still doubted that such a scenario would develop.

The Jesuit

superior in New France believed that the Iroquois had not yet
gone to war against the French because they would not want to
be entangled in a situation of antagonism against their Sault
brethren.

Father Thierry Beschefer wrote to his seniors that

the French "are under great obligations to those who compose

V.

4Allen
Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York:
The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p.
253-255.
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this mission.

[The League Iroquois] have often resolved to

wage war against the french; but they have always been checked
by those whose kindred were at the Sault."5

Beschefer noted

that the League Mohawks had stated they could not consent to
such a war, that their brethren at the Sault would have to be
withdrawn first.

These Iroquois may have been shocked to

find, then, that their Catholic kinsmen offered Governor La
Barre of New France a fighting force of 150 men when he asked
for some in 1683,

"to go to war,

even against their own

nation, if the latter undertook to break the peace with the
french."6
The

Five

Nations

may

not

have

realized

the

subtle

pressure that Jesuits and French officials could bring to bear
upon

Sault

threats

of

inhabitants;
punitive

sanctions

measures

could

issued,

Christian's ability to enjoy eternal

easily be
doubts

life

made,

about

introduced,

a
or

privileges within the community or the church taken away, if
men were not promised for military support.

These tactics are

difficult to trace in historical sources, but bribery was one
form of persuasion which was documented; Governor La Barre
openly told the minister of marine that he "resolved to select
four of the principal chiefs of [the Kahnawakes] to accompany

SJR 62:255.
6JR 62:255-257;
Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents
Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York 15
vols. (Albany: Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 9:234 (hereafter
cited as NYCD).
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Sieur Le Moyne,

to whom I entrusted a number of private

presents, to gain over the most influential, having made, at
the

same

time,

some

reasonable

ones

to

those

Christian

Chiefs."7 He also asked the minister for extra fronds to help
pay for the repair of the church at the Sault which had been
damaged in a storm, prefacing his request with the timely news
that the Jesuits at that mission had been able to raise two
hundred troops for the French.8

Gifts and funding were tied

to military support.

If the Kahnawake Iroquois felt pressure from their
position within New France, they also found positive channels
to develop from their position.

They opened up a new role for

themselves as a quasi-independent middle group between the
French and the Five Nations, defying a dependent status.

They

no doubt felt themselves to be an independent nation however
much the Jesuit fathers and the French governor's officials
might press them.

They became emissaries between the French

and the League Iroquois by relaying belts of wampum (meaning

7NYCD 9:202;
Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie CllA
(Canada: Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 vols.) 6:134
(hereafter cited as CllA).
8NYCD 9:209;
CllA 6:244v.
The New France government
took an increasingly active role in financially supporting the
mission community. Imperial as well as religious motives for
this are obvious from correspondence. (CllA 5:290v-29lv; NYCD
9:149-158.)
There were numerous occasions on which
missionaries or government officials asked for money for the
mission from the court at Versailles. Father Fremin travelled
to France in 1679 for that purpose.
(CllA 5:12-17.)
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official diplomatic correspondence on belts made of shell
strung together9) back and forth between the two groups.
Barre

reported

in

1684

that

Father Jacques

superior at Sault Saint Louis,

Bruyas,

La
the

"furnished seven Christian

Iroquois, friendly to the French and pretty shrewd" to relay
wampum belts to the Mohawks and Oneidas expressing the French
desire for the latter not to get involved in the French-Seneca
conflict which was brewing.10

(The governor's assurance that

these seven Indians were "friendly to the French" indicates
that one could not be at all sure that every Sault Indian was;
factionalism

existed

even

in

these

early

decades

at

Kahnawake.)
Since La Barre worded his communique in terms of Indians
being "furnished" to him for the role of messenger, he must
have seen these Indians as French subjects who could be called
upon

at

will.

The

Kahnawakes,

however,

probably

saw

themselves as an independent third party uniquely qualified to
run interference between two sets of belligerents because of
their geographical proximity to the French, and because of
their knowledge of terrain, village locations, personalities,
and customs of the Five Nations.11 They were also present at
9See Claude Bacqueville de la Potherie, Histoire de
l'Amerioue Septentrionale 4 vols. (Paris; 1722), 1:333-334 for
a
description of wampum.
10NYCD 9:239-240; CllA 6:308-308v.
11Since Indians did not express themselves in a written
medium, there is no direct evidence on their feelings at the
time about such matters.
However, evidence which does

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74
talks held between La Barre and representatives of all five
Iroquois nations the preceeding year, as La Barre made a point
of noting when he described the event to the minister of
marine.12

Sault Indians probably approached these talks as

independent observers, regardless of French perceptions of
their status at such meetings.
League Iroquois perceptions of their strayed kinsmen seem
to have been that they were under the direct influence of the
French.

At the 1683 meeting,

instead of addressing their

Sault brethren directly, the League Iroquois asked Governor La
Barre to "prevent the Christians of the Sault-Saint Louis ...
from coming more to our territory to attract our people to
Montreal, that they stop depopulating our land, as they have
been doing."13

The

sense

is unmistakably one of

1those

foreign Indians invading our land.' League Iroquois speakers
would not always put their relations with their Catholic
counterparts in these terms; at times they claimed them to be
just as Iroquois as someone in a Mohawk Valley longhouse.
Their approach depended on the circumstances.

Here,

the

frustration with the draining of vital human resources from
the homeland put them in an adversarial frame of mind.

La

Barre responded with this retort: "They are not my children infiltrate the European documents generally indicates that all
Indians saw themselves as autonomous peoples, regardless of
the European legal viewpoint of their status.
12C11A 6:134-135.
13C11A 6:300—300V.
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those

Indians...who depopulate your

land,

it

is you who

depopulate your land by your drunkenness and superstitions;
there is complete freedom to come live among us, we do not
stop anyone by force [from returning back to New York].”14
This was

a war of words between enemies over the Sault

Iroquois, whether they were perceived as refugees or pilgrims
or traitors or immigrants.
Nor

did

the

New

York

government

Iroquois as a neutral third party.

see

the

Kahnawake

They were a thorn in the

side of this province which was becoming so dependent for its
diplomatic
Nations.

stability

on

strong

relations

with

the

Five

The Mission Iroquois were a constant reminder that

few Indians were attracted to the religion or the national
identity of the English, and would, if anything, shed their
own people's blood to fight these men rather than defend an
English colony against the possible encroachments of a foreign
power.15

The new governor of New York, more empire-minded

than any of his predecessors, exerted unrelenting pressure on
the New France government, the Jesuit missionaries, and on the
Sault Iroquois themselves as far as he could, to persuade,
cajole, or force them into returning to their homeland.
the summer of 1686,

In

a Mohawk named Jannetie was sent by

Governor Dongan and the Mohawk sachems to the Sault to tell
the strayed kinsmen that Dongan could give them as much land
14C11A 6:300V.
15C11A 11:186.
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as they needed at Saratoga.

At this hamlet slightly northeast

of the Mohawk homeland and about forty miles north of Albany,
Dongan would provide land "to make their homes here" and
pledged that they "would also have a priest there to instruct
them in religion."16
Enjoying their popularity, the Sault Iroquois graciously
replied that they would be "very willing" to come and live at
Saratoga, and added that the Governor of New France "does not
want to prevent their coming here, but says first he wants to
see a letter from Corlaer [the New York Governor] and then
will let them go freely."

This is suspicious; La Barre had

just said he held no Indians against their will, but with this
statement he made their leaving New France conditional upon a
letter from Governor Dongan.

Jannitie's wording, that the

Sault Iroquois were anxious for the letter of permission to be
written "so they can be fully assured of his [La Barre's]
ready inclination to let them come here"
status as less than free.

indicates their

There was some coercion involved at

the mission community.17
The issue of furnishing priests for the Kahnawakes was
16Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records.
1666-1723 (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Association,
1956) (hereafter cited as LIR), p. 104;
NY CD 3:394-395
(Governor Dongan's report on the State of the Province, 1686.)
In this report, Dongan also stated that part of the plan was
to get rid of the French Jesuits in the Iroquois villages,
because they were impeding English trade with the Five Nations
by promoting their own. Religion and commerce were closely
related in the seventeenth century.
17LIR p. 104.
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one which Dongan as a Catholic was uniquely qualified to
handle.

New York officials knew that Catholic priests would

attract the Iroquois in greater numbers than would Protestant
ministers, and a Catholic governor would have a better chance
of finding some.

Before 1664, the Dutch in New Netherland had

only feebly attempted to proselytize the Mohawks, bringing in
a Dutch Reformed domine. Johannes Megapolensis, in 1642 to
convert

the

Megapolensis

Iroquois

nearest

experienced

almost

Fort

unqualified

converts could be counted on one hand.
more

efforts

in

1693

with

Orange

Domine

(Albany).

failure;

his

New York was to make
Dellius,

and

in

the

eighteenth century with some Anglican missionaries, but these
efforts were never as successful as the Jesuits’.

Dellius

severely tarnished his image among the Ho-de-no-sau-nee when
he became embroiled in a shady land deal which involved a
swindle of Iroquois land.
visibly devout,

The Black Robes were morally clean,

and highly dedicated to

Indian missions;

therefore they enjoyed the most success of any Christian
clergy among the Five Nations.18
Dongan knew that in order to attract Christian Iroquois

180n Dutch missionary efforts see Trelease, Indian
Affairs, pp. 169-172, 327-331, John Webster Grant, Moon of
Wintertime: Missionaries and the Indians of Canada in
Encounter Since 1534 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1984), pp. 65-66.
NYCD 3:771-772.
On the Dellius land
scandal see John Rainbolt, "A 'great and usefull designe"..."
New York Historical Society Quarterly. LIII (1969), p. 338.
On Dellius: Hugh Hastings, ed., Ecclesiastical Records. State
of New York 7 vols. (Albany: James B. Lyon, 1901-1916),
passim.
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from the Sault back to New York, he would have to provide
English Black Robes for them.

He promised them he would do

this, and attempted to find some in England who would be
willing to come over as missionaries.

But Dongan may have

been overly optimistic about any Catholic priest's desire to
advance the cause of the English empire only a few years after
the

English

Civil

War

and

Oliver

Cromwell's

vicious

persecution of Catholics in Ireland, England, and Scotland.
Most Jesuits in England were in hiding in the mid-to-late
seventeenth century, afraid of being hunted down; that there
were any who came to North America in that century is amazing
(although some came to Maryland initially because it was a
haven for English-speaking Catholics in the New World, away
from the persecution of the mother country).19

The Duke's

province, as New York was known, governed by an Irish Catholic
no less, may have seemed an attractive destination to a Jesuit
who had found life in England a hardship even after the
restoration of the Catholic Stuart monarchy.

Dongan sent out

a request for Anglophone Jesuits, but none came.20

However,

190n the Maryland Jesuit missions, see James L. Axtell,
After Columbus: Essavs in the Ethnohistorv of Colonial North
America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Ch. 5.
20LIR p. 98. John M. Shea uncovered evidence that three
English-speaking Jesuits came to North America in the late
1680s, but although they spent some time in the province of
New York as well as in Maryland, they never came to Saratoga
or even to the Albany area to minister to Indians. (Edmund B.
O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State of New York
4 vols. (quarto ed.) (Albany: Weed and Parsons, 1850-1851)
(hereafter cited as DHNY) 3:73.
Robert Livingston, the
prominent Albany Indian Commissioner and future mayor of that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
the

governor

had

his

French

counterparts

worried;

they

reported Dongan's plan to the minister of marine in France
under

the

Canada."21

heading
It

is

"regarding

the

impossible

to

dangers
tell

if

that
the

threaten
Kahnawake

Iroquois were bluffing when they agreed to return to the upper
Hudson Valley, and there may have been some who would stay at
Sault Saint-Louis even if others would leave upon the arrival
in Saratoga of an English Jesuit.

But since no priest

arrived, the word of the Sault Iroquois (and of LaBarre) was
never tested on this point.
Meanwhile, the war of words heated up between the New
Yorkers and League Iroquois on one side, and the French, the
Jesuits, and their allied Indians on the other.

The Iroquois

attacks on trading parties of Indians and coureurs de bois in
the upper Great Lakes region, as well as down near the mouth
of the

Ottawa River

escalated.
commissioners22

at the

Governor

St.

Dongan

Lawrence,
and

the

continued
Albany

and

Indian

heard of Seneca-instigated Iroquois attacks

city, lamented in 1700 that the reason the French were able to
attract and keep so many Mohawks in New France was the neglect
of the New Yorkers to send missionaries among these Indians.
NYCD 4:648.)
21C11A 9 :249v .
22This group was a sort of Chamber of Commerce for the fur
trade, for which Albany had been granted a province-wide
monopoly in 1686. See David A. Armour, "The Merchants of
Albany, New York: 1686-1760" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern University, 1965), and Thomas E. Norton, The Fur
Trade in Colonial New York. 1686-1776 (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1974).
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on Illinois and Miami Indians.

For appearance1s sake, they

reproached them for these exploits but in fact contributed a
steady supply of weapons and told the Senecas, with a wink, to
use

them

for

hunting

instead

of

warring.23

Even while

promoting Five Nations attacks on Indians tied to the French
trade, Dongan warned Father Lamberville in Onondaga (one of
the few Jesuits left in Iroquoia in 1686 - the Cayugas had
recently driven Father Carheil out of their villages) that the
French had better not invade Iroquoia and make war upon the
longhouse people.
Indians the

(He also carried on an argument as to whose

Iroquois were

- Dongan

claimed

that

all

of

Iroquois territory was English and that its inhabitants were
subject to the King of England, to which the Iroquois did not
bother to object, since the natives were, de facto. still
sovereign.)24
The French were happily escalating hostilities as well.
When Jacques-Rene de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville arrived in
the French colony in 1685 to replace the inept La Barre as
governor, he started down the road to war with the Iroquois by
reminding

the

Sault

Iroquois

recalcitrant kinsmen posed.

of

the

danger

which

their

"I sent to remind the Christian

Iroquois...that it is necessary to destroy the Iroquois in
^Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change
and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier,
1609-1720"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984),
p. 242.
24Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C U E
et des Postes, 1651-1818, 38 vols.) 10:2-3.

(Des Limites
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order to establish religion...to destroy the Iroquois, it is
necessary

to

attack them..."25

Denonville

also

embarked

immediately on a project of fortifications for the entire
Montreal area, including a large fort at Chambly a few miles
southeast of the Sault,

and made sure that Kahnawake was

protected; the village was fortified in 1685 with a pentagonal
structure having bastions at each corner.

One bastion was

equipped with a huge iron cannon which would serve as a
deterrent to attacks on the village.26
There had been fear in New France of Five Nations forays
against the Sault village after La Barre's failed expedition
of 1684 against the Onondagas, because the Kahnawake Indians
had sent one hundred men to fight.27

This was probably not

all the Sault people could spare, since at least one prominent
headman, Ogenheratihiens, refused to support the effort, but
a pro-French war faction at the Sault had sent its complement
to

the

cause.

(Again,

the

pressure involved is unknown.)

amount

of

persuasion

and/or

That La Barre had to give up

the idea of attacking when the Onondaga chief Outreouti (la
Grande Gueule) saw the sickened condition of the French troops
at

La

Famine may

have

been

a

relief

even

to

the

most

25C11A 7 :124v .
26JR 63:245; C11A 8:121v.
27C11A 6:267; DHNY 1:75.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82
enthusiastic Sault fighters.28 In any case, it postponed the
outbreak
Iroquois.

of

gunfire

between

traditionalist

and

Catholic

But the cannon installed at Kahnawake in 1685 was

a reminder that time was running out for peaceful relations
between the two groups, at least as far as the French were
concerned.
It is not clear how Denonville's message of the need to
attack and destroy the League Iroquois was received by the
brethren

at

the

Sault.

Nevertheless,

determined to humiliate the Five Nations.
Indian

military

support

for

this

Denonville

was

To court mission

purpose,

in

1686,

he

succeeded in requisitioning 1500 livres from the king as a
"show of gratitude" for the Jesuit communities at the Sault
and Sillery.

He also mentioned that these Indians were of

"such great help to us for war as well as for the trapping
that they do."29

Just as La Barre had recognized that "the

maintenance of this Mission (Sault Saint-Louis)

is of very

great importance," undoubtedly with fresh soldiers in mind,
Denonville also greased their palms to prepare for his war
against the Senecas in 1687.30

Aware of colonial politics

28Regarding the meeting between Outreouti and La Barre at
La Famine (near Oswego, N.Y.) see Lahontan, New Voyages 1:3843.
^CllA 8:132, 176; Joseph P. Donnelly, ed., "[Frangois
Vachon de] Belmont's History of Canada," Mid-America. XXXIV
(1952), p. 132.
30The king granted a large sum of money to the Jesuits at
Sault Saint-Louis for construction of a church building in
1684, the year of La Barre's call for troops. (Rapport de
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too, Denonville shrewdly invited several Jesuit priests to
serve as his advisors.

He learned from the mistakes of

previous governors (namely Frontenac) who had alienated the
Black Robes, and therefore had not had much cooperation from
them when it came time to rally fighters for an expedition.31
Indians

from all the missions within Laurentian New

France had rallied for battle under La Barre; a 1684 list
specifies that of almost 400 Indians who

allied themselves

with the French to go to Onondaga country, at the top of the
list were 100 "good men" from the "Christian Iroquois of Sault
Saint-Louis."

The Christian Iroquois of the Mountain (the

Sulpician mission near Montreal) provided sixty, the Christian
Abenakis

of

Sillery

Christian Hurons

of

provided

sixty-five

Lorette sent

"good men,"

the

"40 mediocre men,"

the

Algonquins seventy-two, and the Nipissings and Temiskamings,
forty.32

Clearly, the Sault Indians were the most prominent

among these groups.

They may have appeared to be providing

more to the cause only because their population was the

l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec (hereafter cited as
RAP01. 1939-1940, p. 255; NYCD 9:209.
At a high point in
hostilities during the Franco-Iroquois war of 1689-1701, a
French official lamented that their Indian allies, among them
Kahnawakes, were "influenced only by presents... in the
vigorous prosecution of the war." NYCD 9:526.)
31Louis Armand de Lom d'Arce de Lahontan, The Oakes
Collection: new documents by Lahontan. Gustave Lanctot, ed.
(Ottawa: Patenaude, 1940), p. 27.
32C11A 6:267.
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largest.33

Comprising at least one quarter of the total

numbers, and being the largest single group, they continued to
be the dominant presence among the mission Indian warriors in
the 1687 engagement.

Of 353 allied Indians from the St.

Lawrence communities in that effort, fully half of them (170)
were from the Sault, fifty were from the Mountain mission,
seventy-six

from

Sillery

and

fifty-seven

from

Arhetil

( L o r e t t e ) W h e t h e r they would fight was not something of
which the officers in charge were at all confident.

And the

circumstances surrounding the beginning of the trip to the
Seneca

country

made

many

Indians

wary

of

their

French

contemporaries.
Denonville had planned to attack the Senecas because they
were the Iroquois nation which had instigated most of the
attacks on western Indians trading with the French.
feared, however,

He

that other Iroquois groups further east,

33Lucien Campeau, "St. Lawrence Missions,” Handbook of
North American Indians. Vol. 4, ed. Wilcomb E. Washburn
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1988), pp. 468469.
^Louis-Henri Baugy, Journal d*une expedition contre les
Iroquois en 1687. redioe par le chevalier de Baucrv. aide de
camp de M. le marouis de Denonville (Paris: Ernest Serrigny,
1883), p. 86. (hereafter cited as Baugy.) There were roughly
1600 Frenchmen along, both regular troops and militia, making
a total of about 2000 who left from Fort Frontenac. They were
met by more Indians ("pagan” Indians as distinguished from
these Christian ones) from the upper Great Lakes once they
reached the southern shore of Lake Ontario.
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especially the "Iroquois du nord,"35 would see the movement
of

troops

at Fort Frontenac nearby

Iroquois of a French attack.

and warn the

League

Setting a trap, the French

governor called for a meeting with the eastern Iroquois at
Fort Frontenac, extending an invitation to the Onondagas as
well as the Oneidas, Mohawks, the Iroquois du nord, and some
Iroquois

from

Cataraqui.36

the

short-lived

Sulpician

mission

near

Dongan was suspicious of this invitation and

warned that his French adversary had better not be planning
anything other than diplomatic talks; he threatened to capture
any Kahnawake Iroquois who might come to Iroquoia seeking more
converts for the St. Lawrence community.37

Little did he

know that he would have more to fear from Sault guns than from
their rosaries or crucifixes.
Denonville used Father Jean de Lamberville for his plan;
he arranged for the Jesuit residing at Onondaga to invite the
Iroquois tribesmen to Fort Frontenac, since they would trust
him.

Lamberville had no

idea of Denonville's plans and

believed himself to be promoting peace between the two groups.
However, when the delegation from Iroquoia arrived at the
French compound on the north shore of Lake Ontario, Denonville
35These were Cayugas who had moved to the northeastern
side of Lake Ontario in the 1660s out of fear of Susquehanna
attacks in their homeland.
^On this mission see“James S. Pritchard, "For the Glory
of God; The Quinte Mission, 1668-1680," Ontario History LXV
(1973), pp. 133-148.
37LIR p. 117.
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promptly had them seized and
"Iroquois du nord."38
French king.

imprisoned,

along with the

He now had captives to send to the

Louis XIV had requested Iroquois prisoners as

oarsmen for his galleys, but had meant prisoners taken in a
war

situation,

not

unwitting

victims

of

a

snare.

Nevertheless, the governor solved both the king's and his own
problems at the same time with this move, and ended up with
more than a hundred Iroquois prisoners to be sent to Quebec to
await shipment to France, and a clear path to surprising the
western Iroquois with his troops.39
When the Sault Iroquois realized what had happened,
having recently come to Cataraqui with the French troops and
militia

from the St.

Lawrence on the way to the Seneca

villages, they were outraged that Denonville had tricked the
Indians into irons.40

Moreover, some of the prisoners were

close relatives of the Sault and Mountain Mission Iroquois.41
On learning of Denonville's treachery, one hundred of the
Christian Iroquois refused to continue with the expedition.

“ LIR pp. 109-117, 119-123.
39See William J. Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV. 1663-1701
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 149-151. Also Le
Clerc, Eccles exchange in Revue d'Histoire de L'Americrue
Francaise (Hereafter cited as RHAF): William J. Eccles,
"Denonville et les Galeriens Iroquois," RHAF 14-1 (1960), pp.
408-429? Jean Leclerc, "Denonville et ses Captifs Iroquois,"
RHAF 14-4 (1961), pp. 545-558.
40Baugy, Journal. p. 90.
41NYCD 9:338;
RHAF p. 551.

Leclerc,

"Denonville et ses captifs..."

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87
Puncturing Denonville's careful leak-prevention plan, two of
these protesters decided to run through the woods to warn the
Senecas of the impending attack.

The Chevalier de Baugy, the

governor's aide-de-camp, haughtily dismissed this, claiming
not to be worried about it, or about the possibility of the
protesters harassing the returning French party.

In his

journal, perhaps to reassure himself, Baugy insisted, "I do
not

think they

have

the

guts."42

Aside

from these

two

Indians, the rest of the dissidents planned to return home to
Sault Saint-Louis.

Thus the Sault fighting force was down to

only seventy men but was still one of the largest groups of
French-allied Indian fighters.

Since pressure may have been

applied in getting these Indians to join the expedition, it is
no wonder that so many of them took the opportunity presented
by Denonville's morally questionable actions to bail out.
Baugy had stated that the reason for bringing them along in
the first place was to test their fidelity.

Unwavering

commitment was a bit much to expect, since some were strongarmed into going along.43
Two Kahnawake Indians taken prisoner by the English
testified that they were given a choice of participating in
the campaign or being imprisoned until the war was over.44
Although they may have had ulterior motives for claiming this
42Baugy, Journal, p. 91.
43Leclerc, "Denonville..." pp. 554-555.
“ NYCD 3:431, 433.
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when testifying to the English officials who captured them,45
other parts of their testimony about the expedition match the
official version, and the detailed account of Adandidaghko
(one of the captives)

seems plausible.

He chronicled his

difficult situation; he had wanted to leave his home at the
mission village to hunt, but his relatives reasoned with him
that if he did so, he could expect eventually to be caught and
imprisoned.

So he agreed to stay and accept the inevitable,

despite his wish not to fight, and a few days later, the
French came to the village, gave each Indian thirty bullets,
two handsful of powder, and told them to be ready at the
designated time to leave on the expedition.46
Given this scenario of strong-arming recruits,
should not have been
defected.
Christian

surprised

that

such

a

Baugy

large group

He kept a close watch on the behavior of the
Indians

who

remained

on

the

expedition.

For

instance, the French entourage reached an island on the way to
Seneca country, and found that some Iroquois had been at the
spot earlier to fish but had since left.

The Christian

Iroquois were visibly relieved that they were gone,
noticed.

Having found tracks on another

island,

Baugy
he had

expected the allied Indians to follow these and chase down
45Adandidaghko's earlier claim that he did not
fight was in response to the opening question
interrogation by the English: "Asked if he was not
that he left his country, to the French, and to fight
his own brothers..." NYCD 3:433.

want to
of the
ashamed
against

46NYCD 3:433.
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some Iroquois, but noted in his journal that they did not try
very hard, implying that they wanted to lose track of the
prey.47
Denonville himself doubted the fidelity of the Christian
Indians, especially the Christian Iroquois, "on whom we dared
not rely having to fight against their relatives."48 But the
governor also recognized the tactical need for such Indians in
battle.

He explained to his superiors that although Indians

generally were not skilled at military formation, he would
need to tolerate the Christian Indians, "some of whom we want
with us; for if we had none of them. ..the enemy's Indians
would continually harass us on our flank and rear."49 He was
willing to put up with some discipline problems for this
advantage.

But

they

were

useful

not

only

as

fodder.

Denonville claimed that the order in which they were to march
was not prescribed, as it was for militia and regular troops,
so "they might serve as scouts or in detachments which we
should send out, or to facilitate the passages" over rapids,
at

which

the

Kahnawakes

were

highly

skilled.50

But

Adandidaghko and Kakariall both told a different story - that
the governor ordered the Christian Iroquois and some other
Indians to be positioned in the middle of the entourage of
47Baugy, Journal, p. 91; Leclerc, "Denonville...," p. 555.
48NYCD 9:338.
49NYCD 9:342.
50NYCD 9:359.
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boats and canoes, with Frenchmen before and behind them, so
that they could not escape.51 These Indians may have felt as
much under siege as those they were assigned to attack.
But somehow those who stayed with the expedition lost
their reluctance to fight.

While the French and allied

Indians were building a makeshift fort and boat shelter upon
landing at Irondequoit,52
them.

a few Senecas appeared to taunt

The Kahnawakes, being the most adept at the Seneca

language, were called upon to translate the exchange of words
which followed.

They did not hesitate to tell the Senecas

that they had come to their country to kill them,

either

relaying the sentiments of others who could not communicate
with the Senecas or expressing their own feelings towards
them.53

This

must

have

set

the

mood,

despite

both

Kakariall's and Adandidaghko's claims that up to the last day
before the battle the allied Indians wanted rather "to boil
their pots" than to continue marching, the governor bidding
them to walk on.54
When the battle finally started, the Kahnawakes fought
exceptionally bravely whereas the "pagan" Indians (Ottawas and

51NYCD 3:431, 434.
520n the southwest shore of Lake Ontario, at the edge of
Seneca territory, near present-day Rochester, N.Y.
53Baugy, Journal. p. 97; NYCD 3:434, 446. It is unclear
from this account whether they were merely relaying French
sentiments or declaring their own.
54NYCD 3:431, 434.
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Hurons from Michilimackinac) fled in the thick of the action.
The courage of the former was notable since the Kahnawakes
were positioned way out on the right and left flanks, in front
of

more

than

beside

the

French

troops

and

militia.55

Kakariall recounted that "the Governor put all the Indians in
the Front, because he mistrusted them for feare they would
join with the Senecas."56
the

enemy,

situation.

and

must

They were exposed mercilessly to

have

steeled

their

nerves

to

the

The Sault Iroquois received honorable mention

later for their conduct in the battle; Denonville said they
"surpassed

themselves,

and

performed

deeds

of

valour."57

They even sacrificed one of their headmen; when the smoke
lifted, Ogenheratarihiens lay dead on the field.
Perhaps they steeled themselves in the heat of the battle
because their only other choice was to defect to the Senecas,
to whom they were often very close during the fighting.

But

this would have been suicidal; the French would probably try
to shoot them down rather than allow them to defect, and there
was certainly no guarantee that the Senecas would look kindly
on those who had travelled all these miles to accompany the
enemy army.

They might expect to be killed as traitors.

Therefore, they made the best of their situation and at least

55DHNY 1:152;
NYCD 3:446.

NYCD 3: 434;

Baugy, Journal, pp. 99-100;

56NYCD 3:431.
57Baugy, Journal. pp. 99-100;

C11A 9:65.
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had the goodwill and even admiration of the French army after
the last shot had been fired.58
Clearly, there were some who genuinely wanted to fight
with the French.

Of the three captains of the Kahnawakes who

went with their men (an Onondaga, an Oneida, and a Mohawk),
the Mohawk captain Kryn was known to be pro-French, and may
even have contributed to the arm-twisting efforts of the
French in recruiting men for the occasion.59
Suspicion that some of the Sault Iroquois fought bravely
only to cut their losses is fueled by the testimony of the two
Kahnawake prisoners detained by the New Yorkers; Kakariall
indicated that his people refused to participate in the phase
of

Denonville's

campaign

which

followed

the

battle

—

destroying corn stores at the Senecas' abandoned villages.
Adandandidghko

said the same,

adding that some of these

Indians found hidden c o m stores but kept them secret from the
French in order to minimize Seneca famine.60 Denonville must
have sensed that allegiance was fragile; the governor wanted
to

send

some

Indians

and

Frenchmen

out

to

chase

enemy

stragglers left in the area after the routing by the French
(most Senecas had fled to the Cayugas) but did not because he
58Baugy, the former sceptic, commented after the battle
that "we could be proud of them." (In Journal, p. 101.)
59NYCD 3:431; Henri Bechard, "Togouiroui," Dictionary of
Canadian Biography 1:650-651. He was on good terms with the
Jesuits at Sault Saint-Louis, and probably joined their
efforts to convince Indians to sign up for military service.
“ NYCD 3:432, 435.
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feared that if they were attacked by hostile forces, the
French-allied Indians would allow the Frenchmen to be hacked
to pieces and would join the enemy.61

In the days following

the defeat of the Senecas, the French-allied Indiems refused
to provide an escort for a party of French bringing wounded
back to the main station near the shore.62

The spirit of

cooperation was short-lived.
Four

Kahnawakes

served

the

Seneca

cause

through

espionage, at some point fleeing the French camp undetected to
tell the tribesmen of the French attack.

For their troubles,

however, they had their heads broken by those they informed,
as one escapee from the Senecas told the French.

Other Sault

Iroquois, obviously of the pro-French faction,

followed an

example set by the Huron Indians on the campaign in Seneca
country and went out looking for scalps.63
faction

prevailed

on

the

retreat

from

But the neutral
Seneca

country.

Kakariall, Adandidaghko, Denonville, and his aide de camp,
Baugy, all recounted that the Christian Indians refused to go
with the rest of the entourage to Niagara after the Seneca
campaign.

Denonville

wanted

them

to

help

build

some

fortifications at that outpost on the western end of Lake
Ontario.
brought

The French tried "all the arguments which could be
to bear upon

them"

but

the

Indians

insisted on

61Baugy, Journal. p. 106.
62Baugy, Journal. p. 107.
^Baugy, Journal. pp. 110, 111.
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leaving.

Denonville sent ten or twelve canoes after them to

attempt to bring them back by force if necessary.64

While

the two groups were negotiating in their boats, one Indian
stood up and suggested capitulation, reasoning with the rest
of the Christian Indians that they should minimize their
losses; they had heard the governor's threats, they might as
well go along with him voluntarily rather than be forced to do
so.

Most of the dissidents capitulated, but later, when no

Frenchmen

were

looking,

a

couple

of

canoes

managed

to

escape.65
Although the events surrounding this first open hostility
between Kahnawakes and one of the Five Nations are confusing,
and actions sometimes contradictory,

it is clear that the

Sault Iroquois harbored divided loyalties.

There were at

least two factions: those who wished to please the Jesuits and
the French officials and felt that Kahnawake interests were
inextricably tied to those of the French, and those who felt
more allegiance to their ancestry and their fellow brothers of
the longhouse.
but

probably

The latter were present at the 1687 campaign
against

their

wishes.

A

broad

range

of

persuasions could have been and no doubt were employed to
involve them in the fighting.

Their own kinsmen at the Sault

may have been agents in convincing them to join the war
effort.

As in most wars, some volunteered, but many were

^Baugy, Journal, p. 115; NYCD 3:432, 435, 9:367.
65NYCD 3:435, 9:367.
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drafted.

After discovering that the Kahnawake Iroquois had joined
the French army in trying to bring the Seneca people to their
knees, New York's Governor Dongan asked the League Iroquois to
send a message to their cold-hearted brethren pleading with
them once again to leave their community and return to the
Iroquois homeland, promising them protection if they agreed.
"If they will not bee advised," Dongan darkly hinted in his
instructions to Five Nations representatives, "then you know
what

to

doe

with

them."66

Representatives

of

the

Five

Nations replied that they wanted very much to have their
relatives return from Canada, and did not know why the latter
had fought against their brethren, but could conceive of no
way to get them to return except by sending in a messenger (a
Sault Indian held prisoner among the Iroquois) to give them a
signal to escape.67

There was a widely held belief in New

York and Iroquoia that the Sault Indians were held against
their will in their village.
The recent hostilities between Sault and League Iroquois

^LIR p. 132? NYCD 3:439.
67NYCD 3:444. After the attack on the Senecas, the Five
Nations harangued the Huron Indians for not warning them of
the attack; if they expected the Hurons, who had formerly been
their mortal enemies, to do so, then they must have been even
more shocked that only two Sault Iroquois warned them, and
only at the last minute, and that so many others participated
in the assault. (Nicolas Perrot, Memo ire sur les Moeurs et
Coutumes des Sauvaaes... (Leipzig: 1824) p. 138-143.)
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was

a cause

for

remorse

on all

sides.

Alarmed at the

implications of recent events, Kryn and a few other Kahnawakes
set

out

in

August

1687,

shortly

after

returning

from

Denonville's campaign, for Lake Champlain and points south.
Eyewitnesses
Kakariall

differ

asserted

on

exactly what was

that he

came

to

ask

Kryn's

purpose.

if the Mohawks,

Onondagas, and Oneidas were united with the Senecas against
the French, hoping to dissuade them from such a stance.

(He

also said that Kryn had been sent on the mission by the Jesuit
resident at the Sault, possibly on orders from the governor.)
Adandidaghko, however, testified that Kryn and a few other
Sault Indians came to see if they could still be reunited with
the Mohawks and other Iroquois since this [French] war with
the Senecas had started.

(The Jesuit had sent them to ask

about eastern Iroquois neutrality in the French-Seneca war, in
exchange for a return of prisoners, but they added their own
agenda.)
very

He claimed that many of the Catholic Iroquois wanted

much

testimonies

to

be

reunited

indicate that

in

their

even the

native

land.

pro-French

among

Both
the

Kahnawakes were as worried as the League tribesmen and the New
Yorkers about the new situation and the possibility that it
was irrevocable.68
A band of Dutch New Yorkers on their way back to New York
from Montreal who met Kryn's group said that Kryn told them he
had been down

in Mohawk country to dissuade the eastern

68NYCD 3:432, 435.
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Iroquois from going to war against the French and to try to
convince all of them to come and live in Canada.

If this did

not work, Kryn apparently told the Dutchmen, then all the
Sault Iroquois would return to the Albany area to live with
their relatives once more, pending the arrival of English
Jesuits.69

Despite

concern

about

the

possibility

of

fratricide, the French Jesuits and their faction among the
Sault, of which Kryn was the apparent spokesman, believed that
the French war against the Senecas was warranted and was no
cause for the other four nations to come to the aid of their
fellow Iroquois.

A Frenchman who deserted to the English and

served henceforth as an information pipeline for the New
Yorkers claimed that Kryn was "very true to the French and
would immediately join with the French in the warr against the
Sniekes and Maquaes," and was "in great esteem with the French
Governour. ,,7°

Kryn

was

committed

to

the

French

cause;

although he was doing anything possible to dissuade the
eastern Iroquois from moving to a war footing, this goal was
defined by the French point of view.71

He would be working

for a French peace.
Kryn did prove himself at peace-keeping, for Kakariall
and Adandidaghko both recounted a meeting which took place
69NYCD 3:437-438.
70NYCD 3:487-88.
This was confirmed by Denonville's
praise of Kryn to the minister of marine on October 27, 1687
(C11A 9:130).
71NYCD 3:478.
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between Kryn's group and a band of sixty League Mohawks in
early August 1687.

Meeting somewhere around Lake Champlain,

the two groups could easily have come to blows, since the
sixty were headed to New France to attack villages (possibly
Sault

Saint-Louis)

in

retaliation

for the

French

action

against the Senecas and for Denonville's capture of Iroquois
prisoners at Fort Frontenac.

Kryn seems to have persuaded the

warriors, some of whom were his own relatives, to return home,
and even convinced a few to come and live at Kahnawake and
consider Christian conversion.72
The war party's mere approach to Canada, nevertheless,
was a cause for anger from Denonville, even though their plan
to pillage New France communities
derailed.

ready

for harvest was

Denonville angrily wrote to Dongan reproaching the

latter for sending these Indians to attack his people.

Dongan

replied that he had not commissioned them to go, that they
decided

for

French.73

their
But

in

own

reasons

September,

to
the

take

revenge

Onondagas

told

on

the

Peter

Schuyler, the mayor of Albany, that Dongan "desired us...to
take as many French prisoners as wee could," and that he had
indeed

(justifying Denonville's accusation on this point)

provided the Iroquois involved with powder and ammunition for
the job.

The New York government then wanted the Indians to

hand over to the mayor and aldermen of Albany any prisoners
^NYCD 3:433, 435-436;

C11A 9:141-141v.

^ NYCD 3:512, 514.
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they might take.74

In fact, Kryn's diplomatic skill seems

all the more impressive given the fact that the sixty Mohawks
had been assigned specifically to take Kryn and his group of
seven or eight hostage.
not

accomplishing

reminding
bringing

them
Kryn

their

that
to

When they apologized to Schuyler for

they

Albany

mission,
had
as

he

been
a

reproached
"often

prisoner

them

charged"

and

had

by

with

failed

repeatedly.75
Not all Kahnawake Indians were valuable prey because not
all were French partisans.

Denonville realized that only some

at the Sault supported Kryn.

Some Kahnawakes even informed

New York partisans whom they met in the woods and waterways
between New York and New France of French intentions to make
war on the Iroquois and New Yorkers, thereby undermining the
French side.76

A few attempted to escape from the Sault

mission village; four Sault women and one Sault man did so in
October 1687, and men were sent out to hunt them down and
bring them back.

The four women were returned to Kahnawake

but as for the man, his "brains were knocked out as a traitor"
as soon as he was caught.

Denonville coldly commented that

"this proof of fidelity afforded me great pleasure."77
74New York Council Minutes Old Vol. 6, p. 5;

The

NYCD 3:485.

^ NYCD 3:483, 434.
76LIR p. 142. Denonville praised Kryn and "some of his
warriors of our village of Sault St. Louis Iroquois."
(Emphasis mine.)
(C11A 9:130.)
^NYCD 9:353.
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accusations by Governor Dongan that the Sault Iroquois were
"kept upp in a fort there [in Canada] with guards uppon them"
and not "att free liberty to returne to their country if they
thinke fitt" seem not to be merely the wild-eyed accusations
of this hawkish governor.78
The

French

agent,

Jesuit

Francis Valliant,

who

was

corresponding with Dongan on this matter, tried to turn the
accusation around,

claiming that the two hundred soldiers

stationed at the village of Sault Saint-Louis were there to
protect the Indians from enemy attack.

Valliant referred to

the testimony of a Sault Indian named Cakare who denied that
his people were kept against their will.

But Cakare was pro-

French and had been on a journey to discuss peace with the
League Mohawks when he was captured and held in irons in
Manhattan for his troubles.
Indian

to

admit

the

He was less likely than a neutral

truth

of

such

politically damaging allegation.

an

embarrassing

When asked

and

"whether in

Canada the Christian Mohox were att libertie," he answered
every time that "he knew none that was detained," implying
something

different

from

what

the

question

asked.79

Spokesmen of the League Iroquois told the New York governor
that they wanted their relatives,
Canida," to be free from constraint.

"the praying Indians at
This is telling? if the

League Iroquois were claiming this situation existed, there
78NYCD 3:526.
^NYCD 3:530.
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can be no doubt that they had it first-hand from their fellow
Iroquois.80

A group of Sault Indians journeyed to Mohawk

country in the summer of 1688 claiming that they came "with
consent of ye Jesuite and say that ye Governor of Cannada gave
them liberty to come heither [sic] in the midle of summer."81
That they had to specify this speaks to the usual restriction
of free movement.
Dongan also accused the French of gaining the support of
the Kahnawake Indians through bribery.82
here either.

He was not wrong

Coincidences of time between donations made to

the community and military manpower needed for an upcoming
expedition occurred in 1684 and 1687.
1688.83

It happened again in

Denonville used presents to retain their favor, to

appease them, or to convince them that Dongan's offers for a
new life in Saratoga could not possibly be as generous as
those made by the French.

The Marquis suggested in the autumn

following the Seneca campaign that clothing be given to the
Kahnawakes because they had been unable to hunt while marching
with the French army.

Other supplies for their subsistence

were offered as well, "as an encouragement to act well, and as
^NYCD 3:534. The tribal grapevine was alive and well,
even in the late 1680s.
81NYCD 3:565. A Dutchman held in New France reported in
1691 that although some Kahnawakes were inclined to emigrate
to New York, there were "strict guards kept by the French to
prevent their departure." (NYCD 3:781.)
82NYCD 3:511.
^ RAPO 1939-40, p. 283.
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an evidence that care is taken of them."84

Part of the

reason was that a smallpox epidemic had struck the village
hard; three hundred of the Sault Indians (almost half) were
ill

at

the

time.85

But

another

concern

expressed was New France's public image.

the

governor

Its administration

had to appear more generous than that of its neighbor to the
south, both as a sort of one-upmanship, and as an inducement
to the Indians to view their colony as the one which valued
them the most and treated them best.
The war for the support of Indians became a race to
furnish earthly goods in the most commodious way possible.
The Sault Saint-Louis Iroquois were the spoils of the war;
both sides courted them vigorously.

Much more than the League

Iroquois, they were caught between two superpowers who viewed
them as prizes.

To complicate the situation, they did not

themselves agree on where their allegiances lay.

Pro-French

and pro-League Iroquois factions were to vie for control
within an increasingly constricted sphere of action.

But as

constricted as it was to become, the Kahnawakes managed to
involve themselves in Franco-Iroquois-English relations in
such a way as would keep all the belligerents guessing as to
^NYCD 9:353-354.
On at least one occasion in 1690,
French officers used spirits to lure the Mission Iroquois to
a battlefield. (Collection de Manuscrits. contenant lettres.
memoires et autres documents historioues relatifs a la
Nouvelle-France 4 vols. (Quebec: A. Cote, 1883-1885), 1:511.)
85Trelease, Indian Affairs, p. 304.
In autumn 1690,
smallpox claimed 400 League Iroquois lives. (NYCD 9:490; JR
64:63.)
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what

their

powerfully.

next

move

would

be

and

to

influence

events

They knew that they were the spoils of the coming

war.
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CHAPTER FOUR
KAHNAWAKE-FIVE NATIONS RELATIONS, 1689-1701

When Teganissorens, the Onondaga diplomat, lamented to
his Kahnawake counterparts in 1694 that "we have mutually
butchered each other," he struck at a major psychic crisis
among the people of the longhouse.1

In the 1690s Iroquoian

hostilities were directed at each other as never before and
fratricide became an increasingly likely scenario.

Father

Joseph Frangois Lafitau, the Jesuit missionary to the Sault
Iroguois, noticed in them by the 1710s a hardened attitude
towards war which had its roots in the era of Teganissorens
and Kryn:

"Quite often they [enemies in battle] know each

other and speak to each other.

They ask each other news,

harangue each other and do not beat each other up without
first paying

each other

compliments.1,2

These words

are

haunting against the chronicle of hostile encounters between
Sault and Five Nations people.
Hostilities were indeed beginning to mount in the late1680s.

In the fall of 1688, for example, some Kahnawakes

scalped League Iroquois travellers.

League Mohawks continued

to pillage French settlements during this time, and Denonville
1Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany:
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 9:580
(hereafter cited as
NYCD).
2Joseph Frangois Lafitau, Customs of the American Indians
Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols., William
N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, ed. and trans. (Toronto:
Champlain Society, 1974-77), 2:143.
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told Dongan that he had not "ordered" his Indians to cease
their hostilities against the Five Nations, and did not plan
to do so.

He increased the fortification of the Sault village

that year, and placed troops on an island near the Sault to
prevent Iroquois attacks from the river.

French officials

feared that the League Iroquois might attack the village of
their Catholic relatives, and so Kahnawake became a heavily
protected - and surveillanced - place.

The expressed fear may

have been a pretext for increasing fortifications at the
Indian village.

The

French made

a practice

of keeping

Iroquois prisoners there; some Iroquois came to Montreal in
June 1688 to negotiate for the release of some ninety of their
kinsmen.

One wishes for information on how Iroquois prisoners

were treated inside the village of Sault Saint-Louis.
Despite these escalations, however, there was evidence
that

some

Iroquois

killing each other.

were

consciously

attempting

avoid

In the summer of 1689, the Iroquois did

come and surprise the northern colony,
village.

to

but not the Sault

They struck the hamlet of Lachine directly across

the St. Lawrence from Sault Saint-Louis.

The night of August

4 brought screams from the Lachinois as they attempted to
escape the wrath of the invaders.
Kahnawakes in their attack.

But the Iroquois avoided

Even when some Sault and Mountain

Mission Iroquois joined a French officer who had come out from
Montreal to help repulse the raiders, the latter shot only at
the

Frenchmen

among

the

defensive

fighters,

leaving
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Mission Iroquois reinforcements unharmed.

When the French

militiamen were captured, and the rest of the French in sight
were fleeing, seven Sault Indians tried to reach a fortified
church where another officer and some men were attempting to
hold out.

All of these Frenchmen were killed, yet the Sault

Iroquois fought on bravely, defiant of the League Iroquois
(although perhaps bravery was no longer necessary when they
saw that they were being spared Iroquois bullets) .3 They did
not, however, defect to their kinsmen.

Rather, some were

taken as captives to Iroquois country and forced to give
information about French activities and plans.4
The greatest effect of this invasion, infamously known as
the "Lachine Massacre," was to bring the Sault Iroquois to
live inside Montreal temporarily in a makeshift village they
had erected there.

Denonville claimed that he had them moved

to the city because he had heard rumors that the English and
Iroquois wanted to seize the village and because their fort
was in a state of disrepair.

A League Mohawk, Lawrence, who

was a prominent Anglophile and Protestant convert, disagreed,
accusing the governor of Canada of having these Indians moved

3Joseph P. Donnelly, ed., "[Frangois Vachon de] Belmont's
History of Canada," Mid-America XXXIV (1952), p. 142.
4Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the
State of New York 4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany: Weed and
Parsons, 1850-1851) 2:50 (hereafter cited as DHNY).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107
because "the French were jealous of the praying Indians."5
By this he meant that the French feared Kahnawake defection,
a demoralizing prospect for the French in their war against
the Iroquois and English.

Another account suggests that

"although the Indians of Sault Saint-Louis were entirely in
our interests, and we had a garrison in their fort, they were
obliged to bring their families and their crop harvest to
Montreal,

where they put their cabins

in the

form of a

village."

French fears that these Indians may not have been

entirely in their interest were strong enough to warrant this
removal, at a cost of using valuable troops to transport the
Indians' personal effects and food supply when the colony was
on a war footing.6 This removal was probably not carried out
voluntarily; there is no evidence that the Kahnawakes wanted
to move,

but also no evidence of large-scale resistance,

perhaps because of bias in French records.
When they were finally moved back to the Sault in the
summer of 1690, having had a full year in which to learn all
5Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada:
Correspondance Generale,
1540-1784,
122 vols.)
I0:339v
(hereafter cited as C11A; references are to originals);
Lawrence's claim: American Antiquarian Society Notebook, s.v.
4 Jan. 1690 (cited in Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the
Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier,
1609-1720"
(Unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
Columbia
University, 1984), p. 366).
Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec 192728, p. 19 (hereafter cited as RAPQ) ; "Relation de ce qui s'est
passe en Canada au sujet de la guerre, tant des Anglais que
des Iroquois, depuis l'annee 1682," Historical Documents 3d
ser., no. Ill (Quebec: Literary and Historical Society of
Quebec, 1871), p. 45 (quote); NYCD 9:435.
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the vices of French society from which they had previously
been sheltered by the Jesuits, they were not appreciated in
the city.

A major reason for the move back to the Sault was

that many "disorders" had arisen from this brief experiment in
intercultural living.

The Sault Iroquois became addicted to

liquor in an urban setting where its traffic was impossible to
limit, and when drunk they committed horrible acts of violence
against their own and other people.

It is not surprising that

people taken by fiat out of their homes and into an alien
environment would react in negative ways.
had become

Their discontent

great enough that New France's top officials

reported to the king their worries over Kahnawake defection to
the League Iroquois.

But it was thought that if they were

given provisions and ammunition and returned to their former
home, they would fight exceptionally well against the enemy.7
Not surprisingly,

the new site of the Mission of Saint-

Frangois-Xavier at Sault Saint-Louis, built in 1690 a league
or two further west from the former location, was a fortified
village.8

The

last

of

the

so-called

"beaver wars"

which

the

Iroquois had fought with other Indian tribes, and by extension
with the French, blended into the first of the wars for empire
fought between the French and the English in North America.
7C11A 10:321.
8NYCD 9:435.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109
The English at Albany had become increasingly protective of
their Iroquois allies against the pretensions of the French in
the 1680s, but North American relations were also dictated by
political and diplomatic realities across the ocean.
the Glorious Revolution of
England

was

on

a

1688,

friendly

the

footing

Stuart monarchy of
with

its

counterpart on the French throne, Louis XIV.
events of 1688 changed all that, however,
Protestant

English upper

class

feared

Until

Catholic

The English

as the largely

continued rule by

Catholics and supported a coup of the throne by the Dutch
(Protestant) William of Orange and his marriage to Mary, a
Protestant in the English royal line.

William was no friend

of the Sun King, and proceeded, virtually on ascending the
throne, to declare war on his neighbor across the Channel.
News of this development did not reach North America until
1689, but it did have the effect of gearing up the war machine
in

both

New

France

and

the

various

English

colonies,

especially the northern ones closest to New France.
As the most vulnerable colony to the new enemy, New York
had been psychologically prepared since the blustering cold
war between Dongan and Denonville, but the colony was thrown
into political chaos and strident anti-Catholicism with the
local rebellion of Jacob Leisler and his son-in-law, Jacob
Milborne.
massacre

The
as

not

French
just

therefore
another

interpreted

Iroquois

the

outrage,

Lachine
but

one

instigated by the English at Albany, who, even though not
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entirely sympathetic to Leisler, had had to capitulate to the
rabidly anti-Catholic German demagogue.

The French were to

retaliate for the attack with a raid of their own in early
1690, but Indians were involved on both sides, and in this
February 1690 assault, no Indians were more prominent than the
Sault Iroquois and their relatives, the League Mohawks.
In fact, the Francophile Sault chief Kryn seems to have
been the unofficial leader of the expedition which resulted in
a tit-for-tat "massacre” of Schenectady.

Governor Denonville

had intended to invade Albany, thereby striking at the heart
of the province of New York

(such was the perception in

Quebec).9 Eighty Sault and Mountain Iroquois, 16 Algonquins,
and 110 Frenchmen set out from Montreal in late January, and
as they reached south of Lake George, the Indians asked the
commanders of the operation, Ste. Helene and de Mantet, what
the exact plan was.10

The officers replied that Albany was

the hoped-for target,

and on hearing this the tribesmen

reserved no disdain for this foolhardy plan.
mostly Sault,

knew the geography well,

These Indians,

and explained the

difficulties they would have in attacking the largest and most

9C11A 11:186-188; DHNY 1:180; Guillaume Phips, who wrote
the "Relation de ce qui s ’est passe..." says "as it was the
capital of New York and a considerable place." in Collection
des Manuscrits. contenant lettres. memoires et autres
documents historioues relatifs a la Nouvelle-France 4 vols.
(Quebec: A. Cote, 1883-1885), 1:489.
10NYCD 9:466; Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston
Indian Records. 1666-1723 (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical
Association, 1956), p. 158 (hereafter cited as LIR).
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heavily fortified settlement

in the

region.

One

Indian

(probably Kryn) even asked the Frenchmen when they had become
so desperate.

The response had to do with wounded honor from

the Lachine massacre, and the desire to avenge that blow, or
to die in the attempt.

But Indians were much more pragmatic

than to go or. a suicide mission and would not accept this
plan.

The bicultural group agreed to disagree until they

reached the fork in the path leading to Albany and to the
sleepy hamlet of Schenectady west of it.

At that crossroads,

the Indians managed to convince the Frenchmen to veer to the
west, perhaps by simply refusing to participate in the attack
if it was to be on the larger town.

Or the French may have

deferred to the natives' superior knowledge of the area; they
were quick to admit in accounts of this event that these
Indians knew what they were talking about.11
Having almost reached Schenectady, the group stopped and
was given a pep talk by Kryn.

He harangued them and exhorted

them to forget their weariness and to fight hard for the cause
of avenging the deaths of the previous summer at the hands of
the Iroquois.

Kryn spoke of the Five Nations as traitors

because they had heeded the solicitation of the English —
harsh words for a fellow Iroquois.12

This of course earned

11DHNY 1:186-187.
12NYCD 9:467; Pierre F.-X. Charlevoix, History and General
Description of New France 6 vols., John G. Shea, ed. and
trans.
(New York:
Harper,
1866-1872),
4:123;
Claude
Bacqueville
de
la
Potherie,
Histoire
de
l'Americxue
Septentrionale 4 vols. (Paris: 1722), 3:67.
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him the praise of the French, who spoke in glowing terms;
"this Indian was without contradiction the most considerable
of his tribe, an honest man, as full of spirit, prudence and
generosity as possible, and capable at the same time of the
grandest undertakings.1,13 Charlevoix later claimed that Kryn
"with great eloquence, [spoke] with an authority acquired, not
only over the Indians, but even over the French, by his great
services to the colony, actions of admirable conception and
heroic

valour,

eminent

virtue,

and

untiring

zeal

for

religion."14 In French eyes, Kryn was the most prominent and
admired Kahnawake Indian because he was the most pro-French.
The Schenectadians did not expect to be attacked in the
middle of winter when the snow was

so deep;

they had a

stockade fortification around their village but had left the
gates wide open on the night of February 9.15

They were

awakened in the early morning to the cries of the invaders,
who spared hardly anyone except one Scottish family and about
thirty Mohawks who were in the village.

According to every

French account of the event, the Mohawks were spared because
the French and Mission Indians wanted to make a point that
they believed the English had been the

force behind the

13NYCD 9:467.
14Charlevoix, History 4:123.
15W.H. Whitmore, ed., The Andros Tracts 8 vols. (New York:
Franklin, 1971, reprinted from the 1874 ed.), 3:114.
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Lachine massacre which they were avenging.16

However,

it

seems a bit far-fetched to absolve the Iroquois of blame for
attacking Lachine, even if the English encouraged them.

They

still carried out the raid and did the killing, looting, and
burning.

Since the mission Iroquois were so prominent in the

decision-making on this occasion, they may have insisted on
clemency for the Mohawks because they were kinsmen.

There had

been no problems with keeping the Sault Iroquois from changing
their minds about participating in the expedition on the way
down to Schenectady as there had been three years earlier en
route to Seneca country; they felt much more at ease about
military operations against Europeans with whom they had no
blood ties.
matter.

Members of their own tribe were a different

Still in 1690 as at Lachine the preceding year, the

invading force had strong reservations about inflicting harm
on others of Iroquois ancestry and spared fellow Indians while
shooting at whites.
The officials at Albany managed to persuade some League
Mohawks to pursue the French and mission Indian forces as the
latter were

returning

home

with

their thirty

Mohawks from the first two castles,
Mohawk

Lawrence,

joined

some

prisoners.

led by the Anglophile

militiamen

from Albany

and

16Collection des Maunscrits 1:491; NYCD 9:468; Reuben Gold
Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents 73
vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901), 64:61 (hereafter cited
as JR); Nellis M. Crouse, LeMovne d 1Iberville. Soldier of New
France (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 5758.
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marched toward Lake Champlain.

Lieutenant-Governor Leisler

praised the eastern Iroquois for their "fidelity and courage"
in chasing the enemy, but other accounts indicated that there
had been difficulty in rousing the Mohawks and that the third
castle had declined to send any men.17

Factionalism reigned

among the League Mohawks as well as among the Sault Iroquois;
the third castle was evidently the pro-French or neutral
group, holding out against the pro-English castles led by
Lawrence because the Mohawks at Schenectady had been spared or
because they were more positively disposed toward their Sault
brethren (or for both reasons).

Lawrence's band captured

fifteen and killed three of the French-allied Indian group,
but whether the three unfortunate ones were white or Indian is
not known.18
The neutral or Francophile faction among the League
Mohawks

became

Kahnawake

more

Indians

had

forceful
joined

in
an

the

following

assault

against

months.
English

settlements in northern New England near Salmon Falls.

The

governor of Connecticut expected to count on the support of
the League Mohawks to avenge these attacks by French-allied
Indians, but Robert Livingston complained of the Mohawks'
reluctance on this occasion to chase the "French praying
Indians."19

Sault and League Iroquois with loaded guns were

17DHNY 1:191, 2:87-88; NYCD 3:700, 708, 717.
18NYCD 3:708.
19NYCD 3:728-729. fRAPO 1927-28, p. 45 re: expedition).
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still keeping their distance from each other.
On the Sault Iroquois expedition in New England in the
spring of 1690, Kryn was accidentally killed by a Frenchallied Abenaki who mistook him for an enemy.20

One might

guess that Kryn's death would result in a withering of proFrench

(anti-League)

sentiment at the Sault village,

but

Kryn's nephew, La Plaque, picked up the torch where his uncle
had left it, and this younger Francophile headman made himself
prominent as a trigger-happy reconnaissance man.

(But it is

unclear how much support he had among the Sault people.)

He

frequently ventured south of Montreal toward Lake Champlain to
check for invading English and Iroquois, and at times seemed
to be crying wolf.21
However,

in July 1690, Major-General John Winthrop of

Massachusetts attempted to bring a force from several colonies
to invade Montreal, coinciding with a naval attack from New
England on Quebec.
failed,

The naval attempt led by Sir William Phips

as did Winthrop's land expedition.

Winthrop had

trouble getting the Iroquois to join the force in sufficient
20Collection des Manuscrits 1:500-501; "Relation de ce qui
s'est passe..." Historical Documents. pp. 47-48;
Potherie
1:347-348.
21See for instance, Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie
F3 (Collection Moreau de Saint-Mery, 1540-1806, 270 vols.),
2:249; Louis Armand de Lorn D'Arce de Lahontan, New Vovaaes to
North America (2nd.ed.) 2 vols. (London: Bonwicke, 1735),
1:158; NYCD 9:479-480; Louis Armand de Lorn D'Arce de Lahontan,
The Oakes Collection: new documents bv Lahontan. Gustave
Lanctot, ed. (Ottawa: Patenaude, 1940), p. 33. (La Plaque was
a true French zealot; he went to France to meet the king.
Potherie, Histoire 1:166.)
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numbers.

He attempted to heighten the fervor of at least

those Mohawks who had arrived, by feigning interest in the
Mohawk chiefs' advice on strategy.
answers to his questions,
patronizing attitude.

They gave him outrageous

a display of contempt

for his

But when the assembled men got as far

as Wood Creek and had to turn back because of delays caused by
sickness among the troops and a lack of canoes, Winthrop sent
John Schuyler, the Albanian, on to conduct as much border
raiding as possible, accompanied by whoever would continue.22
Forty militia and one hundred Indians, most of them Mohawks,
continued on to New France.

The Mohawk headmen may have

viewed Winthrop with a contemptuous eye, but John Schuyler was
popular among them, and what had originally looked like a
feeble effort from Iroquois forces turned out to be a strong
showing.23
French forces had known of the approach of the English
and Iroquois because of La Plaque's reconnaisance efforts.
Throughout late August, the French assembled as many able male
bodies as possible at the fort of La Prairie.

They took the

threat seriously; even Governor Frontenac was on hand at the
fort.

He called on his Indian allies from the northern Great

22The Senecas had previously indicated they would provide
some fighters for this cause, but a smallpox epidemic took its
toll in the Seneca villages, and none arrived. (NYCD 9:461,
3:717; Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial New York:
The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1960), p. 304.
^ NYCD 4:193-196; Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse,"
pp. 294-295.
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Lakes as well as from the St. Lawrence valley to join them.
All sorts of bribery were used to encourage natives, including
liquor.24
Many Sault Indians were on hand and called a meeting of
all the chiefs of the various tribes represented, inviting
them

to

visit

announcement.

with

Front enac

and

to

hear

an

important

The speaker was Louis Ateriata, a controversial

and enigmatic figure.25

Ateriata offered wampum belts along

with his words, a sign that he meant seriously what he was
saying.

He exhorted each of the assembled headmen to "open

his heart to Frontenac" as promised, and not to hide from him
any

transaction

or

communication,

no matter

how

secret.

Everyone knew that he implied communication with the Iroquois.
Some

French-allied

tribes

had

been

opening

diplomatic relations with the Five Nations,

their

own

since the war

between the League and the French seemed as though it would
continue indefinitely and these Indians were desperate to stop
the carnage of their own people.
Louis Ateriata was proving to be resolutely pro-French,

24BXSB 9:480.
25The biography of him in the Dictionary of Canadian
Biography confuses him with
another Indian.
He was
controversial because despite being extremely pro-French, the
Jesuits had him banished from Kahnawake for some unknown
reason. He correctly predicted an Iroquois invasion but the
Jesuits at the Sault told Calliere not to listen to anything
that Louis Ateriata said.
(Collection des Manuscrits 1:568;
"Relation de ce qui s'est passe..." Historical Documents, p.
25; Henri Bechard, "Tareha," Dictionary of Canadian Biography
Vol. 1, pp. 633-634.
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an ardent successor to Kryn (La Plaque was also strongly proFrench, but did not seem to be the speechmaker). He announced
to the assembled Ottawa chiefs that he (Louis) was aware of
their secret negotiations with the Iroquois and warned that
they had some explaining to do as to why they carried on these
talks

while

still

considering

themselves

allies

of

Frontenac.26 The Ottawa orator answered that they had indeed
exchanged some prisoners and negotiated,

but reminded the

assembly that they had been forced by the French to declare
war on the Five Nations,

"to cease and renew hostilities

without having been advised of the reason," that such a
situation made no sense to them, and that the French did not
come to their defense when they needed help in fighting the
enemy of the French.

They had decided to look out for

themselves in order to survive.27
Other French allies at this meeting (which Louis Ateriata
was using to rally support for the fleur-de-lys) heard these
words and started to question French integrity.

A Huron

speaker later asked why the French, on one hand, insisted that
their Indian allies fight the Iroquois at every chance, and,
on the other, spared thirty of them at Schenectady.28

The

26Potherie, Histoire 3:99.
27NYCD 9:480.
28NYCD 9:481. The League Mohawks explicitly stated they
did not kill those they captured on the French/Indian retreat
from Schenectady in February 1690 and at La Prairie in the
summer of 1690 because the French-allied Iroquois had spared
the lives of 30 Mohawks at Schenectady. (NYCD 9:499.)
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Sault Iroquois were not the only ones who had ever become
disillusioned with the French; these other allies also became
jaded with a European power which made a policy of double
standards and of getting Indians to do most of their dirty
work for them.

While the Hurons were complaining that the

French had spared Mohawks while they were out in the woods
losing their young men to Iroquois bullets, they may not have
known that

it was probably done as a concession to the

Kahnawake allies.

Frontenac did not let on in his reply that

this was the case, lest he suffer a revolt of his allied
Indians who did not appreciate special treatment for certain
native groups.
The events which followed indicated that most Indian
allies were not eager to fight French battles.

A scouting

party had been sent out toward Chambly a few days before the
meeting of allied representatives and Frontenac called by
Sault Indians.

The scouting party consisted of two Frenchmen

and eight Indians (two from each major tribe represented).
The ten men had not gone as far as they were instructed to,
stopping at Chambly, they said, because they had not seen any
trails.

From this report, the alarm which had gathered so

many habitants and troops as well as Indians at La Prairie
seemed to have been false, and since many were impatient to be
back home for the harvest, Frontenac released everyone and
returned to Montreal.
No record exists to explain the decision made by the
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scouting party, but the official French account blamed the
failure of the ten scouts to detect the enemy so close to La
Prairie

on the

eight

Indians.

Eight could easily have

outnumbered two in deciding to report no danger and to disband
the forces.

The official account spoke of the "negligence" of

the Indians and reasoned that the latter were also eager to
return home,

thereby underestimating the possibility that

enemy forces were on their way through the woods.29

In any

case, two days after most of the men at La Prairie returned
home, the Iroquois and English led by John Schuyler raided the
outpost, catching the inhabitants off guard, killing twelve
men and taking nineteen prisoners.

By their "negligence," the

scouting party had managed to avoid a direct confrontation
with Five Nations fighters.
The La Prairie incident may have caused people on both
sides of Lake Champlain to think about the status of LeagueSault relations; some Kahnawakes who had remained in the area
may have been among those wounded or killed by the Mohawks
allied with Schuyler.30

The

Catholic Iroquois and their

brothers who remained in the Iroquois League were one step
closer to fratricide.
Conversely, the summer of 1690 also brought a return to
normal life of sorts for the Kahnawakes;

they left their

makeshift tents in Montreal and built longhouses at their new
^NYCD 9:481.
30Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse," pp. 294-295.
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village site at Sault Saint-Louis.

The French helped them

resettle by transporting their supplies and giving them "every
assistance necessary both for their subsistence and for the
security of their families,

and to induce them to wage a

vigorous war on the enemy."31

Security considerations were

never far from French minds, and as their aid to the Sault
Iroquois indicates,

they expected the latter to fight the

League Iroquois and the English for them.32

Sixteen ninety-one was the year of decision in KahnawakeFive Nations relations.

But it started with a strange and

unpredictable turn of events.

In March,

a group of 140

Mohawks and Albanians attacked a group of Sault and Mountain
Iroquois who were on a hunting trip near Chambly.

Taking

prisoners as they did was standard procedure, but the next
action of the League Mohawks was unorthodox.

They sent three

of their men as envoys with some of the Sault prisoners to the
gates of Fort Sault Saint-Louis unarmed, and asked for peace
with the Mission Iroquois and with Frontenac.

There were a

few minutes of great tension, after which the Sault people
decided that they meant no harm and indeed came in peace. The
envoys (and prisoners) were admitted inside and, according to
Jesuit Father Bruyas, "were well received by our Indians, who
31NYCD 9:453.
32Daniel Richter says the Sault Indians bore the brunt of
the war for the French. (Richter, "The Ordeal of the
Longhouse," p . 367.)
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were greatly rejoiced at seeing them so well inclined."33
Gifts were exchanged, and an impromptu peace conference was
underway.

The League Mohawks ingratiated themselves with

their Sault counterparts by warning them of an imminent Five
Nations attack of eight hundred men.34

With belts of wampum

to reinforce their words, the Kahnawakes thanked them for the
warning and for sparing their captives, but admonished them
that if they truly meant to live at peace with Onontio (the
Iroquois name for the Governor of New France), which according
to

Father

Bruyas,

they

equated

with

"living

under

his

authority, as true children should do," they must not go back
on their word, as some Onondagas had done.
The pro-French Kahnawakes were the ascendant faction at
this meeting under the noses of the Jesuits, evident from
their assumption that peace with Onontio meant living under
his authority.

The Sault orator explained to the League

delegates that making peace with the Sault Indians meant being
at peace with all of their "brethren," among whom were "the
Christians of La Montagne,

of Lorette,

and of Sillery."35

The pro-French faction among the Kahnawakes identified more
closely

with

other

mission

Indians

traditionalist relatives in Iroquoia.

than

with

their

Or possibly this was

33JR 64:57; Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C U E (Des
Limites et des Postes, 1651-1818, 38 vols.), 10:22 (hereafter
cited as C U E ) .
^ NYCD 9:503; JR 64:57.
35JR 64:59.
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said in the presence of the Jesuits to appease them,

in any

case, belts of wampum accompanied these words so they were
binding, and League Iroquois were given the impression that
the

Sault

Iroquois

identified

more

with

other

"mission

Indians" than with the Iroquois proper.
As for official words from the League Mohawks, they used
no wampum in their speech,

according to Bruyas'

account.

Therefore, these Mohawks did not represent a general consensus
among

their

people;

they were

a

renegade

peace

faction

(neutral or pro-French). They admitted that only the warriors
among their people asked for peace "and have concluded it on
their own account, and not through the Elders - whom they
would not consult, because they [Elders] are not always very
sincere."

These men went on to explain that "moreover, all

those among the Agniers [Mohawks] who had sense are dead."36
The depopulation of the Five Nations by disease and war had
taken its toll on the political culture of the Mohawks; they
faced a leadership crisis because so many of their people had
died, and perhaps some of the more sagacious and cautious
elders had fallen victim to smallpox or extreme factionalism.
The peace delegation to the Sault in the spring of 1691 was a
group which represented only one faction among the tribe;
since politics relied on consensus, the only solution to an
impasse was to break off into a splinter group and attempt to
form policy independently.
36JR 64:59-61.
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Meanwhile the war (pro-English) faction among the League
Mohawks was preparing for the invasion of which the Sault
Iroquois had been warned.

The League Mohawk peace faction

warned the Kahnawakes not to stray from their fort lest they
be captured by Iroquois or Mahican war parties prowling the
area.

This peace faction was out on a limb with its warnings

and promises to settle for peace and to exchange prisoners.
One wishes for names of individuals and for knowledge of their
fates at the hands of their own people because of these
treasonous actions.
At the Sault these mysterious pacifists left behind two
of their own as a gesture of faith.37 Father Bruyas pondered
their sincerity and judged it true.

He admitted that others

(probably Father Lamberville, who was at Sault Saint-Louis)
doubted

them,

but

Bruyas

was

hopeful.

He

reported

to

Frontenac the Sault Iroquois’ elation at the outcome of the
visit, and that they ardently wished for peace as well, being
weary of war as well as of disease, which had struck the Sault
as well

as

optimistic

League
about

Iroquois

communities.

entente between

the

Bruyas was

League

and

so

Mission

Iroquois that he predicted that two-thirds of the Mohawks
would be living at the Sault eventually.38

37And according to another account, 25 League Mohawks
stayed behind to visit with their relatives. (NYCD 9:499.)
38JR 64:63. Robert Livingston reported in 1700 that twothirds of that nation had emigrated to the two mission
villages (the Sault and the Mountain). (NYCD 4:648.)
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However,

another French account of the Mohawk peace

delegation visit indicated that the envoys' message was to
entreat the Sault Iroquois to return to their homeland before
the onslaught of the Five Nations/English force.

This force

of 800 soldiers meant to capture as many Sault Indians as
possible, Intendant Champigny claimed in his letter to the
minister of marine, and to resettle them forcibly in Iroquoia,
as well as to inflict damage on as many French settlements as
possible.

Champigny

proudly

reported

that

"our

Indians

encouraged by their missionaries, and aided by a reinforcement
M. de Callieres had sent them, remained faithful."39

With

such "encouragement," however, these Indians could hardly have
made a free decision.
According to the Intendant, the Sault Iroquois told the
League Mohawk diplomats that if they wanted peace with the
Sault people, they would have to talk to Frontenac.

It seems

difficult to believe that these people would voluntarily
relinquish their sovereignty and defer their own fate to the
French government.

There must have been encouragement to say

these words, and all but the pro-French faction must have
shaken their heads in dismay.

Furthermore,

the condition

placed on the negotiations by the Sault speaker —

that the

League Mohawks had to consider themselves brothers of all the
Mission Indians, not just the Sault people — may have been a
device by which to ensure great difficulty in reaching an
39NYCD 9:499.
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agreement.

The French had just started their war with the

English and wanted their Indian allies to do most of the
fighting.

It may have been in French interests to avoid a

peace with any group of the League Iroquois.

Bruyas' wishes

for peace

in government

circles.

could not have been

appreciated

(Sometimes Jesuits were at odds with policy instead

of aiding it.40)

Champigny expressed grave doubts about the

sincerity of the peace group and predicted an escalation of
hostilities instead of a cease-fire.41
In

Albany

the meeting

at

Kahnawake was

interpreted

differently from both Bruyas1 and Champigny's accounts.

For

instance, the New York Council was told that the "praying
Indians"
Onnooka,

desired

to

Anglophile

return

to

Mohawks,

New

York.42

reported

to

Jurrian
the

and

Albany

authorities that Lawrence the Mohawk had gone inside the fort
at Kahnawake not to make peace, but to make war, and failed to
do so only upon seeing that his life was in danger.

Jurrian

and Onnooka failed to mention that the Mohawks warned the
Sault Iroquois of the coming Iroquois attack, relaying only
that the French government and the Sault people had thanked
their Mohawk counterparts for returned prisoners, and that the
Mission Iroquois expressed interest in emigrating to New York
40See William J. Eccles, Canada Under Louis XIV. 1663-1701
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), p. 133.
41NYCD 9:500.
42New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783,
Library, Old Vol. 6 p. 17 (Calendar p. 64).

New York State
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if a priest would be provided there.

According to these two

messengers, the governor of New France declared that he would
leave most points of diplomacy to his "Children the praying
Indians

att

Caguinago

[Kahnawake]."43

The

discrepancy

between this interpretation and the Kahnawakes' own apparent
resignation of their affairs to the French
accounts

is

glaring.

hostilities went

It

is

no

wonder

in the other

that

years

of

on between the French and their allied

Indians and the English and theirs, given the wildly different
reports each side got of the same events.
Frontenac

seems

to

have

doubted

League

Iroquois

intentions for peace, but decided to play the game which had
been started.

He advised Calliere, the governor of Montreal,

to continue the peace talks started by the Mohawks, "by the
mediation of our Indians of the Sault."44 He did not want to
appear too eager for peace, so he used the Sault Iroquois as
a go-between to cover his intentions, as he explained to the
minister, "in order that it may not appear that I made any
advances on my side."45

This policy, intended or not, had

the effect of scuttling chances of

its success with the

governor of New York, who claimed the right to be involved in
43New York Colonial Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.), New
York State Library, 37:56. (Interestingly, this version
indicates that the Sault Iroquois included,
in their
negotiation offer, six points of religion on which they would
not compromise.)
“ RAPS 1927-28, p. 62.
45NYCD 9:496.
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any negotiation the Five Nations entertained with another
power.

Some League Mohawks told Governor Fletcher of the

meeting at Kahnawake and the desire for peace, asking him how
they

should respond.

He

answered

that they

should not

consider any proposals from the Mission Iroquois, probably
because he jealously eyed the budding role of the Kahnawakes
as intermediaries between the French and the League Iroquois,
wanting that role for his own government.

He prohibited the

Five Nations from communicating with the Sault Iroquois.46
Nor did most of the Five Nations want peace with the
Sault Iroquois on the terms of the spring 1691 talks.

In June

of that year, a group of League Mohawks addressed Governor
Fletcher's

replacement,

Governor

Henry

Sloughter.

They

represented the wishes of the Sault Iroquois for peace and for
the return of some Sault prisoners taken by the Senecas, and
bid

the

Sloughter

other
asked

four

nations

to

representatives

opinion of the offer.

agree
of

the

to

this

others

proposal.
for their

An Oneida speaker representing the four

upper nations spoke of the treachery and deceit of the French,
thereby refusing to consider the Mohawk proposal.

Sloughter

agreed, and a majority of the Iroquois along with the New York
government scuttled the Mohawk-Sault peace offer.47
Not all Mohawks advocated the peace policy in the spring
^Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. Charles Howard Mcllwain,
ed. (New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), pp. 16-17.
47NYCD 3:777-780.
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of 1691.

Some accompanied Oneidas and other Iroquois in

raiding along the St. Lawrence at the Long Sault.

They were

met by some mission Indians and Frenchmen led by Frangois Le
Moyne de Bienville.48

The French and mission Indian group

deliberated for a long time whether to attack the invaders or
allow them to pass, because of the peace negotiations pending.
Finally,

the

Sault

Iroquois,

the

majority

among

the

French/Indian group, convinced the Frenchmen not to harm them,
and some were allowed to go with the mission Indians to
Montreal.49

Later they were allowed to return to New York

unharmed, which upset some of the French.

They viewed the

role of the Sault Iroquois in this incident not as peace
makers, but as a fifth column among the French working to
further the intrigues of the Five Nations and the English.
The Kahnawakes had aided in the escape of Iroquois bandits
from French justice,

as Frontenac saw it.

He had always

mistrusted them, occasionally relenting in this opinion for
individual cases such as Kryn and Paul.50

On this occasion,

however, he told the minister, "there has been much outcry
against the Indians of the Sault, and their conduct has been
suspected of insincerity, I have long since perceived a great
indulgence that does not please me, any more than certain

^On Bienville, see "Frangois Le Moyne de Bienville," by
Jean Blain, in Dictionary of Canadian Biography 1:463.
49NYCD 9:517.
50On Paul's fidelity, see Potherie, Histoire 1:349-350.
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secret intercourse and connexion which they maintain with the
Mohawks, among whom they have many kindred."51
Frontenac also suspected that the Jesuits at the Sault
winked at the secret dealings between the Sault and League
Mohawks.

At the very time when bloodshed broke out between

the two groups of Mohawks, the Christian ones were suspected
of working for the other side.

But those who avoided the

battle may have only been attempting to avoid the nightmare of
seeing a relative fall from one's own bullet or arrow.
When Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, commander of the
troops in Canada,

met a party of forty-to-fifty Oneidas,

however, he showed no mercy but attacked them vigorously,
burning down a building in which they took shelter.

He

apparently had no Kahnawake fighters in his party.52

The

presence or absence of Sault Iroquois men in a guerilla party
seems to have made a difference as to whether or not the party
would attack the invaders.
watchful

eye

of

Jesuits

While at the Sault under the
and

garrisoned

French

troops,

Kahnawakes may have had a policy dictated to them, but when
out in the woods

in a small group,

especially when they

outnumbered Frenchmen, they usually got their way.

Perhaps

this is why they were so heavily involved in these small-scale
forays; it was an opportunity to have a great deal of control
over foreign policy.
51Charlevoix, History 4:197; C11A ll:233v.
52NYCD 9:517-518.
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Many Kahnawakes still wanted peace in late spring; so did
some Iroquois.

While some Five Nations fighters were raiding

French and- even allied Indian targets (such as the Mountain
Mission), others sent a secret wampum belt of reconciliation
to Louis Ateriata at the Sault.

It offered a chance for the

Kahnawakes to escape to New York before hostilities worsened
and pitted League and Sault Iroquois directly against each
other.53

But the Iroquois who sent this belt made a serious

mistake because Louis Ateriata was firmly entrenched in the
pro-French camp at the Sault, and he demonstrated his loyalty
to the French government above other allegiances by promptly
showing the secret belt to Callieres instead of conspiring for
an escape to New York.

Because of this,

the scheme was

aborted, but it indicated an active pro-peace faction among
the Five Nations.
People were still travelling back and forth between the
Sault and Iroquoia.

A Mohawk named Taonnochrio who was sent

to Kahnawake reported that although he had returned,
others had stayed at the mission village.54

ten

Simon Groot, a

Dutchman who had been a prisoner at the Sault and was recently
released,

informed the Albany authorities

that the Sault

village was strongly stockaded and that some of those Indians
were "inclined to come hither, but strict guards [were] kept

53NYCD 9:518.
54NYCD 3:782.
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by the French to prevent their departure."55

Taonnochrio

told Robert Livingston (the Albany Indian commissioner) of his
trip to the Sault, reporting that while there he heard a rumor
that the French were making canoes to go to war.

He asked his

aunt, a Sault Iroquois, why the French were making so many of
them, imploring her to "tell me plainly and do not hide it
from me, for I will not stay here, & suffer my people to be
cut off."

The woman admitted to her nephew that indeed, the

very next day, thirty "praying Indians" would be going out to
"annoy" the Onondagas.

Another Sault Indian confirmed the

story for Taonnochrio and implored the latter or any of the
Mohawks not to go to where the skirmish would take place.56
Sault Iroquois were going to war against some Five Nations
people, while warning others of the danger they themselves
posed.
In June 1691, Major Peter Schuyler assembled his forces
of New Yorkers and Indians for a combined assault on the
French near Montreal.

He had trouble getting all of the

Mohawks to come with him,
faction among them.
full

forces,

but

no doubt because of the peace

The first two Mohawk villages sent their
the

third

could

not

yet

decide.

The

expedition lost track of some Mohawks along the way north
through

the

Lake

George-Lake

Champlain

corridor.

These

Mohawks had said they were going hunting and would meet the
55NYCD 3:781.
56NYCD 3:782.
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army further north, but did not reappear.

Some Schagticoke

Indians also ducked out along the way.57 This behavior calls
to mind the Sault Iroquois reluctance to join the 1687 Seneca
campaign.

There is no doubt that these Mohawk and other

Indians knew that the French army they would meet on the
southern shore of the St. Lawrence would include Indians,
perhaps their own clansmen.
Whereas John Schuyler's raid in the summer of 1690 was a
close call in terms of open fighting between Sault and League
Mohawks, his brother's attack the following summer was not a
false alarm.

It was the real thing.

Even before the two

armies met, Sault and League Iroquois fighters were pointing
guns at each other.

Schuyler sent out four Mohawk spies near

Chambly, who met eight French "praying Indians."

The eight

demanded to know where the four were from and were answered.
The eight then asked their names, and the League Mohawks said
they need not give this information.

The "praying Indians"

replied to this with bullets, wounding three.58
A few days later,
between

Schuyler's

a battle took place at La Prairie

forces

and

a

French

army

which

had

assembled at the fort there on the advice received from some
Mohawks.

The English attacked furiously, but the French soon

rallied and fought back with surprising strength, forcing the

57NYCD 3:800-803.
58NYCD 3:803.
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English and Mohawks to a running retreat.59

This was the

first real battle which pitted Sault against League Mohawks,
but there were very few Sault Iroquois present.
pleaded respect for the peace proposal.

Some may have

Probably only the

most loyal to the French were there; those who fought did so
commendably and were praised by the French.
One Kahnawake warrior named Paul, a fervent Christian,
fought courageously and lost his life on the battlefield,
exhorting his compatriots to fight on even as he fell.60 But
others from the Sault waited until the fighting was over, at
which time they approached the battlefield and counted and
pillaged the bodies.
especially

since

The French were not impressed with this,

they

expected

these

fresh,

well-rested

Indians to pursue the enemy back down toward Lake Champlain,
as those who had fought in the battle were too tired to do so.
But the Sault Iroquois soon found an excuse to leave; claiming
to hear gunfire and running toward it, they left the battle
site.

The gunshots were merely part of a burial ceremony for

the officers who had died, but they had served as an excuse
for the Sault Iroquois fighters who were not as pro-French as
their neighbor Paul.61

And even his death did not motivate

59Lahontan, New Voyages 1:174.
^RAPO 1927-28, p. 65; C11A ll:301v; NYCD 9:521-522;
Edward James Devine, Historic Cauqhnawacra (Montreal: Messenger
Press, 1922), p. 102.
61NYCD 9:523; RAPO 1927-28, p. 68-70. (The Lorette Huron
Indians were cited as "the most loyal Indians that we have"
during the summer of 1691. The Sault Iroquois did not receive
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them to take revenge on the League Mohawks.

Perhaps the anti-

French Kahnawakes even welcomed his death.
The French authorities did not look kindly on the conduct
of the neutral Sault Iroquois
summer.

in the hostilities

of the

By fall, they began to suspect Kahnawake sincerity

and that

of the Mohawks who had come to the Sault the

preceding

spring.

One

official

claimed

that

the

peace

delegation was just an excuse for the Mohawks to take shelter
among their relatives so as to avoid retaliatory action for
being so far into New France territory.62

Frontenac also

said as much to the minister, and blamed the Kahnawakes for
going along with it, "suspect[ing] that the conduct of the
Sault Indians was not completely right and sincere."63
Frontenac suspected Jesuit complicity.

He had always

been at odds with this religious order, but had to tolerate
their presence.
them

for

In 1691, indeed, he needed to be grateful to

continuing

(especially Mohawk)

to

attract

more

League

Iroquois

immigrants to Sault Saint-Louis.

In

August, the New York governor and his Council had to admit to
the English king that Mohawks were still emigrating to the
French mission, to the point that the remaining Mohawks could

such praise, in
Histoire 3:139.)

contrast

to

the

1687

battle.

Potherie,

62C11A 11:300.
63RAPO 1927-28, p. 68.
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no longer provide an effective fighting force.64

Frontenac

saw treachery among the mission Iroquois on one hand, but on
the

other> a valuable attraction which was draining the

enemy's fighting strength.
activity

fell

Fortunately,

Iroquois military

off greatly after the summer skirmish and

Frontenac kept his complaints to a minimum.
When it came time to prepare for the next French military
plan —

to take Iroquois prisoners at Michilimackinac, where

the Five Nations and some Albany allies had been ho m i n g in on
the French fur trade,
intrigues

such as

complaining

French

"it was retarded by various secret

are commonly
official

resorted to here."

was

Indians' efforts to stop the war.

referring

to

the

The
Sault

The latter postulated, with

belts of wampum to add weight to their words, that the colony
would lose its best men if the war was further escalated by
carrying out the Michilimackinac expedition.

But "these new

Councillors of State," as the Kahnawakes involved were called
on

this

occasion,

were

ignored

because

Frontenac

was

suspicious about their motives for pacifism.65 Nevertheless,
the peace faction at the Sault was alive and well in late
1691, not having given in to the pro-French pressure from
zealots such as La Plaque.
But

this

hostilities.

was

the

last

hope

for

any

cessation

of

A direct Five Nations attack on Kahnawake people

^NYCD 3:799.
65NYCD 9:526.
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would discredit the peace faction at the Sault (which relied
on the notion that the Five Nations did not want war) and in
December, an attack finally erupted.

League Iroquois warriors

were ready by that time to join New York soldiers against
targets to the north.

A group fell on some Kahnawakes out

hunting near Chambly and killed several of them outright (a
change

from

the

earlier practice

of merely

taking

them

prisoner). But the Sault and Mountain Iroquois and the French
got word of the attack and pursued the enemy south to Lake
Champlain.

The two sides fought each other, no holds barred,

and all of the "principall Captains" of the League Mohawks and
Oneidas

were

killed.66

The

Mohawks

particularly

were

devastated by this loss; they had no leading men and only 130
warriors left in their villages.

They refused to fight any

more after this routing.67 .
But the Kahnawakes had their hands full with the central
and western Iroquois tribes in the next couple of years.
Various skirmishes erupted in 1692 between Sault and League
fighters,

with

deaths

on

both

sides.68

Both

sides

had

^CllA 12:97; NYCD 9:534.
67NYCD 3:815, 817.
68NYCD 9:534, 3:836. In August 1692, a war party of Five
Nations men assured Peter Schuyler (Mayor of Albany) that they
would shortly bring the "praying Indians” to their knees.
This may have been only to appease Schuyler, as any Indian
group would have done (the Sault Indians did this in front of
Jesuits and other French authorities), but may also have been
a signal that as far as the League was concerned, the time for
full-scale hostilities between the Sault and League brethren
was at hand. CLIR 162.)
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suffered great losses in warfare before this phase of the war
began, so both were limited to small-scale raids for most of
the year.

The French had to abandon a plan to attack iroquoia

for lack of troops.69

By November,

however,

400 western

Iroquois approached the palisade at the fort of Sault SaintLouis.

They did not launch an open attack, but initiated

sporadic exchanges of fire.

An equally large group of eastern

Iroquois had planned to join them, but on learning of their
lack of success, retreated and hit outpost settlements along
the south shore of the St. Lawrence instead.
Large

numbers

of

troops

were

called

in

from

other

Montreal area forts to help defend Kahnawake.70 Whether some
Sault people liked it or not, they were now unmistakeably at
war with the Iroquois proper, but some did not mind this at
all.71

The Oneida Sault chief Tataconicere took relish in

dragging a prisoner, the wife of a League Iroquois chief,
outside the palisade at the Sault and striking her on the head
until she died.

He did this because he had heard a rumor that

she was considering an attempt to escape.

After killing her,

he flung his hatchet into the gate by the palisade as a sign
that he would show mercy to no one, and invited his fellow
Sault inhabitants to do likewise.72

This zealous display of

69C11A 12:182.
70Charlevoix, History 4:232-233; C11A 12:183.
71C11A 12 :87v

; NYCD

9:538.

^NYCD 9:556.
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fidelity to the French cause elicited words of praise from
Intendant Champigny: "one cannot see more faithfulness and
bravery than our Indians are showing on all occasions."

He

added that his administration had "a very great interest in
treating them well."73
There were mixed signals on both sides of the KahnawakeFrench

relationship

in

1692.

While

some

Kahnawake

"councillors of state" had made a last-ditch effort at peace
with the enemy, Tataconicere showed no mercy, and La Plague
had returned from his visit to France geared up to fight the
Iroquois at full capacity.

He actively recruited Sault and

other mission men to field a war party for that purpose.74
Depending on which individuals at the Sault one looked at, one
might see the Sault Indians as "doves" trying to subvert the
French war effort or as "hawks" doing their best to support
the war.

Governor Frontenac perceived only the pacifist (in

his terms, negative) side, whereas Intendant Champigny could
see nothing but great efforts for the French and allied Indian
cause.75
^CllA 12:87v.
74C11A 12:95v; NYCD 9:564.
^Cadwallader Colden, in his History of the Five Indian
Nations... discussed this issue; he explained that the French
wanted the Sault Iroquois to lure more Mohawks and other
Iroquois people to live in New France, but when this did not
happen on a scale large enough to satisfy the Jesuits, the
French became suspicious of Sault communication with the Five
Nations, and viewed it, volte-face, as a source of spy
information for the Iroquois and New Yorkers.
They were
viewed alternately as pillars of the French cause in North
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The issue came to a head during 1692, when some Jesuits
(anonymously)

issued a memoir "on behalf of the Christian

Iroquois in Canada" to Minister of Marine Pontchartrain.

They

were pleading for funds to support members of the Sault
community who had become impoverished over the years during
which

they

had

fought

with

the

French.76

The

crowning

argument was that were it not for these Indians, the Iroquois
would now inhabit the southern shore of the St. Lawrence, and
that the mission Iroquois had even killed some of their own
relatives to prevent this from happening.

The Jesuits who

wrote this petition were truly concerned with the plight of
their "charges"77 and argued that the Kahnawakes had given up
their usual subsistence patterns and means of livelihood for
much of each year since 1684 in order to provide military
support.78

They also pointed out that these people were

America, and as fifth-column traitors.
(Cadwallader Colden,
History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada... 2 vols. (New
York: Allerton, 1922, reprinted from the 1747 edition), 1:179;
also NYCD 9:557.)
76JR 64:109-113; C11A 12:136v-137.
^The term "charges" is used adviseably here; it seems
appropriate in the sense that the Jesuits viewed these Indians
as their charges, but we cannot assume from this that the
Indians saw themselves as charges of the missionaries. More
likely, they saw the Black Robes as diplomats or mediators
between the Indian community and the French government and saw
themselves as independent.
^Sault fighters were starting to demand daily pay when
they went on expeditions with the French, just as French
regular soldiers were entitled to. (C11A 12:193. Another
example of such a demand occurred a few years later (in
Charlevoix, History 5:76-77) (1697) ).
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fighting a war for the French, not a war of their own making.
Despite Frontenac's wariness, Champigny also promoted their
cause at the French court.

And the Jesuit petition on their

behalf made them seem to be a bulwark of the French military
machine.
A few months later, "the concurrence in sentiment of the
oldest and the best heads of the Sault and of the Mountain,
obliged the Count [Frontenac] to direct his attention" to
planning

an

invasion

of

eastern

Iroquoia.79

The

1693

onslaught took place in February, when the French and Mission
Indians would have the advantage of surprising the League
Mohawks in the off-season.

Six hundred habitants. regular

soldiers, Christian Iroquois, Algonquins from Trois Rivieres,
Hurons, and Abenakis descended upon the Mohawk country in the
dead of winter,
easily.

destroying the first two Mohawk villages

Almost all the men were away on hunting trips and the

two villages were barely fortified because of their proximity
to the English settlements.80

The villages were burned and

the women, children, and elderly people taken prisoner.
The

English

in Albany

and

Schenectady

knew

of

the

invading army but did not tell their Mohawk allies, which
later infuriated the Five Nations.

The latter had been

continually enlisted to fight with the English against their
T’NYCD 9:557.
80New York Council Minutes Calendar, p. 81; NYCD 4:2, 6,
19, 39, 9: 550; Potherie, Histoire 1:320-321; Colder., History
1:181-182.
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enemies, and the English constantly spoke to the Iroquois of
their obligations to the English as part of the Covenant Chain
alliance between them, but when the turn came for the English
to assist their Indian allies, they turned a blind eye.81
The third Mohawk village was inhabited by armed men able
to repulse the invaders; they put up a fight, killing thirty
or more of the French and allied Indian forces.

But finally

the attackers gained control and the Mohawks surrendered.
Calliere, the French commander, and Frontenac had ordered that
only

women

According

and
to

children

Pierre

were

to

Charlevoix,

be

spared

the

from

death.

eighteenth-century

historian of New France, the Christian Iroquois agreed to this
policy when they set out from La Prairie.

But at the Mohawk

village, they changed their minds and would not allow the
French to kill any of the prisoners they had just taken.82
One

account

describes

an

exchange

which

between La Plaque and his father, a League Mohawk.

took place
They came

across each other during the fighting at the third village and
the son said, "You have given me life, I give it to you today;
but do not return again under my hand, because I won't save
you [the next time]."83 La Plaque may have issued the threat
for the benefit of his French allies who were watching warily
S1NYCD 4:2, 9:551; Colden, History 1:181-182.
“ Charlevoix, History 4:235; NYCD 9:551, 561.
“ Potherie, Histoire 1:322. (Bacqueville de la Potherie
mistakenly identifies La Plaque as a war chief of the Iroquois
of the Mountain, instead of the Sault.)
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for Sault fidelity.

But the important fact was that even in

this most heated battle,
apparently asked

quarter was given.

for clemency,

The Mohawks

when they surrendered,

volunteering to emigrate to the missions.

by

They claimed they

had been intending to do so for some time, a clever way to
have their captors regard them as new converts rather than as
enemies who should be killed.84

This helped confirm the

worst suspicions of the French about their Indian allies by
inclining the latter to show mercy.
The Sault and Mountain Iroquois were responsible for
scuttling any gains made in the military victory over the
Mohawks; not only did they refuse to allow any of the male
prisoners to be killed, but on the return home, with hundreds
of Mohawk prisoners in their entourage, they found ways to
sabotage French efforts to take the Mohawks all the way to New
France.

They delayed the return march home in order to allow

Iroquois and/or English troops to catch up with them along the
Lake Champlain corridor and released some of the prisoners
when they were able.

Charlevoix claimed that the French

should have foreseen that the Kahnawakes would have done this
because of their "lingering love of country."85

Faced with

the test of taking relatives' lives in order to destroy the
Mohawks as a people,

the Sault Iroquois showed themselves

^NYCD 9:551.
^Charlevoix, History 4:235;
Histoire 1:322-323; NYCD 9:573.

C11A

13:109;

Potherie,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144
unwilling to commit outright fratricide.86
Eventually the Mohawks were able to rebuild, and since
many prisoners escaped or were released,
their homeland to some extent.

they repopulated

But the easternmost tribe of

the Iroquois confederacy was no longer the potent force after
1693 that it had been earlier in the seventeenth century.

The

February invasion was the last straw which broke them as a
formidable power.

Bacquevilie de

la Potherie,

a

French

chronicler of the events of the 1690s, wrote that since the
1693 defeat, "this ... nation has become the smallest of the
Five Nations, and now they are the ones who cause us the least
trouble, although they are neighbours of the English."87
Many Mohawks voluntarily emigrated to the Sault and
Mountain mission villages in the summer of 1693.88

Perhaps,

as in the 1666 defeat, they saw a military devastation of
their homes and their very nation as a sign from spiritual
forces that the Frenchmen's god was the true one and that they
had better capitulate to that deity in order to avoid further
wrath.

Their homes had been destroyed anyway and many had

relatives at the Sault and Mountain villages,

so the 1693

^ h e King wrote a year later to Frontenac and Champigny
that they should stop offering the Christian Indians bounties
for Iroquois scalps, since not even that inducement kept them
from "conniving at the escape of the Mohawks, and rendering
that expedition ... useless." (NYCD 9:573.)
87Potherie, Histoire 1:323.
“ LIR, P- 171; New York Colonial Manuscripts 39:82v-82/2;
NYCD 4:59.
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invasion was the final push convincing many to emigrate.
There was talk of peace between the Five Nations and the
French, and if this had come about (the New York government
and the Albany commissioners did their best to prevent it) it
would have seemed logical for people to once again move back
and forth across the border.
The exodus of not just Mohawks but many other Five
Nations people continued during the war years until the 1701
peace settlement as well as after.
relatives

at Kahnawake.89

The

Many of those who came had
governor of New York and

others having correspondence with New York officials in 1693
referred to the Five Nations as "the Staggering Indians" or as
people "who seem to stagger."90

Clearly, they were at a low

point in their strength, and many of them decided that they
had a better chance of surviving as a people in the new
society along the St. Lawrence.91
89In JR 65:31 (1696), Father Lamberville stated that many
adults came "from the country of our enemies to live here (at
the Sault) with their kindred."
(Also see NYCD 9:665, 687,
4:648.) The Skachkook Indians testified to Albany officials
that some of their Indians had gone to Canada "because they
kill'd no Beaver, and were much indebted here, and so were
ashamed to come hither, chusing rather to go to Canada."
(Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations. July 1698 (New
York: 1698), p. 15.) The demographic trend of the 1690s was
overwhelmingly a northward shift.
^NYCD 4:37, 54.
91The Five Nations went from a
before the war of 1689-1701 to 1230.
not fare as badly, losing barely half
On the scuttling of peace efforts,
Minutes Old Vol. 7, p. 11 (Calendar p.
p. 93).

fighting force of 2650
The Sault Iroquois did
of theirs. (NYCD 4:337)
see New York Council
90) and p. 36 (Calendar
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The Sault Iroquois avoided military confrontation with
their League counterparts after the February event, raiding
only whites further east in the western Massachusetts town of
Deerfield.92

But some League Iroquois still held a grudge

for the attack, as a Sault woman found out in the summer of
1693.

She was out in the fields about one league from

Kahnawake nursing her newborn child and was captured by some
League men and taken to Iroquoia where they tortured her.

A

number of similar incidents were reported during this time by
French eyewitnesses held prisoner among the Five Nations who
later reported them to Jesuits.93
The Sault stance of avoiding mass confrontations but
taking revenge on their brethren on a small scale was a
strategy which satisfied at the same time their anger at their
southern relatives, French expectations of their support, and
their own desire to minimize the escalation of hostilities.
This was the sum effect of Sault attitudes and actions, as
viewed from the outside, but to see a single Sault "policy"
which brought this about is probably inaccurate.

Opinions

differed at Kahnawake on whether the villagers were obligated
or even inclined to follow French policy.

Much may have

depended on how much individual leaders —

be they League

92New York Colonial Manuscripts 39:73; New York Council
Minutes Old Vol. 6, p. 211 (Calendar p. 86); NYCD 9:553.
93JR 64:145, 65:33-35; William Ingraham Kip, trans. and
comp., The Earlv Jesuit Missions in North America (New York:
1847), pp. 124-131. (These violent incidents were interpreted
by the Jesuits as religiously motivated.)
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sachems, war chiefs, or independent, ad hoc leaders —

were

able to convince others, and for those who were taking on
European traits, on how far they were able to assert their
will over those who disagreed with them.

Kryn and La Plague

were leaders who, although not representing everyone at the
Sault, were able to affect events significantly (judged by
their appearance in written documents). These are some of the
few individual Sault Indians about which we can guess; the
others

are

all

but

invisible

in

the

historical

record,

probably because their opinions were unpopular with people who
chronicled New France's history.

If Indians had a written

culture, instead of or in addition to an oral one, we might
have

an

entirely

different

view

of

these

events

and

developments.94

94In the following chapter, some others will be mentioned
who appear in the written records and were not pro-French.
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CHAPTER FIVE
KAHNAWAKE-FRENCH RELATIONS IN THE 1690S

After the 1693 invasion, the Kahnawakes seem to have
become virtual puppets of Frontenac.

In 1694 negotiations

between the governor and the Five Nations, the French count
spoke on behalf of the Sault Iroquois, stating that they were
submissive

to

him.

The

Sault

people

present

allegedly

"uttered a cry of approval of this."1 When a mission Iroquois
speaker

(representing

both

those

of

the

Sault

and

the

Mountain) finally had a chance to speak, he reiterated this
claim, adding that his people would have nothing to do with
either the governor of New York or other officials at Albany.
He added, speaking to Five Nations representatives, that "we
... have even less thought of going to your village to convey
proposals of our movement ... If Onontio [the governor of New
France] hangs up his hatchet, we hang ours up, if he sharpen
it in order to strike the better, so do we."2

It was likely

that only Francophile Indians accompanied Frontenac to this
session, explaining why the only opinion expressed was one of
complete subordination to the French.

Or perhaps the speaker

of the mission Iroquois believed that conditions would be
better for them if they claimed to be Frontenac's unfailing

1Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany:
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 9:578 (hereafter cited as NYCD).
2NYCD 9:579; New York colonial Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83
vols.) New York State Library, 39:156.
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supporters in public, regardless of their true feelings.

The

individual involved may have been encouraged with money or
privileges.to say these words.

Jesuits, French officials,

even Frontenac himself may have bribed

the mission Iroquois

speaker into giving the League Iroquois the impression that
they had no friends at the Sault or the Mountain.
On this occasion, even when Teganissorens had queries for
the Sault Iroquois, Frontenac answered him on their behalf.
The Five Nations would be more inclined to make peace on
French terms if they thought that their own Christian cousins
were prepared to fight them in the event of hostilities.
Therefore, Frontenac was using the Sault Indians as a "big
stick" to make the League capitulate to French demands rather
than risk another fratricidal bloodbath.
But these mission Iroquois protestations of loyalty to
the French did not always translate into unified support in
battle.

In

the

1687,

1690,

1691,

and

1693

military

engagements in which Sault Iroquois were present against Five
Nations people, the Sault men more often than not attempted to
minimize their own involvement, or even to sabotage the French
goal.

Therefore, the words spoken at these meetings may have

been mere posturing.
Tatachquiserax was
posturing;

one who

he appeared sincere

seemed not

to be merely

in his pro-French stance.

Early in 1694 he expressed French allegiance to an Iroquois
woman who visited the Sault in telling her that if the Five
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Nations did not make peace with the French, they and their
allied

Indians would

Iroquois.3

come

in the

spring to destroy the

Frontenac even sent Sault and Mountain Indian

emissaries to Onondaga later that year to ask the League to
consider a peace settlement, so confident had he become of
their fidelity to his cause.

The Onondagas responded with

disdain, chastising the emissaries for their people's attacks
on New York

frontier settlements.

They also asked

for

Onondaga prisoners held at the mission villages to be given to
Frontenac so that they could negotiate directly with him for
their return.

Kahnawake relations with the outside world had

become significantly determined by the French government if
control over prisoners was any gauge.

The Kahnawakes seemed

not to have control over prisoners they held at their own
village.4
But the blustering words of Tatachquiserax and other
French mouthpieces at the Sault did not reflect what happened
when it came to war.

Through

1695,

rumors of a French

campaign rippled throughout Iroquoia and the upper Hudson
Valley, but even when an eyewitness reported Sault warriors
headed for Cataraqui on their way across Lake Ontario to an
Onondaga invasion, not all Iroquois people took the threat
3NYCD 4:87.
4NYCD 4:120. See also Claude Bacqueville de la Potherie,
Histoire de l'Americrue Septentrionale 4 vols. (Paris: 1722) ,
4:76 regarding lack of control over prisoners that they had
taken.
(They had to hand them over to French military
officers.)
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seriously.

Some travelled back and forth from the Mohawk

Valley to Kahnawake to visit relatives.5
Not

only did people defy

the danger

of a military

confrontation, but when Frontenac wanted to send war parties
of mission Iroquois out to take prisoners in order to find out
what

was

going

on

in Albany

volunteers at the Sault.

and

Onondaga,

he

found no

He had to enlist the help of the

Jesuits to persuade them, and the Black Robes found only a few
who would agree to go.

Soon after that, when Frontenac wanted

to assemble an expedition to meet the enemy (with explicit
orders not to spare any lives), he sent "no French Maquas
[Mohawk] Indians."6 It was rare for accounts to state who did
not participate in an expedition.
Later that year,

Frontenac wrote to the minister of

marine that the Indians allied with the French did not think
the French sufficiently heeded their allies' wishes, adding,
however, that gifts would probably induce them to continue
fighting the war.7

The bounty for scalps helped as well,

although the king wanted to eliminate this method "of exciting
the Christian Indians to make war on the Iroquois; the former
ought

to

be

induced by

the

subsistence

it

appears

they

5New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State
Library, Old Vol. 7, p. 127 (Calendar p. 104); NYCD 4:123,
124.
6NYCD 4:125.
7Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de Quebec 192829, p. 284 (hereafter cited as RAPQ).
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receive, when they go to war, and by the other favours and the
protection of his Majesty."8 This issue became timely in the
coming year.
mobilize

For in June 1696, when the French attempted to

their

Indian

allies

against

the

Onondagas,

warriors refused to go unless liquor was provided.

the

There

being none available in French stores, the officers permitted
the Indians with them to steal what they found from French
farmhouses along the way.9

There was a price to pay for

having a not-so-willing Indian fighting force, as in the 1693
Mohawk campaign.

At that time a French official complained

that "though the Indian disposition be naturally prone to war,
and though an attempt was made to persuade them that they are
carrying on hostilities as much for their own, as for our
interest, yet they fail not to demand, every time they set
out, a quantity of provisions and ammunition which costs a
considerable sum, and to refuse, would be to utterly disgust,
them."10

The Indians who lived in mission villages may have

been dominated by the French authorities in some ways, but
having something that Frontenac and other officials wanted,
they made the Frenchmen appease them in order to get it.
In 1696, as in earlier campaigns, Sault Indians could
8NYCD 9:591. Sault raiding parties often brought English
scalps back [i.e. NYCD 9:642; Archives des Colonies (Paris)
Serie C11A (Canada: Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122
vols.), 14:217v (hereafter cited as C11A; references are to
originals) ] but seldom brought those of Iroquois extraction.
9NYCD 9:646.
10NYCD 9:563.
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sabotage French efforts even if they appeared to be fighting
with the French.

It was so well known that they leaked news

of French war plans to the enemy that Callieres deliberately
fed them incorrect information in the summer of 1696.

He told

them that the plan was to attack the Senecas, so that both the
latter and the real victims, the Onondagas, would be thrown
off by Sault intelligence.11

In addition,

on the way to

battle, the Indians in the French entourage were separated and
placed between regular troops and militia so that no mutiny
would take place.12
No

real

military

engagement

took

place

during

the

Onondaga campaign; the sole village of that tribe was already
burned and abandoned when the French and their Indian allies
arrived at it.

Therefore, they ventured eastward to surprise

the Oneidas and found this tribe ready to surrender without a
fight.

Significantly, the Oneidas surrendered to the mission

Iroquois, not directly to the French.13 When a lame elderly
11Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix, History and General
Description of New France 6 vols., John G. Shea, ed. and
trans. (New York: Harper, 1866-1872), 5:16.
(A Mountain
Indian did inform some League Iroquois of this invasion.
Charlevoix, History 5:15.)
12Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the
State of New York 4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany: Weed and
Parsons, 1851-1851) 1:209 (hereafter cited as DHNY). One is
reminded of the 1687 expedition to the Senecas when this
proved to be necessary for preventing Sault Indians from
deserting.
13Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901),
65:27 (hereafter cited as JR); Archives des Colonies (Paris)
Serie B (Lettres Envoyees, 1663-1774, 189 vols.), 19:236-238
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man who

had been

abandoned

in one

of

the villages was

discovered, the Sauit Indians asked the French officers to
spare his life.
he

be

burned

reported.14

But the French "peremptorily demanded" that
at

the

stake,

a

French Jesuit

missionary

The experience was a sobering one for the Sault

Iroquois because this man was a relative of some of them.
They were also distressed when a former Sault resident who had
gone back to Iroquoia was found near the Onondaga village.
The French authorities showed him no more mercy; they burned
him to death as well, for the benefit of Sault eyes.15
Examples such as this were not the only way in which the
French attempted to assert control over the Sault people.
Claude Bacqueville de la Potherie observed the community of
Kahnawake in the 1690s and reported how political decisions
were made.

Although he noted the theoretical participation of

the elders, the chiefs, the aqoianders. the women, and the
warriors, he observed that these Indians "allow themselves to
be directed entirely by the Governor who makes them
elders] come to Montreal.

[the

When the matter at hand has to do

with peace, they execute the orders [from the governor] with
docility."

In another context,

Potherie stated that the

Kahnawakes "don't decide anything without the agreement of the
Governor."

Even the Prayer Chief

(dogigue)

"doesn't do

(hereafter cited as Serie B).
14JR 65:27.
15NYCD 9:655-656.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155
anything without

consulting with the missionary

Father."

Potherie asserted that this method of governing "facilitates
the

conversion

of

the

elders

whom

we

want

to

make

Christians. "16
Potherie claimed that the Christian faith alone made
these Indians stay in New France, ignoring the fact that his
statement directly contradicted his earlier descriptions of
how decisions were made at the Sault, that these people stayed
partly because of pressure exerted on them, not just out of
religious adherence.17 The fortifications no doubt helped to
keep people there; by 1692 there were 200 French soldiers
stationed at Fort Sault Saint-Louis,

and two years later,

Callieres was enlarging the fort "so that they may be more
efficiently and readily assisted in case of attack."18
in

1700 Robert Livingston spoke of the Kahnawakes

When
being

"secured in a Fort guarded with souldiers," it was unclear
whether the Indians were being protected from enemies or
prevented from escaping.19

Thioratorion,

a Sault speaker,

told some League Iroquois representatives in 1695 that he came
16Potherie, Histoire 1:363, 3:39-40.
elders
were
religious
traditionalists
Christianity even at the mission village.)

(It seems that
who
resisted

17Potherie, Histoire 1:363.
18C11A 13:118v, 400; NYCD 9:599; Nicholas Bayard and
Charles Lodowick, A Narrative of an Attempt made bv the French
of Canada upon the Mohaoues Country Being Indians under the
Protection of their Majesties Government of New York (New
York: 1693), p. 8.
19NYCD 4:648.
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to visit them "with Onontio*s consent," indicating that such
consent was

considered necessary.20

government. attempted to have
Indians as possible.

The

French

as much control

colonial

over these

The same thing was happening to the Five

Nations people with the English at Albany.21
Sometimes,

however,

when

Kahnawake

politicians

were

allowed to travel for diplomatic purposes (often initiated by
Frontenac or the current governor), they were able to assert
their own agenda into negotiations.

Odatsigtha was an Oneida

Sault sachem who travelled to Onondaga on behalf of the
French-Five Nations peace attempts in 1697.

He was in a

strong position to influence events because both Frontenac and
the League Oneidas trusted him.22

He turned the job of

messenger into a chance to promote understanding and detente
between League and Sault Iroquois.

Wanting to demonstrate

that not all Mission Indians did the French bidding,

he

relayed

to

a

conversation

he

had

had

with

Frontenac

Teganissorens. Frontenac said: "I would have your arm tyed to
mine that hereafter we might live peaceable together," to
which Odatsigtha answered: "No Father, I will not have my arm
20NYCD 9:597.
21Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. Charles Howard Mcllwain,
ed. (New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), p. 22y New York Colonial
Manuscripts 39:134; NYCD 4:91.
22Richard L. Haan, "The Covenant Chain: Iroquois Diplomacy
on the Niagara Frontier, 1697-1730"
(Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California-Santa Barbara, 1976),
p. 69.
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tyed to yours, because you might lift up your arm against my
own people

& then my

arm would hang to yours."23

This

exchange also revealed Sault skepticism about French force —
that it might easily be turned against the colony's own
allies.

No wonder there may have been

some

ambivalent

feelings about the fortification of the Kahnawake village.
Odatsigtha's speech was not the only opportunity taken by
Sault

people

diplomatic

to

interject

process.

A

their

year

own

later,

opinions
the

Sault

into

the

Iroquois

upbraided the governor of New France for rejecting what they
(or at least some of them) argued was a perfectly good peace
offer from the Five Nations.

They chided him, saying "it is

as if [you are] bereav'd of Your Sences or Drunk; you have
seen how courteous and friendly those Gentlemen sent by the
Government of New-York have been, and also the Mohaoues...1124
These speakers and Odatsigtha were seldom mentioned in French
records because they were not solid supporters of French
policy.

Despite how little we know of them, it is clear that

there were significant forces at the Sault countering the proFrench initiatives of Sault notables such as La Plaque, Kryn,
and Tatachquiserax.
In the 1694-95 attempts at peace talks, a neutral Sault
sachem tried to steer his people away from Frontenac's course

^ NYCD 4:280.
24Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations. July. 1698
(New York: 1698), pp. 20-21.
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and

toward

an

independent

path.

Frontenac

allowed

Thioratarion to go to Onondaga to listen to Iroquois council
meetings, and in return the sachem was instructed "only to
listen, and not to enter into any negotiation whatsoever."
This admonition included receiving belts of wampum from the
Five Nations people.

But Thioratarion was in fact negotiating

his own agenda with the League councillors, dissuading them
from dealing with Frontenac, and targeting French voyageurs to
attack.

The self-styled broker also misrepresented the events

of his trip to the governor on returning to New France.

But

Thioratarion was exposed by his political enemies at home,
including Tataconicere and seven other Sault chiefs, all of
whom were pro-French and opposed to a rapprochement between
League and Sault Iroquois.

Tataconicere told French officials

of Thioratorion's treacherous diplomacy and Calliere ordered
the renegade diplomat kept under constant surveillance at the
Sault and arrested if he attempted to return to Onondaga.25
Similar developments occurred in Iroquoia.
Iroquois

were

pressured

to

wait

for

a

The League

European

peace

settlement as New York officials in Albany tried to prevent
them from initiating their own rapprochement with the Sault
Iroquois and Frontenac.

Teganissorens, the veteran Onondaga

diplomat, had to await the approval of military and civic
leaders at Albany's City Hall before being allowed to send a
messenger

to

Kahnawake.

Peter

Schuyler

and

the

others

25NYCD 9:596-599.
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approved only when Teganissorens promised that the League's
message would be a refusal to meet with the French for peace
talks.

(Albany wanted to wait until such talks were conducted

on their terms,

not wanting a separate peace of the Five

Nations with the French.)

Teganissorens even found himself

acquiescing to the English "have[ing] now shut up the way from
hence to Canada."

He admitted that he had made a mistake in

sending men to the Sault after the English had "shut up the
way," and agreeing with Schuyler's expressed disdain of Five
Nations contacts with the French.26 Like the Kahnawakes, the
League

Iroquois

had

lost

significant

authority

to

their

European counterparts.
But

while

Albany

leaders

were

trying

to

prevent

communication between the League and the Sault, they were
trying

to

Kahnawakes.

cultivate

their

own

relationship

with

the

The report which documented Schuyler's reprimand

of Teganissorens also included Schuyler's invitation to the
Sault Iroquois to come and meet with him.27

Similarly in

1700, six years later, the commissioners for Indian Affairs at
Albany simultaneously tried to prevent communication between
Sault Iroquois and the Five Nations and tried to court the
Kahnawakes, promising them aid in various forms if they would
settle near Albany.

The Sault Indians had come to Albany to

26NYCD 4:90; New York
Wraxall, Abridgment, p. 22.

Coloxiial

Manuscripts

39:134;

27NYCD 4:91.
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trade northern pelts for English trade goods such as blankets.
But Schuyler, Livingston, and the other commissioners also
seemed interested in them as immigrants; consequently they
"caressed" the Sault envoys, and took "fitting care that the
Indians may be plentifully entertained that they may see the
difference between a fertile country and a poor rocky swampy
Canada."28 The commissioners also promised "stores of plenty
to make [them] live for ever happy," and distributed a hog,
some venison, a barrel of strong beer, and great quantities of
powder and lead to their guests.

But they retreated from

their former policy of promising to bring an English Jesuit to
the colony for the Sault Indians; instead they promised them
some Protestant ministers "to instruct Indians in the true
Christian religion."29

28NYCD 4:690.
29NYCD 4:692-693. The English appeared to be losing the
ideological battle of Christianity in converting the Iroquois.
In 1697, a group of Oneidas had demanded from the French
government their own village in New France, with Father Pierre
Milet there to minister to their spiritual needs. (NYCD
9:665.)
In 1700, while New York was promising Protestant
ministers for Sault Indians, a Montreal businessman was
explaining to David Schuyler why Catholicism was so much more
attractive to Indians. He said that the spirit of forgiveness
in the Roman church made the fundamental difference, that it
caused Indians to flock to the priests asking for instruction
and the sacrament of confession.
Schuyler told this to
Governor Bellomont, adding that this was the reason why the
Five Nations were "every day going over more and more to the
French."
Schuyler tied this to the fate of the English
imperial cause, warning that the situation would be worse in
the next war (i.e. the Roman Catholic Church would get even
more Indian converts), and would be the reason for France's
ability to take New York, then other English colonies, and
then finally the whole continent. (NYCD 4:747-748.)
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The Albanians made large promises and generous gestures
to

the

Kahnawakes

but

the

themselves to emigrating.

wary

Indians

did

not

commit

In 1698 when Governor Bellomont had

made overtures to the Kahnawakes,

they replied that they

appreciated the offer but would have to consult with elders
back home at the Sault, a stalling tactic.

No doubt they

feared that once they moved to New York they might not be
treated well and that the Albanians might try to force them in
line with English policy.30
While the New Yorkers were courting and "caressing" Sault
Indians, it was obvious to all Indians that Albany officials
were trying to discourage communication between Sault and
League Iroquois.

In the summer of 1700, the Sault Iroquois

had wanted to exchange a secret peace belt with their League
brethren

—

secret

from

New

York's

governor.

Livingston found out about this contact,

Robert

and had the Five

Nations send back the belt saying that they would never again
enter into negotiations with the Kahnawakes without New York
officials

being

involved.

The

League

Iroquois

were

sufficiently intimidated that they agreed to Livingston's
demands and publicly rejected this type of communication with
their brethren, explaining to the latter that their allegiance
was to New York (and not to their Iroquois brethren in New

30Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations.
1698. p. 3.

July.
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France) .31
In the fall of i700, the Sault Iroquois requested closer
relations with their League brethren, but the Onondaga sachems
who

responded

rebuffed

them

(perhaps

because

interpreter Lawrence Claessen was present).32

New

York

This sign of

strained relations between the two Iroquois groups was just
what

both

New

York

and New

France wanted.

The

French

officials tried to prevent Sault diplomats from communicating
with the League, and New York also intervened to prevent close
ties between the two.

Just as the English wanted Sault envoys

to deal directly with Albany, by-passing Iroquoia, the French
wanted the Five Nations to negotiate directly with Montreal
officials, by-passing the Sault.33

The only message which

French officials allowed the Sault Iroquois to send tc the
Mohawks was one inviting the latter to settle immediately in
New France, to which the Mohawks coyly avoided answering.34
Neither Indian group appreciated these attempts by the
French and the English to straitjacket them.

The League and

Sault Iroquois were being used for European ends,

losing

control over their own diplomatic policy, and being forced to
31Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 38; NYCD 4:696, 745-46.
32NYCD 4:803.
^Charlevoix, History 5:94; Bellomont's Conference with
the Five Nations. July. 1698. p. 3; Wraxall, Abridgment, p.
28; NYCD 9:600, 713, 4:895.
^NYCD 9:671, 676. (Even though this was the only message
"allowed" by the French, it may not have been the only one
sent.)
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watch while their European neighbors entertained the opposing
tribal group and promised these guests things which the "home"
group were never promised.

Some League Iroquois demonstrated

that they did not appreciate New Yorkers interfering with
their guests from Kahnawake in 1695, when Albany officials
wanted two Sault envoys visiting the Onondaga council fire to
make a stop at Albany on their way home; the Oneidas at the
council

fire

would

not

allow

this

diversion

from

the

itinerary.35 In 1699, Five Nations representatives at Albany
complained that while they had obeyed the rule set by New York
that there was to be no travel between them and Canada, the
Albany officials had both sent envoys to Canada and received
visitors from that colony, including Indians.36

The League

Iroquois were jealous of English preferential treatment of the
Sault Indians.

They might have been even more so if they had

heard Albany officials declare that

"the Maquase praying

Indians...are ye spring that move all ye rest."37
No doubt Kahnawakes were also miffed when Frontenac
regaled visiting League Mohawks.38

But while Frontenac saw

the advantages of driving a wedge between the Five Nations and
New York by treating the League Iroquois royally, he also came
around in 1698, his last year as governor of New France (and
35NYCD 9:600.
36NYCD 4:567-572.
37NYCD 4:690.
^Charlevoix, History 5:84-85; NYCD 4:803.
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the last year of his life), to see a positive role the Sault
Iroquois could play in his foreign policy.

In that year he

encouraged League Indians to visit Kahnawake (and to come over
to Montreal as long as they were in the area).

He was

convinced that this was a sure way to get more of the League
Iroquois

to

depopulating

emigrate
Iroquoia

to

the

mission

and weakening the

village,
adjacent

thereby
English

colony.39
As a result of Frontenac's detente policy on Five Nations
visits to Kahnawake, many League Iroquois families came to the
south shore of the St.
intention of staying.40

Lawrence to visit,

some with an

Meanwhile (if English accounts can

be believed regarding what their allied Indians wanted in
terms of Christian missionaries), the Five Nations apparently
finally agreed on a policy regarding Jesuit missionaries in
Iroquoia
emigrants

—

they

did not

want

flocked once again

them there

again.41

But

from Iroquoia to the Sault

mission village (all accounts agree), desiring baptism from
the Jesuits (if the Jesuit Relations can be believed).42

At

least it seemed that all those inclined toward Catholicism had
moved north to the Catholic Iroquois communities at the Sault
and the Mountain, and opinion was consolidated on the once
39Charlevoix, History 5:84-85.
40Potherie, Histoire 4:106.
41Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 41.
42JR 65:31.
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explosive issue in the homeland.
Tensions were now relaxed between the Sault and League
Iroquois.

Indeed,

by 1698, the two Iroquois groups were

speaking of mutually "burying the hatchet" and of renewing
their

former

friendships.43

A

year

later,

a

mutual

condolence ceremony was held at Kahnawake, attended by League
and Sault warriors.

They held day-long sessions in which one

after another rose and confessed, often with remorse, all the
war deeds he had done and mourned the death of his friends in
battle.

Bacqueville de la Potherie witnessed this combination

of public

confession and boasting,

breast-beating

recording the words of one Sault warrior:

forum,

"I killed four

Iroquois five years ago at a certain place," and tearing off
a piece of tobacco, "I take this as a medicine to remake my
spirit;" the musicians applauded him with cries, and by a
movement precipitated by their gourds, you heard the noise of
two hundred to three hundred Indians from one end of the
longhouse to the other...as long as the tobacco lasted, there
were

plenty

of

people

who

cited

their

exploits."

The

octagenarian grand chief of the Senecas remained standing in
his canoe during this event, making "death cries of
H a il,"

" H a i!

crying and mourning for those who had been killed

during the war.44

43NYCD 9:685-686.
^Potherie, Histoire 4:194-201.
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This mutual condolence ritual among former enemies was
part of the healing process for the factionalized Iroquois
people.

Arid at the ratification of the final peace agreement

between the Five Nations and the French in 1701 (in which the
Five Nations agreed to remain neutral in any conflict between
the English and the French), the Kahnawake people announced
that they were working for peace and asked their League
brethren to preserve the peace as well.45

The Ho-de-no-sau-

nee had survived the brutal decade of war despite some searing
incidents of fratricide.
On very few occasions had League and Sault battle forces
eagerly engaged each other.
avoid

each

other,

while

For the most part, they tried to
still

trying

to

maintain

good

relations with their respective European allies, realizing
this was necessary in an era of European expansion.
Iroquois tradition,

Following

they merely avoided conflict whenever

possible, except for a few true "hawks," notably the zealots
such as Paul of the Sault, converted to the French-Catholic
cause, and Lawrence, the League Mohawk who was an Anglophile
and

a

devoted

convert

to

Protestant

Christianity.

Teganissorens, the neutral League sachem, was much more the
norm than these other noted French or English allies.

He saw

any entangling alliance with either power as a threat to his

45Serie B 20:135; NYCD 9:724-725.
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people's sovereignty.46
Despite
policies,

almost

control

of

their

own

the League and the Sault Iroquois both retained

their autonomy.
perhaps

surrendering

Neither group denounced their European ally,

because

this

was

politically

or

geopolitically

impossible. And although factions complicated matters both in
Iroquoia and at Kahnawake, the damage resulting from working
at cross-purposes was minimized.
used

their

possible.
formerly,

situations
Their

but

to

spheres

not

latitude they could.

their
of

completely

These people ingeniously
own

action

advantage
were

restricted?

whenever

narrower
they

than

used what

Both groups realized that they had to

steer their way through a complicated set of allegiances in
which they may have regretted becoming entangled, and both
groups survived the ordeals of the 1690s, although not all
with equal success.
The Iroquois entered the eighteenth century forced by
their peace treaty to remain neutral between the French and
the English, but instead of letting this straitjacket them,
they used the position to play the two powers off against each
other.

They made the best of their population losses and of

a situation which was not ideal.

Likewise, the Kahnawakes,

^See Daniel K. Richter, "The Ordeal of the Longhouse:
Change and Persistence on the Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1984),
Ch. 7-10 (passim), and William J. Eccles, "Teganissorens," in
Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 2, pp. 619-623,
regarding Teganissorens.
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although arguably "vassals" or "charges" of the French, were
only nominally so, and were to use their unique position once
again in the eighteenth century to their own advantage, this
time in the sphere of trade more than in warfare or diplomacy.
Important because they had embarked on a project of creating
a new cultural group which assimilated beliefs and habits from
two cultures, they were to prove themselves to be important
politically as well, to be "ye spring that move all ye rest."
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CHAPTER SIX
KAHNAWAKE FOREIGN RELATIONS 1701-1760
After the 1701 settlement between the French, English,
Five Nations, and mission Iroquois, the question remaining to
be answered was whether the Indian groups would actually
remain neutral,

as had been agreed.

An Onondaga sachem

identified the dilemma: "for ye Indians are divided there [at
Kahnawake] as well as among ye Five Nations, ye one half is
for ye English & ye

other half

for ye

french."1

While

Canadian officials worried about the Five Nations and hoped
they would keep out of the French-English war which broke out
in 1702, the Albany Commissioners and the New York governor
alike expended great effort to achieve and maintain neutrality
from

the

Kahnawakes.2

At

the

same

time,

however,

the

Kaihnawakes continued to be a thorn in their sides, and they
complained often from 1701 on aibout the continuing flow of
1Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records.
1666-1723 (Gettysburg: Pennsylvania Historical Association,
1956) (hereafter cited as LIR), p. 212. Regarding Iroquois
foreign relations in this period, see Daniel K. Richter, "The
Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the
Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University, 1984), Part Four; Richard Aquila, The
Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial
Frontier. 1701-1754 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
1983); Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The
Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English
Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744
(New York: Norton, 1984), Part Three.
2Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the
Colonial History of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany:
Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), 4:983, 5:141, 9:737, 834
(hereafter cited as NYCDf; Rapport de l'Archiviste de la
Province de Quebec (hereafter cited as RAPO) 1939-40, pp. 418,
441.
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Iroquois emigrants to the mission town at Sault Saint-Louis.
For many reasons, not the least of which was military,
New

York

officials were

population
migrants

of the

Five Nations,

northward

resource.3

concerned about the decrease

as

a

and viewed the

hemorrhaging

of

a

in

flow of

vital

human

The declining population was a major impetus

toward forcing the remaining Jesuit missionaries in Iroquois
villages

to

leave

once

the

and

problem

for

all,

because

by

recruiting

they

were

contributing

to

emigrants

to

Kahnawake.4

Father Jacques Bruyas was the last remaining

Black Robe, and he finally left his Onondaga mission in 1708.
At the same time, New York officials continued their
efforts

to

repatriate the

Sault Mission

Iroquois

in the

Iroquois homeland (or rather, to move them to a spot of land
north of Albany).

The officials engaged the League Iroquois

to send emissaries to the Sault to suggest the move back to
New York and sent wampum belts themselves to plead with the
Kahnawakes.

The response of the governor of New France,

however,

indicated the importance of the Kahnawakes to the

French.

When he heard of the New York offer, he threatened to

go to war with the English colony over these Indians.

His

reaction caused a disturbance in the Sault village because
many in the pro-English faction had been excited about the
possibility of moving south.

But the possibility of a move

3NYCD 4:899.
4NYCD 4:888, 899, 905; LIR p. 187.
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"made a great noise" because it was controversial in New
France

and

the

enthusiasm was

squelched

by

authorities,

probably Jesuits as well as secular officials.5
Claude de Ramezay, the governor of Montreal, "used every
exertion" to prevent a meeting between Peter Schuyler (the
mayor

of Albany

and

Commissioner

of

Indian

Affairs who

spearheaded the effort) and Sault sachems who were interested
in negotiating a move to New York.

Oddly enough, some Abenaki

Indians, who themselves had been known to waver in their
support for the French, met the sachems on the way to Albany,
and reportedly "shamed them out of a course so unbecoming in
Christians and so dangerous to themselves."6

Schuyler took

advantage of the League and Sault practice of visiting each
others' villages, and invited some Sault headmen who were
visiting in Iroquoia to come to Schenectady, where he made his
offer of tracts of land in New York for them to settle their
people.

He

also

offered

them

wampum

belts

for

the

Mountain/Sault-au-Recollet Indians as well, and waited for the
response from Kahnawake.

Ramezay again heard of this, no

doubt through a pro-French Kahnwake who informed the Jesuits
at the Sault, and had the wampum belts sent back without an

5Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. ed. Charles Howard Mcllwain
(New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), pp. 42-43 (quote), 44, 80;
NYCD 4:978-79, 983-84, 987.
6Pierre F.-X.
de Charlevoix,
History and General
Description of New France 6 vols., ed. John G. Shea (New York:
Harper, 1866-1872), Vol. 5, p. 164.
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answer.7
Even though unsuccessful, Schuyler's efforts indicated
New York's, desperation to attract the Kahnawakes, since the
effort was made only months after a Sault and French attack on
the

Massachusetts

town

of

Deerfield.

Forty-seven

New

Englanders were killed and over a hundred taken prisoner.
Many of these captives were brought to Kahnawake and remained
there, some of them later choosing to remain among the Indians
and convert to Catholicism even after being allowed to return
to their Massachusetts homes.

This was significant in that it

caused much intermarriage in the ensuing years at Kahnawake.
The best known of these New Englanders who became part of the
Kahnawake community and clan network was Eunice Williams, a
young daughter of a Puritan minister.

At first she abhorred

her new surroundings and captors but eventually became a
devout Catholic, married a Sault Indian, and renounced any
desire to return to Deerfield, a decision that fascinated and
horrified New Englanders as blasphemous.8
7Charlevoix, History 5:166; NYCD 4:871, 918; LIR p. 190.
On the "Mountain" Indians, as they are referred to by the
French, see Chapter 2, footnote 36.
Thomas Hutchinson, The History of the Colony and
Province of Massachusetts-Bav 3 vols., ed. Lawrence Shaw May
(Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1936), Vol. 2, p.
102; Emma Lewis Coleman, New England Captives Carried to
Canada between 1677 and 1760 during the French and Indian Wars
2 vols. (Portland, Me: 1925-26), Vol. 2, p. 40; John G. Shea,
History of the Catholic Missions Among the Indian Tribes of
the United States. 1529-1854 (New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1854),
p. 332; John Williams, The Redeemed Captive returning to Zion
ed. Edward W. Clark (Amherst, Ma: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1976) (first published 1707), esp. pp. 45-69; New York
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The Deerfield attack could not have been looked upon
kindly in Albany since New York was expected to present a
united

front

with

the

New

Englanders

against

French

incursions, and since the Kahnawakes refused to give up the
Reverend Williams' daughter even after much pleading from New
York

officials.

The

New

Englanders

resented

Albany's

neutrality toward Canada and her Indian allies, and condemned
Albany for maintaining diplomatic ties with the Kahnwakes.
But some Kahnawake messengers informed Albany officials of the
impending attack on the Massachusetts town, so that they in
turn could warn their eastern neighbors and avert horrible
results. (These Sault informers were probably pro-English, and
presumably those from the Sault who conducted the raid were
pro-French.)9 But the warning did not reach the Deerfielders
in

time

and

their

town

was

devastated.

Nevertheless,

relations between the Kahnawakes and Albany remained as close
as ever, and trade as well as talks about resettling near the
Hudson River town continued.
The pro-English faction at the Sault was strong after the
Deerfield raid, because although four Kahnawake warriors went
Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State Library, Old Vol.
10, p. 22 (Calendar p. 210); NYCD 4:1083, 1099-1100. See also
James Axtell, "The White Indians of Colonial America," in The
European and the Indian: Essavs in the Ethnohistorv of
Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press,
1981), pp. 168-206; Alden T. Vaughan and Daniel K. Richter,
"Crossing the Cultural Divide: Indians and New Englanders,
1605-1763," Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society XC
(1980), pp. 23-99.
9NYCD 4:1099-1100.
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out later in 1704 to conduct raids on New England outposts, at
least some of the Kahnawake sachems prevented the French from
planning an attack on English targets.10

And three years

later, a Kahnawake sachem made a telling request of the Albany
commissioners: he asked them to send a secret (secret from the
French) wampum belt to the Sault to ask the Kahnawakes to stop
raiding New England settlements.11
pro-English

and

was

trying

to

No doubt this sachem was
gain

support

within

his

community to stop French-inspired attacks on Massachusetts and
New Hampshire towns.
results,

The effort

seems to have

achieved

because later in 1707, Ramezay experienced great

difficulty in convincing the Sault warriors to support his war
policies.

One reason for the reluctance to do so at this time

may have been the issue of control over captives; after the
Deerfield raid, French officials had taken into custody some
prisoners whom Kahnawakes claimed as their own.
The Kahnawakes were angry about French presumption of
control over captives because the captives were taken largely
in order to be adopted into Kahnawake families to increase the
population.

In early 1708 Sault spokesmen informed Ramezay

that because the French had taken many of the captives from
Deerfield and exchanged them with the English,
warriors would no

the Sault

longer join French war parties to the

10NYCD 4:1164.
11LIR p. 201.
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English colonies.12

This would have a crippling effect on

French military strength, even for these small-scale surprise
raids.

In the same year, the minister of marine Pontchartrain

ordered the governor of Canada, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, to
attack Albany as a way of ending the contraband trade between
that town and Montreal.

Jacques and Antoine-Denis Raudot, the

joint intendants of the colony, declined to do so since they
knew that the mission Iroquois would not participate in an
expedition

to

end

the

trade

from which

they

themselves

profited, and the Raudots realized that without their support,
the attack could not succeed.

Mission Iroquois (Sault and

Mountain) military support was crucial to French sorties in
the early eighteenth century.13
By

1708,

the

Kahnawakes

had

worked

out

a

private

agreement with Schuyler not to join French war parties in New
England; the pro-English faction at the Sault had won out at
least temporarily.

This deal became evident because the

French were planning an attack for the summer,

but when

rounding up recruits among the Kahnawakes, "they semmed [sic]
very

tardy

&

unwilling

to

join."14

The

Sault

elders,

12Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada:
Correspondance Generale, 1540-1784, 122 vols.), 28:77-84
(hereafter cited as C11A; references are to transcripts, not
originals, unless otherwise indicated)? Vaughan and Richter,
"Crossing the Cultural Divide," pp. 78-79.
13Dale Miquelon, New France 1701-1744. "A Supplement to
Europe" (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), p. 42.
14Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 56.
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evidently anti-French, had convinced the warriors to "stop
their

hatchets"

and

not

to

support

the

French

occasion, a pro-French warrior informed Ramezay.

on

this

But French

authorities had "in a manner forced some Caghnawaga Indians to
join" and the joint expedition moved toward its destination.
However, at Wood Creek near English territory, the Kahnawake
warriors,

"recollecting their Engagements with us

[Albany

Commissioners] not to join in War against New England wch they
supposed was to be Attacked, threw away all their Provisions
& left the other Forces," dooming the expedition to failure.
To emphasize their defiance and independence from the French,
the mutinous warriors offered to pay the French governor for
the guns he had given them and for the provisions that they
had thrown away in disgust.15
Predictably, the French were furious at the Sault display
of cheek and treachery, and when they found out about the
secret deal with Albany which had precipitated the mutiny
their anger deepened.

Vaudreuil gave an order to local

officials to find out from the Jesuit missionaries at the
Sault and from the garrison commander at the Kahnawake fort
who the pro-English culprits were.

Perhaps fearing serious

reprisals, the elders and chiefs at the Sault soon promised
authorities that they would no longer prevent warriors from
going to war, but not until receiving a scathing reprimand
from Vaudreuil himself.

The governor threatened that "the

15Wraxall, Abridgment, pp. 61-62; RAPQ 1939-40, p. 429.
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idleness [by which] they wanted to keep their young ones would
one

day

be

the

destruction

of

their

village."

After

"reconciling all these spirited opinions," he reported back to
France, the Kahnawakes decided to join Abenakis and other
French-allied Indians in renewed raiding forays against New
England, thereby breaking their agreement with Schuyler and
ending,

at least temporarily,

the ascendancy of the pro-

English faction at the Sault.16
In working out their own internal disagreements,
Kahnawakes

had

been

railroaded

by

the

attempted to create an independent policy.

French

when

the
they

Nevertheless, the

Indians still held some power in the relationship; they had
managed to leave an expedition in mid-march and in doing so
had succeeded in demonstrating that the French needed them in
order to pursue their military objectives.
events of 1708 to his superior,

In reporting the

Vaudreuil contrasted the

unreliable Kahnawakes with their dependable, loyal cousins,
the Mountain mission Indians.17

Vaudreuil had nothing but

praise for the latter, but the fact that they were so loyal
precluded them from having much independence from the French,
or at least from forcing the French to deal with them as a
belligerent group.

The Kahnwakes had at least carved out a

16RAPO 1939-40. pp. 429-430, 432-433, 441-442; Charlevoix,
History 5:204-205, 208-209; David A. Armour, "The Merchants of
Albany, New York, 1686-1760" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern University, 1965), pp. 94-95.
17RAPO 1939-40, p. 430.
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measure of autonomy with which to negotiate with the French.
In an invasion of Canada planned for 1709 the New Yorkers
and

New

Englanders

had

similar trouble

support from the Seneca nation.

gaining military

But the other four Iroquois

nations supported the effort, warning their Sault brethren
through wampum belt messages that an invasion of New France
was imminent and that the mission Iroquois should leave their
village and return to New York.

The League sachems also

warned the Kahnawakes that once the force had invaded New
France, the mission could not be assured safety.

The reply

from the Sault reflected the recent shift toward pro-French
policy ~

the Indians answered that they would remain with the

French.

But the expedition failed anyway, and this was the

closest the League and mission Iroquois came to fighting
against each other during Queen Anne's War.

Otherwise, the

opening years of the eighteenth century were characterized by
close and frequent relations between the two groups, including
the regular exchange of intelligence.18
Meanwhile, the Kahnawakes continued to see how far they
could push the French in their psychological power struggle.
Vaudreuil's wife reported that "the Iroquois of Sault St.Louis have become so insolent that they're boasting that the
French can't do without them."

Her husband responded by

18Bruce T. McCully, ed., "Catastrophe in the Wilderness:
New Light on the Canada Expedition of 1709," William and Mary
Quarterly. 3d ser., XI (1954), pp. 452-453; LIR p. 212; NYCD
5:72-74, 85-86, 141, 9:834; Wraxall, Abridgment,p. 94.
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plucking the strings of pride among the warrior faction; he
stopped inviting the Kahnawakes on warring expeditions.

This

had the desired effect of wounding Indian pride, and a fair
number came running to join in the next French sortie into
enemy territory.19
Not all rallied around the fleur-de-lys, however.

Some

Sault Indians had too much of a renegade spirit to conform to
life at the mission village.

A Kahnawake named Paskoue lived

with a "band” of like-minded people apart from the village,
probably north of Lake Ontario.

A description of him in 1710

indicated that he had "been some years separated from his
Nation" at the Sault.

In that year, Paskoue and his friends

murdered two League Iroquois travellers not far from Fort
Frontenac, causing a delicate diplomatic problem for Vaudreuil
with the Five Nations.

The Canadian governor claimed that no

one in the upper country was able to persuade any Indians in
the area to deliver the murderers to French authorities, an
indication that Paskoue's group was a furtive and dangerous
collection

of

individuals.

No

doubt the

fugitives were

disgruntled at life in the settled community of the Jesuit
mission and were no friends of the Five Nations either, as the
murders demonstrate.20
Paskoue and his fellow "renegades" were not the only ones
from,

or

at,

the

Sault

who

chafed

at

authority

there.

19RAPO 1942-43, p. 415.
20NYCD 9:848, 857.
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Complaints against the insolence of the Kahnawakes continued,
as did claims that they were not easy to govern and were not
sufficiently docile toward the French.21

When Father Pierre

Cholenec decided in 1714 that the community needed to relocate
further west along the south shore, various issues emerged
which revealed conflicts between the Indians and the priests
at Kahnawake,

as well as between the priests and secular

authorities in the colony.

In applying to Vaudreuil for

funding, Cholenec claimed that the Sault Indians had exhausted
the firewood and the soil through c o m
moving to the site in 1696.

cultivation since

Cholenec claimed that the Indians

insisted on moving the village site up two leagues further
along the shore.
In making his

case

for

funds

to

finance the move,

Cholenec argued that the New Yorkers and Five Nations had been
relentlessly pursuing the return of the Kahnawakes to New
York, and that financing the new village site was the only way
to prevent dissatisfaction among the Sault Indians which might
cause them to emigrate.

The missionary claimed that the Sault

mission was indispensible to the defense of New France against
neighbors

to

the

south,

providing

a

buttress

against

incursions which would otherwise have to be borne by Canadian
habitants. The funding was needed quickly, he added, because
the Kahnawakes were "becoming more and more formidable through

21RAP0 1946-47, p. 408.
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their great numbers, and ... seek occasions for a rupture."22
Cholenec attempted to make it seem that the Indians were
asking for a new fort and a church as well as a palisaded
enclosure, although probably the Jesuits cared much more about
a church than the Indians did.

As for a stone fort, it soon

became evident that not all the Kahnawakes wanted one.

But

for now, Vaudreuil wholeheartedly embraced the proposal and
the funding for the move —

2,000 livres —

was granted by the

king in 1716, in which year much of the actual labor of moving
the village took place.23
A conflict arose, however, when the Jesuits requested
that the land concession granted to them in 1680 be renewed,
with new titles to confirm Jesuit possession.

This request

triggered discussion of the status of the concession and
suspicion that the Jesuits might have selfish motives for
wanting their possession clarified.

Father Joseph Frangois

Lafitau of Kahnawake was compelled to present the argument
that the Jesuits had no intention of moving the Indians from
the site at a later date to turn a profit from the improved
land.

But the Council of Marine apparently remained skeptical

22Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and
Al1ied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901),
67:25-27 (hereafter cited as JR).
^Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F3 (Collection
Moreau St.-Mery, 1540-1806, 270 vols.), Vol. 7, p. 374; RAPO
1941-42, pp. 184-185, 1940-41, p. 454. The entire village,
however, was not in place until 1719, and the church and
Jesuits' residence not until 1721. (E. J. Devine, Historic
Cauahnawaqa (Montreal: Messenger Press, 1922), p. 180.)
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—

Lafitau may have protested too much —

were attached to the grant of land.

and stipulations

Most importantly, the new

letters patent indicated that the land was to be held jointly
by the Jesuits and the Indians of Sault St.-Louis, and that
when and if the Indians should abandon it, it would revert
directly to the king.

This is a likely reason why the village

did not move again.24
Another related issue had been whether the Jesuits or the
Crown had control over whether to build a fort, who would

24RAPO 1941-42, pp. 184-186; Archives des Colonies (Paris)
Serie C U E (Des Limites et des Postes, 1651-1818, 38 vols.)
11:26-30 (hereafter cited as C U E ) .
(The present Kahnawake
reserve is on the 1716 site.)
Louis Antoine de Bougainville,
a colonel serving with the French forces in the Seven Years'
War, indicated in 1757 that the Jesuits desired to "profit
from the lands which the Indians had cleared," and he noticed
that they had done this with the Lorette Hurons in moving
their village from "Ancien Lorette" to their later site. The
issue emerged in 1757 because the Jesuits were proposing
moving their Abenaki missions at St.-Frangois and Becancour.
(Louis Antoine, comte de Bougainville, Adventure in the
wilderness: the American journals of Louis Antoine de
Bougainville. 1756-1760 ed. and trans. Edward P. Hamilton
(Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 83.)
Louis Franquet also was suspicious in 1752 that the Jesuits
were encouraging Kahnawakes to make improvements on their
land, only to turn a profit on parcelling it out to habitants
later. (Louis Franquet, Voyages et Memoires sur le Canada ed.
J. Cohen (Montreal: Editions Elysee, 1974), pp. 38-39.) There
was a legal dispute between the Jesuits and the Kahnawakes in
1762, brought on by the question of land control after the
British Conquest.
In 1762, Daniel Claus, Sir William
Johnson's agent in charge of Indian affairs for the British in
Montreal, was attempting to settle the dispute between the
Jesuits and the Kahnawakes.
He found that the Jesuits had
engaged in so much fraud in running the survey line, so as to
add to their land grant at the expense of the Kahnwakes', that
it took Claus a few extra days to determine the actual
boundary. (James Sullivan et. al., eds., The Papers of Sir
William Johnson 14 vols. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1921-1965),
10:376-379, 3:862 (hereafter cited as JP).)
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finance its contruction, and who would have jurisdiction over
it once it was built.
the

Jesuits

on

The Council seemed to give latitude to

whether

to

build

it

or

not,

but

they

demonstrated once again their distrust of the Black Robes by
stipulating that monies earmarked for construction of the fort
be held by the colonial treasurer rather than being placed in
Jesuit hands.25
The

issue of a

quickly.

fort at Kahnawake did not dissipate

It had been a touchy one in the 1690s,

as it

symbolized a loss of self-determination to the Kahnawakes.
Many of them felt trapped by a garrisoned fort and considered
the soldiers stationed there to be thwarting their freedom as
much

as

protecting

them.26

Officials

hinted

at

such

a

purpose? one document related to the 1716 move mentioned the
building of a new fort as an effort to "retain" (retenir) the
Indians.27

In 1719, Ramezay wanted a garrison "to keep the

Indians from trading at Albany," and toward the end of the
Desauniers era at the Sault, these women protested to Louis
Franquet, the engineer who was charged with making preliminary
arrangements for fortification of the entire village, that a
^Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie F5A (Missions
Religieuses, 1639-1782, 3 vols.) 2:32-33; RAPO 1941-42, pp.
185-186.
26In 1722 the Kahnawakes complained that the presence of
garrison troops in their village indicated that the government
of New France mistrusted the Indians, and they also protested
that no other Indian communities were occupied by troops. JR
67:81.)

(

27RAPO 1941-42, p. 185.
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complete enclosure would interfere with the free flow of
trade.28
Whether or not the Jesuits had wanted a garrisoned fort
at the new village site when they applied for the moving funds
in 1714,

it is clear that by the early 1720s they were

adamantly opposed to it and repeatedly lobbied the Council of
Marine to

stop

its

construction.

Some

troops had been

stationed at the new village site but they were removed in
1719.

The Jesuits' motives for not wanting them and their

officer returned to the Sault were mixed.

No doubt they

resented having to share authority with the commandant, as
they had to during King William's and Queen Anne's Wars.

One

Black Robe argued that "whenever the Governor wishes to obtain
anything from the Indians, and the officer does not succeed,
as is nearly always the case, he casts the blame upon the
Missionary. m29
But reasons having to do with the welfare of the native
community itself were also cited by both Jesuits and Indians.
The Kahnawakes claimed that "horrible discord" existed in the
village because of the garrison troops stationed there; the
wives and daughters of Sault warriors and hunters were not
28Franquet, Voyages et Memoires.... p.
Historic Cauahnawaaa. p. 189.

120;

Devine,

29JR 67:73-81 (quote p. 79); RAPO 1941-42, pp. 202, 205,
213. Another example of friction between Jesuits and garrison
commanders at Kahnawake: C11A 98:36-39. Franquet noted that
the Jesuits greatly desired to have complete control in
running the community. (Franquet, Voyages et Memoires.... p.
120 .)
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safe with the French soldiers, and the Indian men themselves
were sorely tempted by the vices introduced into the village
by the troops.

A Kahnawake orator charged that since there

had been a garrison, "tranquility and good order have been
banished," because of the debaucheries mentioned, and also
because "the soldiers frequently seek by false reports to
embroil

us

Governors,

with

the

officer,

and

the

officer

with

the

none of which things happened when we had no

garrison."30

The Indians cunningly argued that they were

made into slaves by the impingement on their freedom which the
garrison posed, and that the funds spent on a garrison and its
barracks would be better spent in relief for the widows and
orphans of Kahnawake whose fathers and husbands had been
killed in the war for the French cause.31
worst fears of the French authorities,

And knowing the

they threatened to

emigrate back to their homeland if the stone fort for the
garrison was built.32
Jesuits argued that the Sault Indians were much more
docile

in the

absense

of garrison troops

than

in their

presence, and that Father Pierre de Lauzon had only managed to
convince them to settle at the 1716 site instead of much
farther away, perhaps even in New York, when there was no
longer a garrison breathing down their necks.

Also important

30JR 67:73-75.
31JR 67:75-77.
32RAPO 1941-42, p. 263.
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to the Jesuits was the level of piety and Christian devotion
at the Sault; they claimed it had plummeted with the coming of
French troops.33 Finally in 1724, Vaudreuil gave up the idea
of placing a garrison there in the face of such opposition,
but the outbreak of war in the 1740s again forced the issue to
the forefront.34

The debate aggravated some of the tensions

between various interests in New France in determining how the
Kahnawake mission community would be run.
The late 1710s were a time of shifting physical settings
for related Iroquois groups as well.

Starting in 1717 the

Sulpician Sault-au-Recollet (the former "Mountain" Mission)
moved to its final site at Lac-des-Deux-Montagnes (present-day
Oka)

northwest of Montreal.

The Indians at that mission

continued to be called the "Mountain" Indians.

And from 1714

until about 1720, Tuscarora refugees from the war with the
Carolina

colonists continued to pour

in to Five Nations

communities, until finally a separate homeland was carved out
for them adjacent to the Cayugas and they were incorporated

33JR 67:77, 81.
^RAPO 1941-42, p. 232.
Potential hostilities in King
George's War were used as a pretext for installing a garrison
in 1747. But the Kahnawakes "had some difficulty in receiving
that little garrison of twenty soldiers," because of alleged
reasons
(which the French officials did not believe)
concerning "secret interests." There would have been a revolt
at the Sault if Charles Deschamps de Boishebert, a leading
military officer, had not promised them that the garrison
would be removed as soon as the war was over. Boishebert did
not understand why these Indians did not want the soldiers
stationed in their village, and concluded that "evil councils
prevail" at Kahnawake. (NYCD 10:86-87, 96.)
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into the League; hence the change in name around 1720 from the
Five to the Six Nations.35
Warriors of the reincorporated Six Nations people joined
Kahnawake war parties in the 1720s for forays against the
Virginians and the Catawba Indians of South Carolina who had
assisted

the

North

Carolinians

in

driving

out

the

Tuscaroras.36 Six Nations motives for fighting these peoples
seem to be in revenge for the routing of the newest member of
the League as well as the renewal of long-standing rivalries.
But Sault motives for warring against these groups is less
clear.

Sault Iroquois were the instigators who persuaded

League Iroquois warriors to participate against the wishes of
the New York government.

Kahnawake war parties had ventured

to Catawba country even before the Tuscarora War of 1711-1713.
The Catawbas were a convenient enemy, far enough away so as
not to be able to retaliate or upset relations with the
French, with whom the Catawbas had little or nothing to do.
(The French in fact smiled on these Kahnawake raids to the
350n the Mountain mission, see C U E 11:54-55; RAPQ 194041, p. 454; Louise Tremblay, "La Politique Missionnaire
Sulpicienne au 17e et debut du 18e siecle, 1668-1735,"
(Unpublished M.A. thesis: Universite de Montreal, 1981). On
the Tuscaroras and their war, see NYCD 5:387; Christine A.
Styrna, "The Winds of War and Change: The Impact of the
Tuscarora War on Proprietary North Carolina, 1690-1729,"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, College of William and Mary,
1990).
36See James H. Merrell, The Indians1 New World: Catawbas
and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of
Removal (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina
Press, 1989), p. 54, regarding Catawbas fighting against the
Tuscaroras for South Carolina in the Tuscarora War.
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south.)37
Daniel Richter's compelling argument about the League's
need for mourning wars to assuage the bereaved and to boost
the population of Iroquois tribes holds true for the mission
Iroquois as well.38
their societies.

They,

too,

integrated captives

into

For example, in a 1723 raid, a Kahnawake war

party took an Indian prisoner in Virginia whose release became
an urgent cause involving the New York provincial authorities
and

the

Virginia.

Six Nations

as

well

as

the

Sault

Iroquois

and

The English tried to enlist Six Nations help in

convincing the Kahnawakes to give up the man, but the English
declined to use force for fear of offending the Sault and
League Iroquois.

But the prisoner "was more Endin'd to go to

Canada then to return to his own Country."
reported that the Kahnawakes

Albany officials

"have made a Sachim of him

37Wraxall, Abridgment, pp. 50, 52; New York Colonial
Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.) New York State Library,
60:156; NYCD 5:568, 660; Commission for Indian Affairs,
Albany. Minutes of meetings at Albany [1722-1748] and schedule
of propositions made by the Indians and answers given to them,
1677-1719. 5 vols. National Archives of Canada (hereafter
cited as Minutes of the Indian Commissioners) l:6-8a, 165,
167, 2:67; New York Council Minutes Old Vol. 21, p. 436
(Calendar p. 381); The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader
Colden (New-York Historical Society, Collections. L-LVI [New
York, 1917-1923]), Vol. 4, p. 278 (hereafter cited as Colden
Papers); JP 1:378, 386; James H. Merrell, "Their Very Bones
Shall Fight: The Catawba-Iroquois Wars," in Daniel K. Richter
and James H. Merrell, eds., Bevond the Covenant Chain: The
Iroauois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America. 16001800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p.
127.
38Daniel K. Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois
Experience," William and Marv Quarterly 3d Ser., XL (1983),
528-559.
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according to Custom."39 The community at the Sault continued
to be a mosaic of cultural origins, with the periodic influx
of native as well as European captives, integrated into the
seamless web of families and clans.
Other targets of

the Kahnawakes

members in the form of captives.

provided new family

In 1716 at the invitation of

the French, Sault warriors took part in the war against the
Fox nation west of Lake Michigan.40

Once again in 1731 they

were called upon and provided more fighting men than did the
Canadian militia.41

Four years later, the call came again

and ninety joined the French campaign against the Fox.
luck cursed this expedition, however.

Bad

The journey to Fox

territory was arduous

and guides led

the fighting forces

astray so that hardly

any of them encountered the

enemy.

Those who did found themselves greatly outnumbered, but as
Father Luc Nau,
expedition,

the Kahnawake priest who accompanied the

recounted,

the Kahnawakes

in the group proved

their bravery and their reputation as "the most Warlike of all
the american tribes."

One of their leaders, Onorakinguiak,

called out to the rest that they must fight bravely and not
let themselves be captured; his words of inspiration were "Let

39Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:8a, 11-lla.
40Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin
16:341 (hereafter cited as CSHSW); Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed.,
Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History (Norman, Ok: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1987), p. 42.
41CSHSW 17:124.
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us

show these

frenchmen.1,42

renards

[Foxes]

that we

are

Iroquois

and

The French and allied-Indian force defeated

the Fox warriors soundly, forcing them back into a wooded area
to take refuge.

It is telling that a Sault Indian was the

unofficial commander in this battle.
numbers,

Perhaps because of their

the mission Iroquois seem to have dominated the

expedition, and the French militia and their leaders feared
their allies almost as much as they did the enemy.
Officially, the commander in charge of the expedition was
Sieur de Noyelle, but his authority was limited.

He confided

to his superiors that the French soldiers in the war party
feared that the Sault (and probably Mountain) Iroquois "would
put them into the Kettle."
expeditions,

"it

De Noyelle advised that on future

is necessary that the

French should be

stronger than the savages so as to be able to dominate them;
otherwise

They

dominate

us

...

complaisance and attention to Them."

notwithstanding

[our]

He spoke from personal

experience; a Kahnawake warrior during this expedition "was
bold enough to beat one of our soldiers in my presence."

But

de Noyelle did not punish the man, rather pretending to turn
his head "as if I had not seen it," explaining that "we
expected every Day to be abandoned by those people [mission
Iroquois] at the first word we might say to them."43
French commanders lived in fear of their allied forces in
42JR 68:275-277.
43CSHSW 17:226-229.
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these backcountry forays and the Kahnawakes knew they could
behave as they wished.

They realized they had the upper hand.

Power relationships were different in the interior of the
continent from what they were at the garrisoned fort along the
St. Lawrence.

The Kahnawakes may have been the most warlike

of all North American bands, but they were not unswervingly
loyal to the French cause.

However, they were easily the

largest single group of Indians on which the French called in
time of war, and therefore they had to be tolerated.44
In 1739, the missionaries at the Sault played an active
part in convincing Kahnawake warriors to join a French foray
against the Cherokees.

Father Lauzon used the confidence he

enjoyed among the Kahnawakes to press them into service.

The

Kahnawakes made up more than half of the entire allied-Indian
force for the southern offensive.

Even some League Mohawks

joined in this effort, notwithstanding promises they had made
to the governor of New York.45

No doubt the reason that

Kahnawakes agreed enthusiastically to fight was the prospect
of captives, potential adoptees, for their community, since
Father Nau had recently commented that the Sault population
was not as large as it had once been.

In 1740, a Jesuit

missionary at Detroit noticed that a party of "bandits" from

^E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State
of New York 4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany: Weed and Parsons,
1850-1851), Vol. 1, pp. 17-18. (Hereafter cited as DHNY.)
45RAPO
6:148.

1922-23,

pp.

181-182,

184-185;

JR

69:37;

NYCD
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the

Sault

came

back

Chickasaw captives.46
fighting,

they

from

the

southern

foray

with

some

Whatever the Kahnawakes * reasons for

were

much

braver

than

their

French

counterparts; although the French had brought cannons and
mortars, they did not dare engage Indians in battle, and the
Iroquois of Kahnawake, along with some Canadian militia, were
the only ones to encounter the enemy.47
Charles,

Marquis de Beauharnois,

the governor of New

France, came to think of these Indians, along with the other
"domiciliated" (mission) Indians, as the heart of the French
fighting force; he noted that despite their "inconstancy" they
were to be kept on alert in case needed for battle, whereas
his French and Canadian regulars and militia seemed soft by
comparison.48 However, one year after stating this, he found
the

"inconstancy"

to

be

overwhelming;

when

Beauharnois

approached the village at Kahnawake to speak with the Sault
Iroquois, the sachems gathered up all the people and fled the
village to avoid having a confrontation with him, true to the
Iroquoian
bravely,

trait
the

of

avoiding

Kahnawake

conflict.

reputation

for

Despite

fighting

"inconstancy"

was

monumental in the early 1740s, since they engaged in battle
with Indian tribes behind Beauharnois' back and against his
will, maintained close trading ties (and, Beauharnois feared,
46JR 69:47; CSHSW 17:328.
47JR 69:47-48.
48NYCD 9:1068.
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information networks) with New York, and at times even incited
other mission Indians against the French.
When Beauharnois finally managed to get an audience with
the Kahnawake people in the summer of 1741 by engaging Father
Lauzon to strongarm the sachems into coming to Kontreal, he
chastized them for fomenting dissent among the St. Francis
Abenakis and the Mountain Indians.

Charging that "one of your

Chiefs wished to inspire them [the Mountain Indians] with
sentiments of rebellion against the discipline of your common
Father," he expressed his disbelief that they could have
suggested such bad thoughts to the Mountain Indians,

who

"understand better than you the value of my friendship."49
But the Sault sachems spoke ill of their Mountain Iroquois
cousins, complaining that the latter had informed the French
of Sault intrigues.
were

strained

Relations between the two communities

at best,

and

Beauharnois

did

not help by

suggesting that the Mountain Iroquois were beyond reproach
whereas the Sault Iroquois needed to be reprimanded and forced
back into a posture of obedience.
contrast

to

the

loyal

Mountain

He complained that in
Indians,

almost

all

the

Kahnawakes had "English hearts."50

49NYCD 9:1073-1074; Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et
la Nouvelle-France au XVIIIe siecle 2 vols. (Paris: Alphonse
Picard et Fils, 1906), Vol. 2, p. 254. A similar statement
comparing Sault and Mountain loyalty is found in CSHSW 18:18
(1749).
S0NYCD 9:1071.
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The warring efforts of the Kahnawakes against distant
tribes in the 1730s and early 1740s clearly paid off at home?
periodic raids against the Chickasaws as well as the Catawbas
produced "a large number of slaves” to be brought to the
mission village, according to Father Nau.

But these so-called

"slaves" were spared torture for the most part and were
adopted into the community.

Nau claimed that the Kahnawake

Indians "instruct them in our mysteries, and by Holy baptism
place Them in The way of reaching heaven."

By this means as

well as the voluntary immigration of "outside families coming
from a distance who willingly settle down among us," the
population of the Sault mission increased significantly in
this period.

Nau indicated that there was so much work to be

done because of the influx of people, as well as caring for
the sick and settling quarrels among the Indians, that the
missionaries stationed there were extremely overworked.

But

the Jesuits could not have helped feeling gratified that
Indians were joining the ranks of the Sault in such numbers
and that conversely Six Nations sachems in the homeland were
worrying about the exodus of their tribesmen and women.51
Undoubtedly,
involuntary
immeasurably.

however,

newcomers
The

the

influx

complicated

number

of

tribal

of

life

voluntary
at

origins

the

and
Sault

represented

51JR 69:57-59 (quote); Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 223; New
York Council Minutes Old Vol. 21, p. 33 (Calendar p. 349) ;
NYCD 6:282, 645. In 1741 the population at Sault St.-Louis
was 1160, with 270 warriors. (C11A 75:206-207)
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increased, so that many languages must have been spoken in the
longhouses, although Mohawk remained the dominant tongue.

An

example of the cosmopolitan nature of the Kahnawake community,
was a man whom the French called Beauvais; he was a metis and
could speak "every language," according to his compatriots.52
During a raid against the Foxes and Sakis, Beauvais had been
able to converse with them, which struck French observers on
the scene as remarkable. Beauvais served as a reminder of the
multi-cultural community in

which he made his home.53

The polyglot nature ofthe Kahnawake community goes

far

toward explaining the many and contradictory responses to war
which came from its members.
George's War in 1744,

the

With the outbreak of King
English and French once again

prepared for military activity in the northeast and both sides
courted

their

unqualified

Indian

military

contacts.
support

the

Six

goal

was

Nations

and

neutrality from the Kahnawakes and other mission Indians.

The

French sought the reverse.

from

The English

The French had reason to be

worried about Sault allegiance, because trade ties with Albany
were

closer than

ever

in the mid-1740s,

and the Albany

Commissioners, if not the League Iroquois, might be able to
convince the Kahnawakes to stand neutral in the conflict, as
52CSHSW 17:227; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 35.
53Beauvais became a sachem, indicating that the Kahnawakes
were color-blind, that mixed-bloods were not barred from being
appointed to positions of honor. There were many references
to mixed-blood people at Kahnawake. One family even retained
ties to white relatives in New England. (JP 1:267)
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they had managed to do previously.

But whereas Europeans

assumed that a belligerrent group would have one policy to
which the whole group would adhere, native society did not
allow for leaders to force others to agree with them; sachems,
elders, or matrons might decide on a policy, but this did not
mean that warriors would adhere to it.54

Individuals would

make their own decisions.55 At the Sault there were at least
54Despite the cultural blinders with which most Europeans
perceived Indian political culture, Iroquoian women played an
integral role in deciding whether or not Iroquoian men would
wage war. But since they were involved at the village level
of negotiations, European politicians seldom witnessed their
involvement. Only one meeting of Beauharnois with a Mountain
mission council
is documented specifically enough to
distinguish between elders, women, and warriors speaking to
the governor. fNYCD 9:1078-1079) The only other references in
European sources documenting mission Iroquois women's
involvement in politics were by Frenchmen interested in native
culture.
In the 1710s Father Lafitau noticed at Kahnawake
that "the matron has the power to make peace or war," and
Pierre Pouchot concurred in the 1750s. (Lafitau, Customs Vol.
2, pp. 163-164; Pierre Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war in
North America between the French and English. 1755-60 2 vols.,
trans. Franklin B. Hough (Roxbury, Ma: W.E. Woodward, 1866),
Vol. 2, p. 202.
55Claude LeBeau, Aventures du Sr. C. LeBeau. avocat en
oarlement. ou vovacre curieux et nouveau parmi les Sauvaoes de
l'Ameriaue septentrionale 2 vols. (New York: Johnson Reprints,
1966) [originally published in Amsterdam, 1738], Vol. 2, pp.
278-279; Joseph Frangois Lafitau, Customs of the American
Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols.,
William N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, ed. and trans.
(Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974-77), 1:293-296, 300; Theda
Perdue,
"Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois in the
Eighteenth Century," in Richter and Merrell, eds., Beyond the
Covenant Chain: The Irocruois and Their Neighbors in Indian
North America. 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University
Press, 1987), pp. 148-149; Mary Druke, "Structure and Meanings
of Leadership Among the Mohawk and Oneida During rhe MidEighteenth
Century"
(Unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
University of Chicago, 1982), pp. 7, 22 23.
Father Joseph
Frangois Lafitau observed that at times, war was a "political
agreement between chiefs of opposing parties to keep their
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two factions which pursued independent policies in the ensuing
years of French-English conflict;

this was more and more

apparent in the years leading up to war.
Differences of opinion had been visible as early as the
1720s.

In

1725,

a

group

of

warriors

had

murdered

an

Englishman at Saratoga, but some sachems hurried to Albany
upon hearing of it to ensure the Albany Commissioners that
they regretted the act, that it was in no way condoned by the
majority of their community, and that it was only "some of
their vilest people" who had committed the heinous deed.56
In the same year, the Commissioners reported that there were
six sachems at Kahnawake and two of them had been accepted by
the Albany men "as Children of this Govemmt" (allies of New
York), and would give regular intelligence of affairs in New
France.

No doubt representing the pro-English position at

Kahnawake councils was also part of their role.57
youth alert and had no other object except to harry each other
and put their valour to the test." (Lafitau, Customs...
2:105.)
56Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:151a.
S7Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:129.
Some captives
taken by a Kahnawake war party in the early 1750s became an
issue which illustrated this point; Susanna, a respected
Kahnawake woman who was visiting in Albany, told Conrad Weiser
that the conduct of that party in capturing the English
traders in peacetime was not approved of at all at the Sault,
and that most of the people there were
angry at
those who had
done it, "and in their Drunkenness would call them [the
captors] old women and Breakers of the Peace." (NYCD 6:796.)
The peacetime taking of captives by Indians was becoming a
social problem in New France, because it was condoned by the
French, who purchased prisoners from Indians and kept them as
slaves. An economic incentive for taking captives developed
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An Indian named Skonondo also played this role for a
time.

A frequent visitor at Albany from 1724 to 1726, when

he acted as a speaker on behalf of the Sault Iroquois and
passed intelligence to the New Yorkers, he emigrated in 1728
from the Sault, bringing his family and about sixty others to
live

near

Albany.

He was

Kahnawake at this time.

unquestionably

a pro-English

It is unclear how long he and his

group remained in New York, but by 1735 he had returned to the
Sault and was by that time referred to as a sachem, not just
a speaker.

But he was still very much in the pro-English camp

at the Sault and still made frequent diplomatic trips to
Albany, ensuring the Commissioners of good relations between
the Kahnawakes and New York.

In fact, in 1736, he stated that

he was "mindfull of his being a Child of this Govemmt. [New
York]" and that he would

"be

faithfull to the Same"

by

informing them of anything important that was happening in
Canada

relating

to

New

York.58

Skonondo

was

also

instrumental in making sure relations between the Sault and
League Iroquois were smooth, that the "Road [between Iroquoia
and Kahnawake] should be kept Clean & be free for all to use
it peaceably."

In further pro-English activities, Skonondo

went to Boston in 1744 to affirm that the mission Iroquois
among native groups. (Lafitau Customs... 2:152; Ian K. Steele,
Betrayals: Fort William Henrv & the "Massacre" (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 13-14.)
58Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:68, 171a, 211, 2:82a;
Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 170; New York Council Minutes Old Vol.
15, p. 155 (Calendar p. 303).
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would remain neutral in the war.59
However,

once the war began,

changed his mind;

he was

the enigmatic Skonondo

present

at

the destruction

of

Saratoga by French and mission Indian forces in 1746, the
event which proved to be the most destructive to Kahnawake New York relations in King George's War.

His presence there

implies that he participated in the fighting, unless he was
forced to go against his will.
of the French cause.

But he had become a supporter

In 1754, when war was again imminent, a

pro-English diplomatic mission

from the Sault headed for

Albany told New York authorities that Skonondo had wanted to
join them, but "was Rejected Having often Given Reason to
Suspect his Fidelity" to the pro-English faction.60
turncoat was

This

living evidence not only of the variety of

opinions at the Sault but also of the possibility that some
would change their minds over the years.
Indeed, a group of Kahnawakes admitted to the Albany
commissioners in 1741 that they had not yet decided whether to
remain neutral in a French-English war.
Sault

spokesman

indicated that

the

Three years later a

sachems

of

Kahnawake

supported neutrality, and perhaps in specifying the sachems,
hinted

that

not

everyone

at

the

Sault

agreed

with

59Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:65a, 299.
60New York Colonial Manuscripts 75:33, 79:37.
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sachems.61

Two months later, some other Kahnawake Indians

visiting Albany were called to task for a rumor that the New
Yorkers had heard concerning the mission Iroquois: that the
French governor had offered them the hatchet against the
English and that they had accepted it.

The commissioners

complained to these visitors that this taking up

of the

hatchet was contrary to what the sachem had told them two
months earlier and to what Skonondo had promised at Boston.
The reply was that the Sault sachems had held a meeting with
the warriors of their village, asking them not to use the
hatchet "Contrary to the Covent, with ye English" but to make
war only on the Catawbas.62

Clearly,

a majority of the

sachems and matrons were pro-peace (pro-English) whereas most
of the warriors
English.

seemed to want to make war against the

And indeed, while some Kahnawake travellers came to

Albany to pass intelligence to the New Yorkers, others spied
on the English colony,

returning to Canada with military

information about New York for the benefit of the French.63
But even the pro-French faction was concerned about
relations with their fellow Iroquois of the Six Nations; those
who agreed to take up the hatchet on behalf of the French
invited Six Nations sachems to join them in their French
61Wraxall,
Abridgment.
Commissioners 2:275a-276.

p.

223;

Minutes

of

Indian

62Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:298a-299.
63NYCD
2:308a.

9:1109-1111;

Minutes

of

Indian

Commissioners
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alliance and in living at the Sault.64
worried

about

propositions,

a

positive

especially

response

when

they

military support for their own cause.

New York officials

to

either

desired

of

Six

these

Nations

The League Iroquois

were extremely reluctant to pledge military alliance with the
English in 1745, and one League Indian even emigrated to the
Mountain mission, embarking on a career of leading war parties
against New York.65

In early 1746,

the grand council at

Onondaga flatly refused to join the English side, arguing that
they and the Sault Iroquois were "One Family and one Nation
that they intermarried amongst one Another and would not
therefore make war upon each other."66
Some Kahnawakes continued to entreat the League Iroquois
to remain neutral, claiming that "the white people might fight
for themselves" and that "there were only a few of Unruly
Cachnawage Indians at the Destruction of Saratoge" in 1745.67
This

was

revealing

on two

scores:

that

there were

some

inklings of an Indian-versus-white alignment of sympathies,
and that the "unruly" Kahnawakes present at the Saratoga raid
represented a small minority of their people, most of whom
disapproved of the raid.
The

possibility

of

both

groups

of

Indians

aligning

^Minutes of Indian Commissioners 3:84, 90.
65Colden Papers 3:137; NYCD 10:32-33.
^raxall, Abridgment, p. 244.
67Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:359-359a.
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against both sets of Europeans frightened the latter.

French

and English alike feared that the League and Sault Iroquois
had a "secret understanding" not to fight each other even if
forced to go along on war expeditions.

Cadwallader Colden

claimed that the two Iroquois groups had a code they used to
identify each other in the woods between New France and New
York; a Six Nations man told a Schenectady man who wanted to
go to New France that he needed only to dress like an Indian
and, when encountering mission Iroquois along the way who
would ask him to identify himself, call out "Maria" to be
safe.

French officials claimed that in battles which involved

Kahnawake

and

League

warriors

on

opposite

sides,

the

Kahnawakes would fire warning shots as the enemy approached,
to save their fellow Iroquois from being slaughtered.68

The

French officials worried about the understanding and feared
that the two groups of Indians would "allow the whites to
fight each other without interfering with them on either
side."69

New York leaders went even further, worrying that

the two groups, while protecting each other, would "continue
their Depredations agt. the Christians [Europeans]."70
^Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian
Nationsr...1 2 vols. (Reprinted from the London 1747 edition,
New York: Allerton, 1922), Vol. 2, pp. 214-215; NYCD 10:105.
69NYCD 10:94.
Also Paul A. W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser:
Friend of Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1945), pp. 232-233.
M i n utes of Indian Commissioners 2:406.
In 1750,
Pennsylvania's Indian agent Conrad Weiser lamented that
Onondaga, seat of the Six Nations Confederacy Council, "was
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But these fears were probably unfounded, since the two
groups of Indians did go to war on opposite sides and even
knowingly killed each other on occasion near the close of the
1744-1748 conflict.

The Kahnawakes instigated the distancing

which led to this position, since they had been first to take
up the hatchet.

In the summer of 1746, when the Six Nations

were agonizing over whether to go to war, their Sault cousins
distanced themselves rhetorically from the League, speaking of
"your

Father"

and

"our

Father,"

as

though .the European

alliances defined their relationship, instead of the blood and
family

connection

which

League

orators

had

emphasized.71

Clearly, at least for the moment, the pro-French faction had
won at the Sault, speaking for the community in general.

But

opposition still existed, since even at the height of Sault
support for the French in this war, Canadian officials worried
that the Kahnawakes were "treacherous, and favour the Mohawks
in

their

incursions

on

our

settlements;

they

are

even

suspected of giving the enemy notice when we are in pursuit of
them.,|7Z

thick with French praying Indians when I was there," adding to
the fear of pan-Indian organization. (Samuel Hazard, ed.,
Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania 16 vols.
(Harrisburg; 1838-1853), Vol. 5, p. 480.)
71Colden Papers 3:234.
^NYCD 10:92.
Aaron, a League Mohawk, reported to New
York officials in 1746 that he had visited a friend at
Kahnawake who was against involvement in the war. (Minutes of
Indian Commissioners 2:396a.)
This is one of few glimpses
into individual opinion of persons at Kahnawake.
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Not all Kahnawakes favored the Mohawks;

in the early

spring of 1748, a group of Kahnawakes encountered some League
Mohawks, and the two groups, speaking to each other in Mohawk,
denounced

each

other

and

boasted

of

their

own

bravery.

According to English accounts, the Kahnawakes not only killed
most of the Mohawk group, but also desecrated the bodies of
their

victims,

roasting

various

parts

over

a

fire.73

Although at other times, it was clear that Kahnawakes were
coerced into fighting, there were no Frenchmen present at this
fratricidal spree; those Kahnawakes who took part in this
butchering

of

Six Nations warriors

did

so of their

own

volition.
But coercion was sometimes evident.

In the summer of

1747, some 34 Sault Iroquois had been outfitted for a war
party by French authorities,

who ordered the warriors to

divide themselves into two or three smaller groups.

The

reaction to this order was less than enthusiastic since the
warriors

"manifested

some

repugnance,"

but

they

were

"authoritatively told that they were to submit to orders and
obey." And some Six Nations representatives at a council with
William Johnson in April
counterparts were

1748 told him that their Sault

"too much under the

French" to agree to be neutral
war.74

Directions

of the

for the remainder of the

New Yorkers who were personally acquainted with some

^JP 1:146-147.
74NYCD 10:167; JP 1:163.
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Kahnawake Indians because of the illegal trade reported that
the priests at Kahnawake routinely pressed the Sault Indians
to

make

diplomat

war
came

on
to

the

English.75

Kahnawake

for

When

a

League

discussions

in

Iroquois
1746,

a

presumably pro-French Sault Indian informed a missionary of
this visit, who in turn notified the governor of the colony.
The Jesuits acted as watchdogs for the interests of the French
colony by monitoring talks between the
people.

Sault and League

If Sault and League negotiators had desired to have

private meetings, they were thwarted in this attempt as long
as the meetings were to be at the mission village instead of
in a village in Iroquoia.76
The government of New France also attempted to control
the movement of Sault Indians.

Governor Beauhamois claimed

that he installed a chief at Kahnawake, and told him to report
everything that happened at the Sault, and to heed the Jesuits
at all times.77 At a particularly delicate time in 1744, the
Montreal governor decreed that no Kahnawakes should enter that
city.78

No doubt many chafed at this attempt to limit their

Minu t e s of Indian Commissioners 1:143a. For additional
evidence of Jesuit pressure, see C11A 95:152-154? NYCD 10:209?
Minutes of Indian Commissioners 1:143a? "Les malignites du
sieur de Courville,"
[anon.]
Bulletin des recherches
historioues L (1944), p. 73.
76Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:394-394a, 403. Another
instance of this happening: 2:373.
^NYCD 9:1075.
78Minutes of Indian Commissioners 2:298, also 2:286a.
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freedom and to control their policy.
Some rebelled completely against the growing intrusion of
French imperial control on life at the Sault by leaving the
village and heading west to escape the restrictions.
country

in

the

1740s

and

1750s

was

a

haven

The Ohio
for

many

dispossessed or discontented tribal groups from the east.

For

the discontented, the source of their unhappiness with life in
the East was often disagreement with the policies followed by
the sachems or warriors in their villages.

Separating from

the group had always been a way of dealing with such political
factionalism and never more so than in the mid-eighteenth
century.
The nature of politics in Iroquoian and other native
societies was changing at this time; the traditional pattern
of sachems, elders, matrons, and warriors enjoying a balance
of influence within the polity was being replaced by decision
making by a few "pine-tree chiefs," men unofficially appointed
by whites, or recognized by whites, as the men in charge of
making policy.

Often these were warriors or war-inclined men

who were encouraged by Europeans not to seek consensus within
the village council but to impose a policy.79

Sachems duly

appointed by matrons saw their position declining, but their
^ a r y Druke, "Structure and Meanings of Leadership..."
pp. 93-94, 144-145, 151.
Joseph Brant is an example of a
white-appointed or recognized leader who usurped authority
from traditionally recognized sachems. (See James O'Donnell,
"Joseph Brant," in R. David Edmunds, ed., American Indian
Leaders: Studies in Diversity (Lincoln, Ne: University of
Nebraska Press, 1980). Also see above, footnote 82.)
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role had not been one of coercion.

This traditional authority-

had been that of speaking, of presenting a point of view in
hopes of convincing others to agree with it rather than using
force.

The elders, sachems, matrons, and warriors had always

sought agreement in council meetings.

If one could not agree

on extremely important issues and felt strongly enough about
it, he or she could leave the village.
Many of the people living in the Ohio country were those
who had voted with their feet.

Many Six Nations people were

there, particularly Senecas (these Ohio Senecas were called
Mingos), as well as Delawares and Shawnees who had lost their
land in the east, and Ojibwas, Hurons, Wyandots, Twightees,
and others.

Both Sault and Mountain Mission Iroquois people

were found in these small communities.80

Little is known

about these newcomers except for the occasional captivity
narrative by white prisoners such as Colonel James Smith of
Kentucky.

Smith

was

captured

in

1755,

shortly

before

Braddock's defeat, by a Mountain Iroquois and two Delawares.
They

took him

to

Fort

Duquesne,

forced him to

run the

gauntlet, and later escorted him to a community of Kahnawakes,
Delawares, and Ojibwas on the Muskingum River northwest of

^ CSHSW 18:91? Guy Fregault, Le Grand Marquis: Pierre de
Rioaud de Vaudreuil et la Louisiane 2e. ed. (Montreal: Fides,
1952), pp. 357, 358; Shea, History, p. 335? Michael N.
McConnell, "Peoples "In Between": The Iroquois and the Ohio
Indians, 1720-1768," in Richter and Merrell, eds., Beyond the
Covenant Chain: The Irocmois and Their Neighbors in Indian
North America. 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University
Press, 1987).
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Fort Duquesne.

Smith was adopted by this group and spent

several years among them.

Fortunately, his subsequent account

of life among them provides clues about these Ohio emigrants.
For instance, the Kahnawakes among this group may have been
religious as well as political refugees,

since one of his

adoptive brothers told him that many of the Kahnawakes (as
well as Wyandots) "were a kind of half Roman Catholics."

The

brother also said that "the priest and him could not agree, as
they held notions that contradicted both sense_and reason,”
and that he believed the traditional native religious way "was
better than this new way of worshipping God."81
Some were opposed to fighting in the Seven Years' War.
Tecaughretanego, a Kahnawake member of the community, told
Smith that although he had had a reputation as a warrior, he
had been very much against the war in council.
"stayed

home"

rather

than

go

fighting,

the

Therefore he
traditional

Iroquoian method of dealing with dissent from the group.

If

this was his attitude in the community in the Ohio country,
there is a good chance that Tecaughretanego had left his home
at the Sault for similar reasons.82
recounted

that

Tontileaugo,

a

Conversely, Smith also

Kahnawake

refugee

at

the

Muskingum camp, who wanted to go to war against an enemy tribe
81Samuel G. Drake, ed., Indian Captivities or Life in the
Wiowam (Buffalo, N.Y.: 1854), p. 206. Pierre Pouchot reported
that in the 1750s many Sault Iroquois were abandoning their
mission village because of disenchantment with the Christian
religion. (Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war... 2:224.)
82Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, p. 221.
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was voted out of the war party.

The community held a council

when deciding whether or not to make war on another group, and
they held votes on whether each potential warrior should be
included in the expedition.

Tontileaugo was disappointed

because "the votes went against him, as he was one of our best
hunters."

He was needed to stay behind and provide meat for

the women, children, and elderly people at the community.83
Smith also told of elders trying to cajole the young men
into going to war; on this occasion the former did not believe
that the warriors necessarily could drive all the English off
the continent, but "they were willing to propagate the idea in
order to encourage the young men to go to war."

These elders

also claimed to have visions just before a war party set out
for battle in order to "animate and excite [the warriors] to
push on with vigor."84

Whereas at the Kahnawake community

itself elders and sachems seemed to be opposed to war and
warriors eager to go to war, more often than not, the reverse
seemed to be true in this western community of Kahnawakes.
The practice of cajoling and using gentle pressure on warriors
shows

that

traditional

behavior

in

decision-making

and

conflict resolution persisted.
Also revealing in terms of Kahnawake attitudes toward and
perceptions of the League Iroquois, was a potential skirmish
between this Muskingum community and William Johnson's war
^Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, p. 195.
^Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, pp. 203, 216.
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party which included Mohawk warriors.

This party was spotted

one evening near the camp and many feared that they would be
ambushed.

The women were sent out of the range of possible

fire and the men hunkered down on the ground to wait for enemy
action.

But Tecaughretanego, Smith's Kahnawake friend from

whom he had learned some Mohawk, whispered to him that he
should not be afraid, because all the Mohawk speakers of the
community had to do to ensure their safety was to talk with
Johnson's Mohawk allies.

Since they spoke the same language,

Johnson's Mohawks would not hurt the Kahnawakes or Smith
(since he also spoke Mohawk), although they would kill the
Ojibwas and others.85

Thus the "understanding" between the

League and Kahnawake Iroquois was based on language.

Once a

European had been adopted into a tribe, he or she was no
longer considered to have any identity other than that of the
tribe.

There was no distinction between natural-born native

and white adoptee.86
While some Kahnawakes had emigrated to the Ohio country
to find a freer life, other Iroquois people were forming new
communities closer to New York and New France in the east.
Abbe Frangois Picquet, a Sulpician missionary, left Montreal
85Drake, ed., Indian Captivities, p. 215.
(Several
languages were spoken at the community: Wyandot and Ojibwa as
well as Mohawk, and possibly others, and some of these Indians
also spoke English.)
^Indeed, at Smith's elaborate adoption ceremony, a sachem
addressed him in a speech, declaring that "every drop of white
blood was washed out of your veins."
(Drake, ed., Indian
Captivities, p. 186.)
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in 1748 to start an Iroquois mission on the St. Lawrence far
west of Sault St.-LoUis, almost at the mouth of Lake Ontario.
He called his mission "La Presentation," and recruited League
Onondagas and Oneidas, whose homelands lay almost directly
south of the mission.

Picquet's mission became militarily

significant; the League Mohawks were sufficiently enraged by
it

that

they

determined.

razed

it

in

1750,

but

the

Sulpician

was

He rebuilt it, had it fortified, and established

a garrison there.

By 1753 there were 400 Onondagas and

Oneidas in residence.87

Picquet aggressively attempted to

influence these Indians with French culture; he sent some of
the La Presentation people to France and had them dressed as
Frenchmen "from head to foot" even when they returned to the
mission community.

Bougainville described one as "a savage

harlequin in blond wig and lace-covered garb."88

Picquet's

aggressive approach also extended into the political realm, as
he allowed New France officials to try to intervene in village
politics, and he spied on the League Iroquois for the French
in the early 1750s.

Some Indians of La Presentation balked at

this, and still felt themselves to be part of the Six Nations.
By 1753, many were returning to their home villages, and the
mission

atrophied during the

Seven Years'

War.

Picquet

87John G. Shea, "The Jesuits, Recollets, and the Indians,"
in Justin Winsor, ed., Narrative and Critical History of
America 8 vols. (Boston: 1884-1889), 4:285; DHNY 2:421;
Michael Kammen, Colonial New York: A History (New York:
Scribners, 1975), p. 314; NYCD 10:263.
^Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 103.
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abandoned the mission, but some Iroquois continued to live
there until 1806 when the New York State government had them
removed and sent to other reserves.89
Another mission community was established in 1753 at Lake
Saint

Francis

on

the

St.

Presentation and Kahnawake.

Lawrence,

halfway

between

La

Fathers Gordon and Billiard left

with thirty families from the Sault to settle on this site.
Although official correspondence claimed that these families
had decided to move because they could no longer make a living
from the soil at Kahnawake, a Catholic historian claimed that
one particular family did not fit in at Kahnawake and left
with those who supported them against the majority at the
Sault.90

Although

having

to

spend

some

money

to

help

establish the new community, the French government approved of
its foundation because it would add to the geographic barrier
against enemy invasion which the Sault village and the La
Presentation mission provided to the colony.91
Whatever the reason

for the thirty families leaving

a9NYCD 6:780, 10:563; DHNY 2:421; Bougainville, Adventure
in the wilderness. pp. 103-104; Robert Lahaise, "Frangois
Picquet," Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 4, pp. 636638. The mission was near present-day Ogdensburg, N.Y. (On
this mission see Harold Blau, Jack Campisi, and Elisabeth
Tooker, "Onondaga," in Handbook of North American Indians
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978)
[William Sturtevant, gen. ed.], Volume 15, Northeast. Bruce
Trigger, vol. ed. (1978), p. 495.)
^Shea, History p. 339.
Also C11A 99:311-317; Devine,
Historic Cauqhnawaqa. p. 255.
91C11A 99:315-316.
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Kahnawake for a new start, it was clear that this "St. Regis"
or

"Akwesasne"

potential

mission

newcomers

community was

from

the

Six

more

Nations,

attractive
as

departing

Governor Duguesne told his successor in the post,
Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, in 1755.

to

Pierre

Duquesne claimed that

the League Mohawks "had evinced some repugnance to come to the
Sault,

either because the land there was not fertile,

or

rather because they had remarked that Brandy was as abundant
among their praying Brethren as among the English."92 By the
1750s, the social problems of the League Iroquois were as
common at the Kahnawake community.
However, at the same time, a large number of English
prisoners had been taken by Sault warriors, and many of these
English adoptees at Kahnawake liked the community so much they
decided to stay when offered safe return to their own colony.
They had converted to Catholicism, been adopted by Kahnawake
women into families, and dressed as the Sault people did.93
It is puzzling that these adoptees seemed so enamored of the
Sault community at a time when many Six Nations people viewed
92NYCD 10:301; also Bougainville, Adventure in the
wilderness. p. 112 (Vaudreuil inviting League Oneidas there
(or to La Presentation or Fort Frontenac) in 1757).
(This
Governor Vaudreuil is not to be confused with the earlier
Governor Vaudreuil who died in 1725.
The one who became
governor of Canada in 1755 was his son.
See William J.
Eccles, "Pierre Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil de Cavagnial,"
Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 4, pp. 662-674.
^CllA 95:100-105; NYCD 10:212, 214-216; New York Colonial
Manuscripts 77:77 (Calendar p. 603); New York Council Minutes
Old Vol. 23 p. 71 (Calendar p. 387); Franquet, Voyages et
Memoires. p. 38; Lafitau, Customs... 2:172.
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it as an undesirable place to live.

Kahnawake was a place of

enigma in the 1750s.
"Spirited opinions" were exchanged at Kahnawake council
meetings leading up to the Seven Years' War.
not the French allowed them to decide
difficult to tell.

And whether or

for themselves is

The Sault Iroquois experienced the tension

between their desire for autonomy and the French desire to
make them dependent and pliant.

We have seen evidence of

French attempts to control these people and their policy, and
one of the most obvious attempts to have mastery over their
fate was the imposition of French garrison troops and a
commandant

in thevillage fort.

village in

1750 tomake possible recommendations on improving

fortifications and adding troops.

Louis Franquet visited the

He encountered an awkward

subject in his conversations with the Jesuits there; when
asking them about the number of people and of warriors in the
village, the Jesuit replied that there was no way to calculate
either population.

Franquet noted that his query had been

viewed as indiscrete, and that there might be difficulties for
French authorities in "ascertaining the resources that we
could draw from the community in wartime."94
Proof

of the division in political opinions among the

Kahnawakes

emerged in regard to the garrison; at least two

sachems

(Teganagwasen

and

Beauvais)

wanted

the

garrison

maintained in the early 1750s, whereas three were opposed and
94Franquet, Voyages et Memo ires, p. 119.
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demonstrated this by returning war medals they had received
from the commander of the garrison, M. Douville.95
While factions at Kahnawake were engaged in a tug-of-war,
so were New York and New France engaged in their own tug-ofwar, a contest for the sympathies of both the Sault and the
League Iroquois.
1755.

Their attempts reached a fever pitch by

Especially conspicuous were William Johnson's courting

of the Kahnawakes,

his willingness to spend money in the

effort, and his orders to officials in Albany "to give the
said Cagnawaga Indians no ill usage of any kind."96

He did

this in the face of opposition of other influential people
such as William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts and majorgeneral

of

British

forces

in the

Seven

Years'

War,

who

believed that all Kahnawakes in Albany should be imprisoned.
Goldsbrow Banyar, an important figure in New York governing
circles, believed that the Sault Iroquois visited the colony
of New York only to spy for the Canadians and to thwart New
York's efforts at enlisting the League Iroquois.97

Johnson

^CllA 95:145-147, 150-151; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires.
p. 120.
96J£ 1:639-640, 643, 646, 2:582, 597; New York Council
Minutes Old Vol. 21 p. 430-432 (Calendar p. 380) ; New York
Colonial Manuscripts 79:44; NYCD 10:218; DHNY 2:384; Richard
Day, ed., Calendar of the Sir William Johnson Manuscripts
(Albany: New York State Department of Education, 1909), p. 37.
97JP 1:543-544, 650, 791. Banyar held the positions of
deputy auditor-general of New York, deputy secretary of New
York, deputy clerk of the Council, deputy clerk of the
provincial Supreme Court, register of the court of chancery,
and probate judge, until 1776.
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invited individual Kahnawakes to live near his estate in the
Mohawk Valley west of Albany for a two-year period starting in
the spring of 1755, and he assured the Six Nations that one of
his main concerns in preparing for the coming battles with the
French was not to spill any Kahnawake blood, knowing that this
was one of the main reasons why the Six Nations had not yet
pledged their support for the English cause.98
Indeed,

Kahnawake

support

was

pivotal

to

military

campaigns in the Lake Champlain corridor, the arena for which
Johnson was preparing,

not only because of their military

prowess and intimate knowledge of the terrain and waterways,
but also because the decision of most Six Nations warriors on
whether to join Johnson's redcoats depended on whether their
Sault

relatives

neutral.

would

join

the

French

effort

or

remain

The League Iroquois viewed the Kahnawakes as being

"a part of themselves" and many of them pledged as late as
1754 that they would not ally with the English because of
their alliance with their Sault cousins.99
The

vast

majority

of

Kahnawakes

had

refused

to

participate in the French campaign in the Ohio country at the
start of the Seven Years' War, agreeing only to be employed on
a monthly basis as hunters for the army's food supply.100
98NYCD 6:973, 980-983; JP 9:619.
"Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war... 1:37: Bougainville,
Adventure in the wilderness, pp. 54-55; DHNY 2:384; New York
Colonial Manuscripts 79:105c, 80:51; NYCD 10:267-269.
100DHNY 2:365.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217
And when all the other mission Indians were out on scalping
raids in New England in the early summer of 1755, only the
Kahnawakes refrained from conducting such raids.101

However,

as the months, weeks, and days counted down to the time of
battle in the Lake Champlain-Lake George region, with many
attempts by Johnson and League delegates to dissuade the
Kahnawakes from military involvement, the latter finally, in
desperation and with deep regret, explained that they were
powerless to remain neutral,

that "the French Priests by

throwing Water upon our Heads, subject us to the Will of the
Governor of Canada."

The Sault spokesman who announced this

also reminded the League delegation that the Six Nations
people were fortunate in that they were still "a free People."
The Kahnawakes'

decision was made with regret; they asked

their League cousins to be careful for their own safety and to
stay out of the way of the fighting.102
When Iroquois individuals had responded years earlier to
the spiritual message of the Jesuits, they had not realized
the imperial implications of their choice, but it now became
clear.
Although the French had not been able to force the Kahnawakes
to fight in the Ohio country or to go on scalping raids,

101JP 9:201.
102JP 9:220-221; DHNY 2:399.
The Sault spokesman also
stated that "it is not in our power to comply with it [the
plea for neutrality], for the French & we are one Blood, &
where they are to dye we must dye also." (JP 9:221.)
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Jesuits as well as military officers exerted significant and
successful

intimidation to

enlist with General

Dieskau's

forces based at Fort St. Frederic in the summer of 1755.

A

Dutchman who had been a prisoner in an Abenaki mission village
east of Montreal told Johnson on his return to New York that
the French had not been able to persuade the Kahnawakes to
join them until the French "threatened to kill them or drive
them out of their country.1,103
Johnson was deeply disappointed,

not only because he

would face these formidable Indians as foes, but also because
his own Iroquois support would dwindle; on the eve of the
battle at Lake George, he had only sixty League Iroquois,
although he had expected four hundred.104

And those who did

accompany him into battle were not much help against the
enemy.105
Nor, in the end, were the Sault Iroquois much help to
Dieskau; in fact, they determined the outcome of the Battle of
Lake George fought in September 1755 by sabotaging Dieskau's
plan of attack.
warfare

was

particularly

a

The tension between forest and European-style
constant

theme

throughout

in this battle the

this

war,

but

tension between the two

approaches and the discontent of the Kahnawakes combined for

103JP 2:649.
104DHNY 2:397-398; JP 1:880, 882, 894, 2:8, 383, 9:223;
NYCD 6:994, 1001.
105NYCD 6:1012.
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disastrous

results.

Although

Governor

Vaudreuil

had

instructed General Dieskau, a German baron who had made a
career as a professional soldier in Europe, on how to treat
Indians and how to conduct forest warfare, Dieskau could not
adapt

to

the North American

situation.

Fresh

from the

European theater, he had not enough time, no experience, and
little desire or patience to deal with Indians and Canadian
habitant militia units and their customs of warfare.106
Dieskau's mistakes included not consulting with Indians
on battle plans or at least making a pretense at doing so, not
using Indian scouts, expecting them to attack a fortified camp
(something Indians refused to do), expecting them to remain
fighting and even to advance when the fighting was going badly
and there was a chance at escape, and not taking into account
the allegiance of Indian groups across enemy lines.

The

various accounts of what happened at the Battle of Lake George
differ considerably, so that it is difficult to know precisely
what happened, but it seems clear that the Kahnawakes, when
told of Dieskau' initial plan, refused to participate, forcing
him to change his plan.

At least at this point Dieskau

realized that the Kahnawakes "were considered by the other
Indians as the oldest and first" and took the objections

106NYCD 10:316, 329; Bougainville, Adventure in the
wilderness, p. 60: Colonel Bougainville also shared the
European mistrust and ignorance of the ways of forest and
Indian warfare: George F.G. Stanley, New France: The Last
Phase. 1744-1760 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), pp.
102-103; Steele, Betrayals, pp. 43-50.
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seriously enough to adapt.107
All accounts concur that the Kahnawakes sabotaged the
French plan by warning the League Iroquois and English of the
approaching French ambush with warning

shots.

And when

Dieskau tried to make the best of a bad situation (from a
European point of view) by charging Johnson's fortified camp,
the Kahnawakes,
militia,
defeat.

along with other Indians and the Canadian

fled leaving the French regulars to their bloody
Dieskau

himself

was

seriously

wounded.

The

Kahnawakes later told some Six Nations deputies at a meeting
that they should not have feared the Sault Iroquois in this
battle; they claimed they had had only powder, no shot, in
their muskets.108

Clearly, although the Sault Iroquois had

engaged in military action, they were pressured into it and
rebelled by making the situation intolerable for the French,
and by only pretending to fight against their fellow Iroquois
warriors.

Dieskau held them solely accountable for the French

defeat at Lake George, expressing great bitterness at their
treachery.109

But since the Sault Iroquois were strongarmed

107n y c d 10:342.
,108NYCD 10:316-327, 335-336, 340-343, 367, 7:239-240;
Daniel Claus, Daniel Claus' Narrative of his Relations with
Sir William Johnson and Experiences in the Lake George Fight
(New York: Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York,
1904),
pp.
13-16;
Charles
Henry
Lincoln,
ed., The
Correspondence of William Shirley 2 vols.
(New York:
Macmillan, 1912), Vol. 2, pp. 278-279; JP 1:744.
109NYCD 10:316-318, 340-343; Shirlev Correspondence. Vol.
2, pp. 278-279.
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into fighting, the French should not have expected unswerving
obedience.

Even as they were faced with an unwanted task

forced upon them, the Kahnawakes had found a way to assert
their own will.110
In

subsequent military

notable by their absence,

actions,

the Kahnawakes were

despite Vaudreuil's efforts to

reassure them that he was not angry with them for what had
happened at Lake George.111

When the French took Fort Bull

and Fort Oswego in 1756, there were fewer than twenty Sault
Iroquois present among the French forces as opposed to strong
showings by other mission Indians.

In the fall of 1757, over

one hundred Kahnawake warriors joined a French attack on
German Flats, a settlement of German refugees in the Mohawk
Valley.

They disagreed on strategy, however, and forty of the

Sault warriors left the warpath in disgust.112
Many Kahnawakes had been very disappointed in the French
victory at Oswego.

Thomas Wildman, a Kahnawake known to be

pro-English, "was crying like a Child" when he heard the news.
There had been "a general Disgust agt the French" among the

110The English were pleasantly surprised at Dieskau's
defeat at Lake George, concluding that the Kahnawakes were
"not altogether in the power of the French" after all. (JP
2:68; also 2:86.)
111NYCD 10:381, 448. (Vaudreuil treated them with kid
gloves for the remainder of the war. NYCD 10:828, 838; RAPO
1923-24, p. 354.)
112RAP0 1923-24, p. 223, 1926-27, pp. 380, 403; C U E
10:249-250; DHNY 1:330-331; NYCD 10:404-405, 530, 674; JP
9:862.
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Sault Iroquois in 1755 and 1756, according to a Dutchman who
had spent time in New France as a prisoner.

He claimed that

the Kahnawakes wanted to leave New France but could not do it
"without being hindred [sic] from the french," and that eight
Frenchmen had been murdered in Montreal by some Kahnawakes.
But there were no official reports about these killings, no
doubt because the French did not want to risk further rage
from these Indians which publicity would unleash.113

The

Dutchman's report included two contradictory realities: French
tyranny over the Sault Iroquois and simultaneously a French
fear of offending them because of their importance.

The

dynamic of autonomy versus dependency had clearly slipped
toward dependency, but the Kahnawakes still had some clout and
therefore

some

basis

for

autonomous

power

in

their

relationship with the French colony.
The

Sault

Iroquois

could

still

threaten

to

leak

intelligence to the Six Nations or the English, and the French
took this possibility seriously, suspecting them of this form
of treason in 1756.114

In meetings with the French governor

in that year and the next, the Kahnawakes made no secret of
the fact that they were divided in their opinions and that
113JP 2:649.
On a similar note, see Louise Dechene,
Habitants et Marchands de Montreal au XVIIe siecle (Paris:
Plon,
1974), p.
32? William J.
Eccles,
"Sovereignty
Association, 1500-1783," in Essays on New France (Toronto:
Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 166, 214? CllA 95:148-149.
114Minutes of Indian Commissioners 5:63? RAPO 1923-24, pp.
223-228? Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 32? JP
2:709.
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they had agents in Albany.

Bougainville even claimed that,

because they were divided among themselves, the Kahnawakes "do
not dare to take a decisive course."
paralyzed by

indecision,

considered them to be

at

Even if they were

least French officials

in control

still

of their own decision

making.115
Although they did accompany the French in large numbers
to Fort St. Frederic for a possible attempt on Fort William
Henry in the spring of 1757, there is a good chance that the
recruits were unhappy with their lot, since a brawl broke out
between them and some Frenchmen at Fort St. Frederic.

Hen on

both sides were killed during the fight, with one witness (who
probably exaggerated)
murdered.

claiming that sixty Kahnawakes were

In the aftermath, the Sault people complained to

the Six Nations that the French had formed a scheme to reduce
not

just

the

Kahnawakes

but

the

League

to

slavery.116

French-Kahnawake relations were at a low ebb.
Perhaps
including

because

visits

by

of

great

General

efforts

to

(Louis-Josephe,

recruit

them,

Marquis

de)

Montcalm and Colonel Bougainville to "dance the war dance" and
drum up support for the summer 1757 battle plans, virtually
all of the Sault warriors journeyed to the Lake Champlain
theater for the August siege of Fort William Henry.

In fact,

115Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 110; NYCD
10:553; JP 9:606-607.
116Minutes of Indian Commissioners 5:120; JP 9:741; NYCD
7:285-286.
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because they were the largest group of Indians allied with the
French on this occasion,

the war belt was given to them,

symbolizing their leading military role among both the mission
and the western French-allied Indians.117

But since Montcalm

was in charge of this military action, the same disregard for
Indian allies marred the effort as had marred Dieskau's.

The

siege of the fort was successful, but the ensuing massacre of
the surrendered English forces by Indians resulted from the
misunderstandings

between

(especially Indians)

Europeans

and

North

Americans

on the rules of warfare.118

But the

Kahnawakes do not seem to have been involved in the furious
massacre at Fort William Henry.

Some of them may even have

left the area for Crown Point before the killing began.119
Proof of Montcalm's

inability to

incorporate Indians

successfully into his military strategy was his desire to
fight

the battles

supporters
declared,
Carillon

against

of
the

1758

without native

forest

war

strategy

support.

His

of Vaudreuil

in reporting the news of the French victory at
(Ticonderoga)

in July,

that "what must the more

excite the public admiration and joy, is the fact that no
Indian has contributed to this great event —

a circumstance

117RAPO 1923-24, p. 270; NYCD 10:575, 609.
118See Steele,
"Massacre".

Betrayals:

Fort

William

Henrv

&

119JR 70:91-203 - Father Pierre Roubaud's account.
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which perhaps never occurred in this country."120

And in

1759, the Kahnawakes informed the League Mohawks, no doubt
hoping the information would reach Sir William Johnson, that
"lately they had Buryed their Ax, & they did not choose to
take it up again so soon."121
More than coincidentally, a few weeks later, after the
French capitulated at the Plains of Abraham, Johnson sent a
message to the Sault Iroquois, reminding them that he had
always wished to befriend them and that it was not too late
now for them to send wampum belts indicating their warming to
the

English.122

Ever

ready

to

make

the

best

of

their

situation, the Kahnawakes responded not only by renewing good
relations with Johnson but in 1760 by guiding General Jeffrey
Amherst's British forces around the Lachine rapids in the St.
Lawrence river to reach Montreal, the last piece of land held
by the French in Canada.123
As the British subsequently marched into the city, the
Kahnawake people faced a new reality.

No longer having two

European powers to play off against each other, they faced a
Protestant landlord with a less-than-shining reputation for

120NYCD 10:753.
See also 10:805-806. Virtually to the
end, Vaudreuil and Montcalm continued sparring about the
usefulness and desirability of Indians as military allies:
NYCD 10:780, 810-812, 828; RAPO 1923-24, p. 354.
121JP 9:68.
122JP 13:155.
123NYCD 10:1121; JP 3:273, 13:190.
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dealing

with

Indians.

acquainted with Johnson,
currying their favor.

However,
who

they

realized

were

the

personally

importance

of

In Johnson's son-in-law, Daniel Claus,

stationed in Montreal as the British agent for Indian affairs,
the Kahnawakes had an advocate.
eye out

for

ill treatment

Claus conscientiously kept an

of the

Kahnawakes by

British

soldiers garrisoned in the area and by the Jesuits who were
trying to wrest control of the mission lands away from the
Indians.124 With Claus' help, the Kahnawakes were successful
at making the transition to English rule of the surrounding
colony as painless as possible.

Their resourcefulness and

flexibility was seen by some as convenient collaboration with
the invading force,

but Sault support for the French had

almost never been unwavering or unqualified.
From the earliest wars between the English and French, to
the end of the Seven Years' War and the British conquest of
New France, there had always been many "spirited opinions" at
Kahnawake,

and

they

had

always

attempted

to

reconcile

differing opinions among themselves in such a way as to retain
their sovereignty against the wishes of both the French and
the English.

At times they had walked a narrow road bordering

on dependence, with the traps of Jesuit and official French
control ready to snare them, but they had maintained political
autonomy.

Militarily, the Sault Iroquois had been important

124Colden Papers 5:360, 7:19; NYCD 7:550; JP 3:332, 353,
380, 381, 383-384, 575-576, 638, 664, 862, 969-970, 10:269270, 376-379, 13:164-165.
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and even crucial to the French, but had not succumbed to
French subjugation.
them

on

their

own

They had forced the French to deal with
terms,

seizing

the

initiative

when

necessary, such as when Governor Beauhamois came to meet with
the sachems in 1741, and in 1755 when the Kahnawakes turned a
seemingly certain French victory under Dieskau at Lake George
into a chaotic and embarrassing fiasco.

Leaders such as

Skonondo changed their minds, opinions differed greatly, and
political splits remained unresolved but these variations
notwithstanding,

the

Kahnawakes

affected

the

warfare and diplomacy in the colonial Northeast.

outcome

of

They were

not mere puppets of the French.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
KAHNAWAKE AND FREE TRADE
IN.AN AGE OF MERCANTILISM

Shortly after the French completed fortification of Fort
St.

Frederic at Crown Point on the southern end of Lake

Champlain, which the English in New York regarded as being
well inside their territory, a group of sachems from Kahnawake
arrived at Albany.

One would- expect their reception by New

Yorkers at this 1735 meeting to have been chilly.
they

sat

down and

amicably

concluded

a

However,

treaty with the

Commissioners of Indian Affairs, a group of Albany merchants
whom a succession of New York’s governors had authorized to
conduct business with Indians on behalf of the colony.
recording

secretary,

Peter Wraxall,

found this

The

situation

loathsome, and editorialized in the minutes that most of these
commissioners "swallowed the Bait with Greediness,

by this

Solemn Treaty the Canada Trade was opened & freed from all
Obstructions.”1
The bait of which Wraxall spoke was the steady stream of
furs which
Montreal

the Kahnawake

and

points

Indians brought to Albany

northwest

to

trade

for

from

English

manufactured goods, chiefly woolens, to clothe Indians and
French colonists.

This arrangement infuriated Wraxall and

others in New York who believed in the prevailing doctrine of

1Peter Wraxall, An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs in
the Colony of New York. 1678-1751. ed. Charles Howard Mcllwain
(New York: Blom, 1968, reprint), p. 193.
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mercantilism —

that a colony must trade only with its own

mother country or perhaps with other colonies also tied to the
same empire, but never with a colony of a rival empire.

Trade

between New York and Massachusetts was morally acceptable even
if it went against the exasperating Navigation Acts, but trade
between New York and New France was considered by most people
in the English colonies to be tantamount to treason.

And

exasperated Canadians also complained of Kahnawake being "a
sort of Republic" through which this smuggling trade flowed.
The

conclusion

of

a

treaty

guaranteeing

free trade

between Albany and the Kahnawakes was merely a formalization
of trade patterns which had existed for nearly half a century.
As

early

as

1681,

Governor

Frontenac

of New

France had

complained to the king that the Kahnawakes had commercial
relations with "the Iroquois of their nation"

(meaning the

Iroquois adjacent to New York), and that their transportation
of furs past Chambly to Albany was detrimental to the French
fur trade company's ledger books but irresistible because the
pelts brought

a better price

in the Albany

fur market.2

Frontenac lamented that Sault Saint-Louis seemed to be an
entrepot for this traffic and attempted to curb it there, even
if he could do nothing about furs which had already been
2Archives des Colonies (Paris) Serie C11A (Canada:
Correspondance
Generale,
1540-1784,
122
vols.)
5:385
(original). (Hereafter cited as C11A; all C11A references are
to the transcripts, rather than the originals, unless
otherwise stated.) Rapport de l'Archiviste de la Province de
Quebec 1922-23, p. 78, 1926-27, pp. 126-127 (hereafter cited
as RAPQ).
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carried south beyond Chambly toward New York.

But the trade

increased instead of diminished, and by 1686 there was enough
trade of this type that it was also discussed with grave
concern among colonial officials in New York.3
The trade flourished for several reasons, not the least
of which was geographic.

The journey along the Lake Champlain

corridor was fairly easy despite the Adirondack Mountains and
their dense forests separating the Montreal area from Albany.
Canoes were the ideal form of transportation, using the Hudson
River at Albany, a twelve-mile portage to Wood Creek (Riviere
des Chicots), Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River, and a
portage

at

Kahnawake
Montreal.4

Chambly
village

covering
across

the

the

St.

eighteen

miles

Lawrence

to

River

the
from

Indians routinely made this trip of about two

hundred miles in only a few days.
Since the furs of beavers, martens,

foxes, and other

creatures were thicker farther north, and since the price paid
in Albany for these furs was higher, it was natural that a
free-wheeling traffic developed, despite the invisible line
drawn by cartographic imperialists between French and English
colonies.

That invisible line had routinely been crossed by

Iroquois who travelled, and indeed, emigrated and immigrated,
3Lawrence H. Leder, ed., The Livingston Indian Records.
1666-1723
(Gettysburg, PA:
Pennsylvania
Historical
Association, 1956), p. 98.
4Cadwallader Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations
of Canada... 2 vols. (New York: Allerton, 1922, reprinted from
the 1747 edition), Vol. 2 p. 44.
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back and forth between Iroquoia and the Kahnawake mission
along the St. Lawrence.

When relatives went to visit one

another from the early 1670s on, they always brought gifts for
each other —

the sine qua non of human relationships in

native society.

The

fur trade along the Lake Champlain

corridor grew out of this gift exchange heightened by the
awareness that northern furs were thicker and that prices for
them were better in the southern fur trade center of Albany
than in New France.

Some scholars have even gone so far as to

suggest that one Iroquois motive for emigrating to the mission
community was to engage in this profitable trade, which seems
likely, since an enviable position developed for Kahnawake
Indians within it.5
At the end of the 1689-1698 war between the French and
the English and Iroquois, Colonel Peter Schuyler and Domine
Godfrey Dellius made an official diplomatic visit to Montreal
on behalf of the colony of New York, and while there took the
opportunity to invite the Kahnawake Iroquois to trade at
Albany on a regular basis.

This invitation was also extended

when the Kahnawakes visited Albany in the summer of 1698 and
attended meetings with New York's Governor Bellomont and the
sThomas E. Norton, The Fur Trade in Colonial New York.
1686-1776 (Madison, Wi: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974),
p. 122. (Norton cites E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., Documents
Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York. 15
vols. (Albany, N.Y.: Weed and Parsons, 1853-1887), Vol. 9, pp.
145-146. [Hereafter cited as NYCD.]) Also Daniel K. Richter,
"The Ordeal of the Longhouse: Change and Persistence on the
Iroquois Frontier, 1609-1720" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University, 1984), p. 200.
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League Iroquois.

The Commissioners expressly invited the

Kahnawakes again two years later, playing on the kin ties
between the Kahnawake and League Iroquois.

The commissioners

said they would trade with the Kahnawakes as if they were
their own people (that is, League Iroquois.)6
At the turn of the eighteenth century prices fluctuated
wildly, the rate given for furs in Montreal even sometimes
rising above that in Albany.

For instance, at the July 1698

meetings between Governor Bellomont and the League and mission
Iroquois, an Onondaga sachem complained to the governor that
prices were better in Montreal, and that Albany prices should
be made more competitive so as not to lose Indian customers
permanently to New France.
this time,

(There can be no doubt that by

even if Indians had not been transformed into

economically motivated people, they clearly understood market
principles, and were using economic arguments with Europeans
in order to persuade them to change market conditions to the
Indians' favor.)7

Four years later, the same complaint was

6Bellomont's Conference with the Five Nations. July. 1698
(New York: 1698), p. 3. Daniel K. Richter, "Cultural Brokers
and Intercultural Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 16641701," Journal of American History. LXXV (1988), p. 63. NYCD
4:692.
bellomont*s Conference, pp. 5-7. Regarding the debate
over when or if Indians adopted European-like economic
behavior (acquisitive, accumulative, market-oriented) see
Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as
Hunters. Trappers and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of
Hudson Bav. 1660-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1974). Arthur J. Ray, "Indians as Consumers in the Eighteenth
Century," in Carol M. Judd and Arthur J. Ray, eds., Old Trails
and New Directions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
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made to Bellomont's successor,

Lord Combury,

but shortly

thereafter, longer-term trends returned and the traditional
pattern of higher prices offered for pelts and lower prices
charged

for

prevailed.8

European

goods

at

Albany

than

at

Montreal

Kahnawake carriers, with their crucifixes and

bundles of pelts,

became a familiar sight on the Albany

horizon after the turn of the century, and by 1706 probably
around half of the furs trapped in Canada ended up in the
European market via Albany instead of Montreal.9
Frenchmen who wanted to pursue the trade seldom made the
trip to Albany themselves.

For a number of reasons, they

found it much more convenient to hire an Indian who knew his

1980).
Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, "Give Us Good
Measure": An Economic Analysis of Relations between the
Indians and the Hudson's Bav Company before 1763 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1978). Daniel Francis and Toby
Morantz, Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in
Eastern James Bav. 1600-1870 (Kingston and Montreal: McGiliQueen's University Press, 1985). E.E. Rich, "Trade Habits and
Economic Motivation among the Indians of North America,"
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science XXVI
(1960), 35-53.
8NYCD 4:983-987;
Wraxall, Abridgment, p. 29;
C11A
29:130; Stephen Earl Sale, "Colonial Albany: Outpost of
Empire"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Southern California, 1973), p. 146.
9David A. Armour, "The Merchants of Albany, New York,
1686-1760" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern
University, 1965), p. 112.
(Exact numbers are impossible to
know, because the trade was contraband.
It is also unclear
what percentage of the furs being brought to Albany were
trapped by Kahnawake hunters themselves, but at least some of
them came originally from points north and west of the St.
Lawrence Valley. These were trapped by other Indians, brought
to Montreal, and then smuggled out of Montreal to the Sault
mission village, to be taken down to Albany.
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or her way to Albany to carry their cargo of furs (acquired in
New France from up-country Indians) to the New York fur mecca
on the upper Hudson River.
Commissioners,

The Albany fur merchants/Indian

and certainly New York colonial officials,

preferred this as well; they did not want Frenchmen "trading
within his Majesty's dominion on this side of the Lakes."10
The New Yorkers were jealous of the French success in the fur
trade; one official lamented in 1686 that the French had made
many discoveries and formed alliances with Indians because of
it.11
But whereas the French were more adept at relations with
Indians and at travelling great distances to find them, the
English

had

an

unmistakable

advantage

which

competitive in the strictly monetary aspect —
they offered for pelts.

kept

them

the high prices

The French admitted this in 1689,

complaining that the Albanians gave Indians better rates for
furs and also that they exchanged English trade goods at a
better rate.

Apart from the aberrant price fluctuations from

1697 to 1702 associated with the end of a long period of
warfare and a short-lived glut in the English fur market
because of a change in hat styles, the better prices in Albany
were

due

partly

to

a

long-term glut

in the

French

10Livinaston Indian Records, p. 98.
11NYCD 3:395.
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market.12
For the last three decades of the seventeenth century,
Frenchmen at trading posts in the pays d'en haut (the "upper
country" of the northern Great Lakes) had taken advantage of
a liberal license policy, which opened up the fur business to
individual

profit,

despite

the

official

monopoly

of the

Compacmie des Indes.13 By 1700, the fur market in France had
been all but ruined, flooded with pelts from many individual
license-holders in New France.

The price of peltries on the

Paris market plummeted and the economy of New France was
marginal from then until the 1730s,

at which point other

industries had developed sufficiently to take over the export
revenue

once

generated

solely

by

furs.14

Illegal

trade

between Albany and Montreal, while siphoning off potential
profits from the Compaanie des Indes,

actually helped the

12William J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade in the Colonial
Northeast," in Handbook of North American Indians (Washington,
D.C.:Smithsonian Institution, 1978) [William Sturtevant,
gen. ed.], Volume 4, History of Indian-White Relations.
Wilcomb Washburn, vol. ed. (1988), p. 327.
13E.R. Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry in the Fur Trade
During the Eighteenth Century," in J.M. Bumsted, ed., Canadian
History Before Confederation: Essays and Interpretations 2d
ed. (Georgetown, Ont.: Irwin-Dorsey, 1979), p. 135.
14Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France,
1713-1760," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report
1939, p. 84.
Dale Miquelon, New France 1701-1744. "A
Supplement to Europe" (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987),
pp. 174-175. Allen W. Trelease, Indian Affairs in Colonial
New York: The Seventeenth Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1960), p. 293.
The trade also rebounded
somewhat when western posts were reopened in 1716, and new
eastern European markets were found.
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French fair economy by diverting a glut of furs from Paris to
Albany and London.
had

recovered

By the 1720s, the French market for furs

(although profits

were more

moderate than

formerly) and the smuggling trade to Albany had helped the
French fur economy to weather the collapse of prices up to
that time.15
Another factor affecting the price disparity for furs in
Montreal and Albany was the difference in structure of the
trade itself.

The French trade was controlled by a single

company, which, although going through several metamorphoses,
set the prices for pelts.

Conversely, the New York trade

consisted not of one large monopoly but of about a dozen
independent merchants.
have

stressed

the

While many historians and economists

difference

between

this

competitive

(supposedly healthy) atmosphere and the (presumably unhealthy
and unfair) French monopoly, the Albany merchants together had
a monopoly granted by the New York government.

At the highest

level, Albany's

monopoly

fur

trade

was

no

less

a

than

15Miquelon, New France, p. 174.
Richard L. Haan, "The
Covenant Chain: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Niagara Frontier,
1697-1730" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Califomia-Santa Barbara, 1976), p. 143.
Denis Riverin, a
prominent Canadian, offered "reasons for the bad state of
affairs of the colony of Canada" in 1705, in which he argued
that the solution to the crisis of the fur trade (brought on,
he believed, by the monopoly's fixed price) was to export
beaver surpluses to Albany.
Pontchartrain, the Minister of
Marine, did not take River in's advice, but it was a viable
solution and underscores that the trade between Albany and
Montreal in furs aided the French in overcoming the glut in
their peltry market. (Miquelon, New France, p. 66.)
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Montreal's.16

Their town's prerogative excluded people in

neighboring towns from carrying on the fur trade and resulted
in a situation far from a free marketplace.
Although

in

theory

the

Albany

merchants

were

in

competition with each other, in fact they acted together as an
interest group, the most obvious example being the collective
role they pursued in managing Indian affairs on behalf of the
colony.

However, they were more open to market forces than

were their French counterparts, since prices for furs were
controlled more directly by the market price in London than by
the price in Paris in the case with the French.17 The French
company could and did set a low price for a pelt, giving the
impression that it was under financial stress and had no
choice in the matter.

French officials commented on this,

revealing the lack of confidence which the French commercial
community had in the company; they complained that the company
actually had made great profits but was keeping the price
offered

for

furs

artificially low.

Pierre Pouchot also

accused the French trade of being poorly managed, corrupt, and
irrational.

His description of how the trade worked leaves

little question as to why the Albany traders were able to
16Adair debunks the myth of the moral superiority of the
English "non-monopoly" trade. (In "Anglo-French Rivalry..."
pp. 136, 140.)
17Robert Sanders, Letter Book, 1742-1758, in National
Archives of Canada, p. 43.
NYCD 10:199-201.
Norton, Fur
Trade. p. 64. William J. Eccles, "A Belated Review of Harold
Adams Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada." Canadian Historical
Review LX (1979), p. 436.
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offer more competitive rates.18
Albany's ability to post more alluring prices were also
rooted in general differences between the colonial economies
of France and England.

The English were much more business-

oriented than the French.

In England, becoming a merchant was

increasingly respected from the time of the Reformation, and
more and more Englishmen pursued this mode of making a living.
In French society, commerce never gained such prestige. As a
result, the French economy was never as strong or rationalized
as the English from the sixteenth century on, because the
cream

of

society

eschewed

involvement

in

that

preferring royal administrative service instead.

sector,

The French

colonial economy depended on a few thriving industries, which
by good fortune held the whole together, but in general it was
not as strong as the English economy in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.19
Logistical factors were also considerable in calculating
the differences between English and French colonial economies.
18NYCD 10:200-201, Pierre Pouchot, Memoir upon the late
war in North America between the French and English. 1755-60
2 vols. [Franklin B. Hough, trans.] (Roxbury, Ma: Woodward,
1866), Vol. 2, pp. 47-51. Also, ultimately the French were
much more interested in the fur trade as a way of maintaining
and extending Indian allegiances than as a way of making
money. See William J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth
Century Imperialism," William and Marv Quarterly 3d ser., XL,
No. 3 (1983), pp. 341-362.
19Charles W. Cole, Colbert and a Century of French
Mercantilism 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1939), Vol. 2, pp. 362, 553. Roy Porter, English Society in
the Eighteenth Century (London: Allen Lane, 1982), Chapters 5
and 6.
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New York had the advantage of an easily accessible port at
Manhattan and of the Hudson River, which remained ice-free
year-round.

That meant that twice as much cargo could be

transported in a year as on the St. Lawrence, and return on
investment was much faster in New York than in New France.
The Gulf of St. Lawrence and the St. Lawrence River were icefree for only six to seven months of the year, so that often
a vessel could make only one trip across the Atlantic from
France each year.

The Hudson River was much easier to

navigate than the shoal-ridden St. Lawrence, providing another
geographic advantage to the New Yorkers over the French, which
translated into a time and cost advantage.20

Furthermore,

there were no duties on furs in the English colonies, whereas
the government at Quebec imposed duties on furs leaving the
colony, an impediment to trade.21 All these factors added up
to the overwhelming ability of Albany to undersell the French.
It is remarkable that the French fur trade continued to
function for as long as it did.
But there were intangibles involved in the fur trade too,
which sometimes outweighed the considerations of the ledger
book.

One French official reasoned that if the French offered

merchandise at the same price the English did, the Indians
would immediately turn to trade with the French, because,
20Peter Kalm, Travels into North America [John R. Foster,
trans.] (Barre, Ma: Imprint Society, 1972), p. 134; Colden,
History of the Five Indian Nations 2:21.
21NYCD 5:729, 733; C11A 31:266-270.
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prices being equal, the Indians "like our liquor better than
they like [theirs], and they get along with us better than
they do with other nations," particularly the English.22 The
French were much more interested than the English were in
learning Indian languages, sending missionaries and others to
arrange peace settlements between warring tribal groups, and
respecting

Indian

customs

and

preferences.

They

also

occasionally intermarried with Indians, and in general were
not interested in owning native land, all of which stood in
stark contrast, in the native eye, to the English attitude
toward their American hosts.23
But

prices

were

far

from

equal.

Nicolas

Perrot

documented the differences between prices at Montreal and
Albany in 1689? for eight pounds of gunpowder an Indian had to
pay with one beaver pelt in Albany, but with four in Montreal.
Similarly, a musket cost two beaver pelts in Albany, five in
Montreal.

Woolen and cloth goods such as blankets, shirts,

and leggings cost twice as many pelts in the French town as in
Albany.24
These woolen and cloth goods were another reason for the

22RAPO 1922-23, p. 7.
^Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry..." pp. 149-152.
James
Axtell, The Invasion Within; The Contest of Cultures in
Colonial North America. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1985), esp. Prologue and Ch. 12.
24Nicolas Perrot, Memoire sur les moeurs coutumes et
religion des sauvaqes de l'americrue du nord (Leipzig and
Paris: 1864), p. 314.
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rush

to

take

furs

to

Albany.

English

woolens

were

acknowledged by everyone in northeastern North America to be
so far superior to French that by the 1720s and 1730s Montreal
fur merchants were using any means possible to send their furs
to Albany to exchange them for high-quality English blankets.
In turn, the English woolens were sold to Indians in Montreal
and at posts far away in the pavs d'en haut.25

Cadwallader

Colden, the surveyor-general of New York, noted that in a
single year nine hundred pieces of "strouds" (woolen blankets
made

near

the

transported
commodities,

Stroud

north

River

from Albany,

to be

sent by

the

in

Gloucestershire)

along with
French

other

"into the

were

English
Indian

Countrys. "26
These "strouds" were of a color and consistency favored
by Indians all over northeastern North America, but try as
they might,
product.

the French could not manufacture a comparable

Numerous efforts were made, and as late as 1749

French officials reported that yet another attempt had been
made to produce a blanket of comparable value to the English
scarlet strouds.

But this effort by the Compacmie des Indes

^ Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin
Vol. 18, pp. 72-73? Francis Back, "The Trade Blanket in New
France," Museum of the Fur Trade Quarterly Vol. 26, No. 3
(1990), pp. 2-8.
26NYCD 5:729.
Most of the Indian trade prosecuted by
Samuel Storke's London merchant firm with Livingston and
others in New York was in textiles. (William I. Roberts,
"Samuel Storke: An Eighteenth-Century London Merchant Trading
to the American Colonies," Business History Review XXXIX
(1965), p. 162.
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(the organization which held the French fur trade monopoly)
was a failure.

They sent four pieces of fabric to New France

on trial, and the pieces were sent back with the comment that
they were "frightful; the red cloth is brown and impressed;
the blue of a very inferior quality to that of England; that
as long as such ventures are sent,

they will not become

favourites with the Indians."27 These brilliant red blankets
were so vital to the Albany-Montreal commerce that a New York
official referred to the smuggling trade as "the Strowd Trade"
and claimed that this trade alone provided the livelihood of
the

Kahnawakes.

If

not

for the

transport

of

this

one

commodity, the observer noted, the Kahnawake Indians would no
longer find smuggling lucrative and would settle permanently
in New York.28
Albany

officials

gave

strouds

as

gifts

to

Indians

27NYCD 5:747, 10:199-200. Also C11A 67:96-101, 93:170-172.
Pierre Pouchot commented in the late 1750s that French
blankets, made in Normandy, were much finer than the coarse
English variety.
It may be, however, that Indians valued
durability more than fineness of texture.
A European's
opinion of what made a good blanket by no means coincided with
an Indian view of desirable woolens. (Pouchot, Memoir upon the
late war in North America between the French and English.
1755-60. Vol. 2, p. 191; Roberts, "Samuel Storke..." p. 163.)
28Commission for Indian Affairs, Albany. Minutes of
meetings at Albany [1722-1748] and schedule of propositions
made by the Indians and answers given to them, 1677-1719. 5
vols. National Archives of Canada. (Hereafter cited as Minutes
of the Indian Commissioners.) Vol. I, p. 109.
(This account
even stated that many Kahnawakes had moved to the mission
community from Iroquoia for the purpose of carrying on "the
Strowd Trade.") Also NYCD 5:753; The Letters and Papers of
Cadwallader Colden (New-York Historical Society, Collections.
L-LVI [New York, 1917-1923]), Vol. 4, p. 286. (Hereafter cited
as Colden Papers

.)
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whenever the latter came on diplomatic missions and colonial
officials needed to curry favor with them.29

Although the

trade between Montreal and Albany was frowned on by government
officials,

merchants

in both colonies and of course the

Kahnawake Iroquois continued to pursue it.
officials

attempted

violators

of

to

expose

ordinances,

at

abusers
times

While New France
and

even

to

prosecute

intendants

and

governors of New France felt it necessary to condone emergency
importations of strouds from Albany, because the commodity was
desperately needed at Indian trading posts and for government
use as gifts

for Indians.30

Trade was tied to

imperial

alliance and rivalry; Indian alliances needed to be maintained
because Indians could always threaten to ally themselves
instead with France's adversary, the English.31

Ironically,

the French desperately needed English trade goods and had to
go against the morals of their imperial allegiance to get
them, in order to maintain the friendship of Indians rather
than lose them to the English.

Cadwallader Colden did not

exaggerate when he claimed that no considerable trade could be

^e.g. Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 2:143, NYCD
5:245.
30C11A 30:255-257, 35:55, 55:190-191, 68:28-29.
31William J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century
Imperialism," William and Marv Quarterly. 3d Ser., XL (1983),
pp. 341-362. C.H. Mcllwain even stated that "the object was
to get the trade; it made less difference whether the furs
were needed or not." (In Introduction to Wraxall's Abridgment.
p. xxvii.)
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carried on with Indians without strouds,32
The governor of New York in the 1720s, William Burnet,
engineered passage of legislation in the New York Assembly
which officially outlawed "the Canada Trade"

(much to the

chagrin of the Albany merchants/Indian commissioners who were
not the least bit concerned with mercantilism).
effect of this prohibition after two years,

The main

however,

merely the escalation of stroud prices at Montreal.

was

Before

the act was passed, a stroud selling for 10 pounds at Alb2any
sold for 13 pounds and change at Montreal.

After the act, the

Montreal price jumped to 25 pounds and upwards.33 After four
years of the ban on the "Canada trade," Colden noticed that
the French had still not found another source of strouds (at
least not one as inexpensive as the Albany source, despite
skyrocketing prices). He concluded that as long as the French
wanted these English woolens and were willing to pay the
spiralling

prices

for

them,

the

trade

would

continue

indefinitely, ban or no ban.34
32Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations. 2:22.
^Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations. 2:22;
5:762; Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:141a.

NY CD

^NYCD 5:753; Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations.
2:22;
Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:104.
The
Montrealers could have bought strouds in Boston or London, and
in fact they did obtain some from these sources, but they must
not have been able to buy enough of them, or as cheaply, since
they continued to buy them in ever-increasing volume from
Albany, regardless of the ban. (Armour dissertation, p. 154.)
One way to get around the ban on trade between Albany and
Montreal was to take goods such as strouds to Mohawk villages
west of Albany, where Kahnawakes could come via Lake Ontario
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Another commodity which the Albany merchants provided to
New France via Kahnawake carriers and Montreal businessmen was
wampum beads, which were manufactured on Long Island and New
Jersey.

Robert Sanders, an Albany merchant who became mayor

and an Indian Commissioner by the

1750s,

regularly

sent

shipments of wampum beads through his Kahnawake carriers to
customers in Montreal.35 Every government which had dealings
with Indians had to use wampum for diplomatic purposes; New
France got its supply from a rival colony.
Also explosive in terms of imperial allegiances was the
issue of selling gunpowder to Indians who might use it to
fight alongside a rival power or, worse, sell it directly to
the French.

An Albany entrepreneur bent on turning a profit

could not very well argue that Indians needed gunpowder for
hunting animals with desirable pelts, because even by the
eighteenth century, Indians used firearms only for moose, elk,
and bear.

For

fur-bearing

creatures

raccoons, muskrats, and martens —

—

beavers,

minks,

Indians used traditional

(and more effective) means such as nets, snares, and cage

to pick them up in exchange for furs.
They would not be
subject to New York law in Mohawk country, and furs coming
into Albany from the Mohawk valley would not appear
suspicious. (Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:102;
Livingston Indian Records, p. 229; Armour, "The Merchants of
Albany," p. 150.)
35Robert Sanders Letter Book, pp. 23, 31, 50, 51, 62, 63.
(On Sanders, see Norton, Fur Trade. p. 190.) Miquelon, New
France. p. 175.
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traps.36

Gunpowder,

firearms,

and

lead

unmistakably meant for human targets,
Albany were not too concerned.

for

shot

were

but the traders of

They sold these items to

Kahnawakes for their own use as well as sale in Montreal.
Conrad Weiser, the Pennsylvania Indian agent, reported
with distress to the New York Colonial Council in 1745 that
someone in Albany had sold many barrels of gunpowder to the
French, via some "praying Indians."

Weiser pointed out that

this had "enabled the French to fight against the English."
Worse

than

prohibition,

that,
agreed

the

Albanian

on

in

1744

culprit
at

the

had

violated

outbreak of

a

King

George's War, that all sales of ammunition to and repair of
arms for Indians from Canada would not be allowed.37

During

this war, the Albany merchants were made responsible for the
security of the town, being posted in turns on sentry guard
duty through the night.38

This may have been done in order

to press upon these men the fact that Albany was not far from
the

frontier between New

York and New France,

and

that

especially during war the safety of the colony against enemy

Norton, Fur Trade, p. 28.
37New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State
Library, Old Vol. 21, p. 36; NYCD 9:1109, 6:286. In 1741 New
England officials charged the Albanians with selling to the
French ammunition which was used to kill New Englanders, and
the latter claimed that they had seen their own goods
(presumably stolen in raids) purchased from the "French
Indians" at Albany.
(Wraxall, Abridgment, p. 221 fn. Also
Kalm, Travels into North America, p. 334.)
38NYCD 9:1110.
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attack

was

much

more

important

than

making

money

from

potential enemy customers.
To the Albany men, profits had always been more important
than colonial allegiance largely because they were descendants
of the Dutch traders who peopled Albany, or "Orange" as it had
been called, before the Dutch lost the colony to the English
in

1666.

Generations

after this

conquest,

much

of the

population of the Hudson Valley was still ethnically Dutch,
and even in the mid-eighteenth century, one could still find
as much Dutch as English spoken on an Albany street.39
merchants

who

prosecuted

the

fur

trade,

if

not

The

Dutch

themselves, had married into old elite Dutch families and had
soaked up the prevailing preoccupation with profit.
English officials appointed by Whitehall to oversee the
colony of New York were not always welcome in towns such as
Albany,

where the fiscal and trade policies of the alien

mother country sometimes collided with the Dutch way of doing
things.40

However,

English

governors,

following

Thomas

39Alice P. Kenney, The Gansevoorts of Albany: Dutch
Patricians in the Upper Hudson Valiev (Syracuse, N.Y.:
Syracuse University Press, 1969), pp. xxi-xxiii. Patricia U.
Bonomi, A Factious People; Politics and Society in Colonial
New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 54.
40Just after the capture of New Netherland by the English
in 1664, the issue of whether these merchants would have to
relinquish their ties with Amsterdam commercial agents colored
their attitude toward mercantilism. (Robert Ritchie, "London
Merchants, the New York Market, and the Recall of Sir Edmund
Andros," New York History LVII (1976), pp. 4-29.
See also
Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany. 1630-1710: The Dutch and
English Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990).)
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Dongan's example in 1686, granted Albany a continuance of its
monopoly in the fur trade and also continued the prerogative
of the Chamber of Commerce-like body to make policy on Indian
relations.

Because

the

merchant

elite

was

virtually

synonymous with the town leadership, this body evolved from
Albany's town government and was formalized in 1696 as the
"Commissioners of Indian Affairs."
To limit abuses of Indian customers, however, trade was
confined to the town limits, so that Indians could freely
choose their trading partners, and not be subject to coercion.
Just outside the town were buildings set up to lodge Indians
who came annually for the summer trading season, as a safe
haven

away

from grasping merchants.41

Other

than

these

safeguards built into the Albany monopoly, the merchants, or
handlers. had

free

enabled

to

them

reign.

Their

prevent

budding

advantageous

situation

entrepreneurs

in

the

neighboring town of Schenectady from sharing a part of the fur
trade.
The Albany merchants were used to getting their way.

As

time went on, however, politicos outside Albany complained
that there were too many on the board of Indian Commissioners;
over the decades their number had grown to twenty.42

By the

41Sale, "Colonial Albany: Outpost of Empire," pp. 86, 116;
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 28-29, 57, 61-62.
42The twenty in 1730
original number of four
prestige and was highly
(Minutes of the Indian

were a substantial increase from the
in 1696.
The position was one of
in demand by the elite of Albany.
Commissioners 1:311;
NYCD 4:177;
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1730s, important figures in New York colonial politics lobbied
for the demise of the body altogether.

They argued for giving

the responsibility to one person alone, and William Johnson
was appointed to the position in 1755.43

The interests of

empire were becoming increasingly important in the 1730s and
1740s, and Albany's relations with Indians were coming to have
a larger significance for all of North America.

Many New

Yorkers wanted a single commissioner to make policy with
imperial interests in mind, not just the commercial concerns
of the Albany merchants.

In fact,

the Albany men were

increasingly seen as having a conflict of interest in being
involved in Indian affairs.
One

reason

for

tension

between

these

Albany

merchants/commissioners and other politicians in the colony
was the neutrality, often tacit, sometimes official, which the
commissioners engineered between themselves and the mission
Indians of Canada.

This amounted to a de facto neutrality

between the province of New York and the colony of New France
during Queen Anne's War, which infuriated New Englanders and
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 74-75.)
43Archibald Kennedy, in The Importance of Gaining and
Preserving the Friendship of the Indians (New York: 1751),
claimed that the commissioners "have so abused, defrauded, and
deceived these poor, innocent, well-meaning People [the
Indians]" that one would have thought he was an Indian rights
activist.
In another pamphlet, Serious Advice to the
Inhabitants of the Northern Colonies (1755), Kennedy also
railed against "our late bad Management."
Peter Wraxall's
Abridgment was published in order to demonstrate the
incompetence of the commissioners and the fitness of Johnson
to take over their responsibilities. (Wraxall, p. xcvi.)
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imperial appointees in New York.

While the Kahnawake and

other mission Indians were helping the French attack various
towns

on

the

exposed

frontiers

of

New

Hampshire

and

Massachusetts, these same Indians were allowed to trade with
Albanians as honored guests.

New York governors had to

appease angry New England leaders because of the tainted
neutrality.44
This

controversial

neutrality

historiography of colonial New York.

has

affected

the

The Albany merchants

have been repeatedly portrayed as villains who selfishly put
the concerns of their own pocketbooks ahead of the safety and
security

of the

colony.45

Only

rehabilitated by Thomas Norton,
policy

of neutrality can be

recently have

they been

who suggested that their

interpreted positively.

He

claimed that they were not necessarily unpatriotic, but were
opposed to war and saved the colony from being involved in,
and devastated by, war with neighboring New France many times.
Although the merchants may have been primarily concerned with
protecting the fur trade, they also provided for the military
security of the colony by maintaining peaceful relations with
the mission Indians instead of inciting war with them as many
^NYCD 5:42-43, 72-74, 141, 228;
New York Colonial
Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.) New York State Library, Vol.
56, p. 126. Of course, French officials constantly attempted
to persuade the Kahnawakes and other mission Indians to
abandon pledges of neutrality they had made with English
colonies. (See for example: NYCD 9:856.)
45Wraxall referred
Abridgment. p. 180 fn.)

to

them

as

"Dutch

reptiles.”
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New Englanders did.46
When fear of war between the English and the French swept
the colonies in the 1730s, peace conferences were held between
the Kahnawakes and the Albanians, and again in 1744 when King
George's

War

was

imminent.47

New

York

Governor

George

Clinton spoke angrily of "an abominable neutrality" entered
into during that war.48

At one point during the conflict of

1744-1748, neutrality was suspended because Kahnawakes took
part in a raid on the hamlet of Saratoga just north of Albany.
But earlier, the neutrality had been so secure that Kahnawakes
came to Albany claiming that they wanted to conduct business
as usual despite the circumstances.

Although it is difficult

to discern whether this request was granted and trade was
carried on, the audacity of the Kahnawakes demonstrates that
they felt they could disregard the state of war around them
and that they did not consider trade and war to be related.
Soon after this request, the governor of New York asked the
assembly to pass a law prohibiting trade with the "French
Indians" in time of war.49
For their part, the New France authorities were uneasy
about close relations between the Sault Iroquois and the
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 7-8, 75-82.
47Wraxall, Abridgment. pp. 191, 223, 233? Minutes of the
Indian Commissioners, 2:61a, 69, 284a, 359; NYCD 6:207.
48NYCD 6:416.
49Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 233?
Manuscripts 74:222; NYCD 6:645.

New

York

Colonial
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Albanians.

The relationship could either help or hurt New

France, depending on the circumstances and the wishes of the
Indians.

Especially

since

the

Kahnawakes

were

"well

acquainted with the English language," it was not unusual for
them

to

provide

their business
war

contacts

information

regarding

Montreal.50

Trade could often be used as

gathering intelligence.

preparations

in
or

Albany with
plans

in

a pretext for

For instance, two Iroquois Indians

sent by Albany officials to spy in Canada told those who
questioned them at the village of Kahnawake that they had come
only "to fetch beavers."

Not only Indians but whites also

mixed trade and intelligence-gathering.

Cornelius Cuyler, an

Albany merchant, went to Montreal in 1738 and spied on the
French for the New Yorkers, probably claiming he was there on
business.51

In the midst of his business

records, Robert

Sanders (another Albany merchant) mentioned some intelligence
to which he was privy regarding an impending French attack; no
doubt he got this information through personal friendships
with Montreal merchants or from the Kahnawake carriers who
regularly delivered pelts to him.52
New York officials as well as those in New France were
concerned that Indians who traded between the two colonies

S0NYCD 10:19 (quote); Minutes of the Indian Commissioners
1:193, 195, 253a.
51NYCD 9:899, 6:131.
52NYCD 5:85, 6:131;

Robert Sanders Letter Book, p. 83.
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also spied.

At the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, a New

York politician complained to William Johnson, "I dont like
these French Indians being suffered to come to Albany to hear
& carry away what they can."
concern,

as

the

Kahnawakes while
French.

gathering

of

There was reason for this
sensitive

information

by

in Albany seemed to be promoted by the

French records mention the return to New France of

Nanangousy, a Kahnawake sachem, from the English trading post
of Oswego "where he has been to spy."53

William Shirley

complained in 1755 that the French had "constant intelligence
... of every motion of the English" given to them by the
French-allied Indians who frequented Albany.54
Kahnawakes often did not heed the wishes of the French.
Louis Antoine de Bougainville reported with dismay during the
Seven Years' War that the Sault and Mountain Iroquois wanted
to remain neutral because they did not wish anything to
interfere with their smuggling, but that they still desired to
be privy to French intelligence.

Bougainville seemed to be

wary of allowing them to keep open the path to Albany and to
53James Sullivan et. al., eds., The Papers of Sir William
Johnson 14 vols. (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1921-1965), Vol.
1, p. 499 (hereafter cited as Johnson Papers♦):
E.B.
O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State of New York
4 vols. [quarto ed.] (Albany, N.Y.: Weed and Parsons, 18501851), Vol. 1, p. 305 (hereafter cited as DHNY
Another
similar incident: NYCD 10:19.

.)

54Johnson Papers 1:543. Also New York Council Minutes,
Old Vol. 25, p. 37 (Calendar p. 416);
Richard Day, ed.,
Calendar of the Sir William Johnson Manuscripts (Albany: New
York State Department of Education, 1909), pp. 33, 36; DHNY
2:384.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25 4

tell

them

of

French war plans;

this

could

have been

a

dangerous combination.55
But there were personal ties between Sault Iroquois and
Albany merchants over which French officials and military
personnel had no control.

Kahnawake people came to Albany

sometimes on "private business," and their merchant friends in
Albany condoled the deaths of Kahnawake family members.56
French government officials had a reason to be nervous about
such personal contacts between trading partners.

In 1739,

some Kahnawake sachems who came to trade at Albany were
invited to diplomatic talks as well, a situation which must
have irked the French.57
Sometimes, however, diplomacy was used for furthering
trade instead of vice versa.
the

smuggling trade,

During the 1720s New York ban on

Kahnawakes came to Albany to trade

clandestinely, under the pretext of announcing that they were
ready to make peace with the New England colonists.58 At one
point, some Kahnawakes and possibly Mountain Indians as well
registered their protest against the New York trade ban by
55Louis Antoine, [comte] de Bougainville, Adventure in the
wilderness; the American journals of Louis Antoine de
Bougainville. 1756-1760 [Edward P. Hamilton, trans. and ed.]
(Norman, Ok: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 110.
Colden also saw danger in this from the New York side.
(Colden, History 2:53.)
56For example, see Minutes of the Indian Commissioners
2:177a, 187a.
57Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 2:173.
58Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 151.
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threatening to join Abenaki Indians in raiding Massachusetts
towns.59

The

Albany

commissioners,

too,

could

use

blurring of trade and diplomacy to their own advantage.

the
When

a group of five Kahnawake sachems came to discuss diplomatic
issues in the summer of 1741, the commissioners did not like
what the Indians told them.

As a kind of sanction imposed

against their Indian counterparts in these negotiations, the
commissioners refused to trade with them, claiming that "it is
no Custom for sachims to Come with Bevers, when they come
about publick business."60

Everyone present knew this was

not true, but the commissioners held the upper hand in this
diplomatic encounter because they could deny the privilege of
trade.
this

To trade or not to trade was a powerful question in

context,

and trade

and

diplomacy were

inextricably

related.
At times the Albany men abused their right to trade with
Indians, giving rise to the litany of complaints about ill
treatment of tribesmen and women who had come in good faith to
exchange pelts for blankets and other trade items.

As early

as 1702, some Iroquois Indians complained to Governor Combury
that Albany traders used skewed scales in weighing pelts in
order to cheat Indians, and that in general they did not
59NYCD 5:744. The Commissioners did not like the ban
either, and not only because it hurt their pocketbooks but
also because it meant that not as much intelligence would come
their way from Canada. (Minutes of the Indian Commissioners
1:186.)
M i n u t e s of the Indian Commissioners 2:214a.
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conduct

business

fairly.61

For

several

decades

it was

considered not unusual for traders from Albany, when they
heard of a group of mission Indians coming down the Hudson
River from Canada, to travel north of Albany (or send scouts)
to wait for the entourage,

"lay hold of the Indians,

and

secure their [pelts]." Then they would "escort" these Indians
into the town to the trader's own house and relieve the
visitors of their bundles, getting them drunk so as to cheat
them.

Some even prepared wagons to be stationed five or six

miles outside of the town to unload the canoes and carry the
cargo to their homes.62
In 1715 a Kahnawake reported that some of John Schuyler's
servants confiscated his cargo of pelts against his will and
transported

it

into

town

to

an

unknown

location.

The

commissioners acted as their own police force by investigating
the matter and locating the cargo.

Discovering that the

Kahnawake victim had been transporting the goods on behalf of
a French merchant

for delivery to Myndert Schuyler,

ordered the shipment delivered to the latter.63

they

It was not

unusual for Kahnawakes to be accosted and harassed by Albany
traders when venturing into New York territory; this happened

61NYCD 4:987; Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 29, 32-33.
(They
were accused of watering down the rum they sold to Indians as
well. Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:13.)
62Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 53 fn.
63Wraxall, Abridgment. pp. 110-111.
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again in 1738.64
A particular problem associated with New Yorkers' abuse
of Indian traders and carriers was the use of liquor to get
them

drunk

and

take

advantage

of

their

intoxication.65

Robert Sanders was apparently one who did not engage in this
sort

of

trickery,

since he

complained

about

one

of his

colleagues using liquor to intoxicate an Indian and take
advantage of him in trade.

Sanders attempted to prosecute the

man for his deviousness.66
Peter Kalm, a Swedish botanist who travelled throughout
North

America

in

1750

and

1751,

claimed

that

rum

was

"absolutely necessary to the inhabitants of Albany; they cheat
the Indians in the fur trade with it; for when the Indians are
drunk, they will leave it to the Albanians to fix the price of
furs."

From talking to many people and from witnessing these

transactions himself, Kalm estimated that Indians trading at
Albany sometimes got less than half of the value of their
goods.

He also charged that the Albany merchants "glory in

these tricks, and are highly pleased when they have given a
M i n u t e s of the Indian Commissioners 2:143.
650nly New Yorkers and not Frenchmen are singled out for
this because there is little evidence that French traders
abused Indians, and plenty of evidence that the English
(Dutch) did.
Many Indians of varying nations came great
distances to trade with the English because the French would
not sell them liquor in as great quantities or as often. (For
instance see Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:12a.)
Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 68-69; Adair, "Anglo-French Rivalry,"
p. 145.
R o b e r t Sanders Letter Book, p. 44.
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poor Indian a greater portion of brandy them he can bear."
But Kalm also stated'that Indians seemed to weigh their losses
and grumble only mildly about being cheated, because at least
they had been able to drink heavily, something which (Kalm
observed) they valued more than almost anything else in the
world.67
Alcohol

dependency

was

indeed

a

social

problem

in

Iroquoia and at mission communities such as Kahnawake in the
late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The Jesuits had

attempted to ban the sale of alcohol to Indians in Canada, and
were at times partially successful,

but even responsible

traders in New France stocked liquor for sale to Indians.
This was necessary in order to keep the trade with Indians
from being
course,

completely usurped by the English.68

And

of

liquor was the one commodity which could increase

Indian consumption levels.

Without it, there was a definite

limit to the Indian notion of consumption and profit motive,
a limit which Europeans were constantly attempting to raise.
Even so, the French trade in liquor to Indians was negligible
compared

to

the

English

volume

of

sales;

Dale Miquelon

67Kalm, Travels into North America, pp. 322, 331-332. Kalm
also visited New France and did not comment on such abuses
there.
^Governor Vaudreuil of New France feared in 1710 that the
English would be able to make alliances with the mission
Indians solely because the Albany merchants sold them liquor.
He claimed that Indians could buy unlimited quantities of it
there, implying that the sale of liquor to Indians was more
restrained in Canada. C11A 31:10-10a (original).
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estimates that at one French post, woolens made up 64 per cent
of goods sold to Indians, and alcoholic beverages only 6 per
cent.69
Kahnawake Indians complained in 1742 that they did not
like going to Oswego, the New York trading post northwest of
Albany, because alcohol and therefore abuse and social chaos
were endemic there.

A Kahnawake orator told some Onondaga

Iroquois that the demon of rum ran rampant at Oswego and had
been responsible for the murder of eight Kahnawake men there
by League Iroquois people.70

By 1750 many League Iroquois

had become so badly indebted to Oswego and Albany traders,
largely

for

rum,

that

they

attempted

to

sell

their

children to the traders as security for their debts.

own

That the

traders let the situation deteriorate so far indicates that
their morals did not interfere with selling alcohol to make
money.71
Given

the

notoriety

of

English

traders

for

taking

advantage of an Indian weakness for drink, it was no wonder
that Indians considered the French more honest in commercial
dealings.

Kahnawake people, in regular contact with both the

English and the French and travelling between the two colonies
69Miquelon, New France, pp. 150, 152.
No numbers are
available for New York, but Norton suggests that sales of rum
in the Indian trade were surpassed in volume only by textiles
at Albany at this time. (Norton, Fur Trade, p. 30.)
^NYCD 9:1093. Also Minutes of the Indian Commissioners
2:237; Norton, Fur Trade, pp. 31-34.
71New York Colonial Manuscripts 76:118a, 121.
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frequently, were in a position to notice the difference more
than others.

It may have been this obvious difference which

infuriated them when they came across examples of English foul
play and trickery.

Their consciousness of being cheated may

explain periodic acts of hostility by Kahnawakes toward Albany
people.
In 1711, some Kahnawakes murdered several New Yorkers
outside of Albany but the following spring offered atonement
for them and desired a renewal of commercial relations with
the

Albany

traders.72

Robert

Sanders

noticed that

they

cheated either him or his trading partner in Montreal while
carrying shipments of goods back and forth between Montreal
and Albany.

Sanders made light of it, dismissing the carriers

as "rascals [who] do well for themselves often."73 Alexander
McGinty and David Hendricks, traders from New York, were taken
as prisoners by Kahnawakes and kept at the mission village for
some time before being released.

They may have been taken

captive because of abusive behavior toward these Indians, who
by the 1750s, when this capture took place, had had many
negative

experiences

with

greedy,

dishonest

traders

from

English colonies.74
The New Yorkers were aware of the native preference for
^New York Council Minutes, Old Vol. 11, p. 87.
p. 247.)

(Calendar.

^Robert Sanders Letter Book, pp. 43, 76.
74New York Colonial Manuscripts 77:97, 100, 112;
Sanders Letter Book, p. 76.

Robert
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dealing with Frenchmen, resented it, and were bothered by the
presence of French traders in League Iroquois villages.

The

Joncaire family, hardy coureurs de bois. enjoyed generations
of successful relations with the Senecas near Irondequoit and
Niagara.

They traded with the Senecas, repaired their muskets

and ironware, and married into their families.75 In 1719, it
was

discovered that the

French were

building a

fort at

Niagara, in addition to the trading post the Joncaires had
erected at Irondequoit.

This development was of grave concern

in New York, especially since some Kahnawakes were at Niagara
recruiting League Iroquois people to move to the new French
post.
The French beachhead at Niagara was part of the impetus
for the 1720 New York law banning trade with Canada.76

But

the movement for this law was also a strategy of the recently
arrived Governor Burnet to end the hegemony of the Albany
merchants and to force the recalcitrant Dutch to adhere to the
British empire's priorities —

namely, ending the boon to the

French which the "Canada trade," or "Strowd trade," provided.
In the 1720 act, Burnet argued that "the French build Forts

^New York Colonial Manuscripts 60:156; Minutes of the
Indian Commissioners 1:124; Colden Papers 4:279. Regarding
the Joncaire family, see Yves F. Zoltvany, "Louis-Thomas
Chabert de Joncaire," Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol.
2, pp. 125-126, and Malcolm MacLeod, "Philippe-Thomas Chabert
de Joncaire," Dictionary of Canadian Biography Vol. 3, pp.
101-102.
76NYCD 5:485, 528, 571.
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with our goods."77
Burnet had managed what no other New York governor had
been able to do: overcome the political clout of the Albany
interest in the colonial assembly.

However, he did not count

on opposition from another source: some influential London
merchants who were suppliers to the Albanians and profited by
the wholesale woolen trade carried on with Kahnawakes and
Montrealers.

Samuel Storke, Samuel Baker, and other London

merchants petitioned the king against the law generally and
particularly against a strengthening of the act which Burnet
proposed in 1724.

Acceding to their wishes, the Lords of

Trade disallowed the New York law.
the

law

had

to

accept

its

All those who had favored

revocation,

since

even

its

staunchest advocates realized that it had failed to stop the
trade.78
The disallowing of the trade ban was a pyrrhic victory

^NYCD 5:577.
Minu t e s of the Indian Commissioners 1:105a, 58a, 103103a;
Colden, History 2:6-11;
Haan, "The Covenant Chain:
Iroquois Diplomacy...," p. 221; Norton, Fur Trade, p. 147.
Burnet's law was ineffective because it only outlawed selling
goods to Canadians and Canadian Indians, but did not ban the
importation of furs. (NYCD 5:582) This left a large loophole
which was easy to use to advantage.
Also, Burnet himself
issued passes to travel to New France to the most notorious
Albany merchants involved in the stroud trade: men such as
Cornelius Cuyler. (NYCD 9:899)
Thomas Norton suggests that
despite his get-tough stance, Burnet realized that he should
not crack down too heavily on the trade for fear of alienating
the Kahnawakes. (Norton, Fur Trade. p. 139.)
New York
officials had to admit anyway that the trade ban was useless
because Indians were "very difficult to detect...and to bind
them any way to observe the laws in force." (NYCD 5:811.)
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for the Albany merchants, however.

Their singular control

over the fur trade was gradually eroded in the 1720s, and not
just

by

Joncaire's

fort

at

Niagara.

Burnet

was

still

determined to break their hold on the trade and had a New York
court strike down their

monopoly in 1726.

That meant that

neighboring Schenectadians could prosecute the trade, but more
importantly, it cleared a path for the opening of a frontier
trading post, fortified soon after it was built, at Oswego on
Lake Ontario, northwest of Albany,

in Onondaga territory.79

Both the League Iroquois and the French had misgivings about
the erection of this fortified post in the heart of Six
Nations territory, and the Kahnawakes made official trips to
Albany to warn officials that the French would not countenance
this move.80
But this diplomatic role of the Kahnawake Indians did not
preclude their own trading at the new post.

180;

They became

^Sale, "Colonial Albany: Outpost of Empire," pp. 175,
Wraxall, Abridgment. pp. lii, lxxx-lxxxii.

®°DHNY 1:290; Minutes of the Indian Commissioners 1:111a114, 174a;
New York Commissioners of Indian Affairs at
Albany, Instructions for Lonrence Claese the Interpreter to
the Six Nations, Dec 27 1727, New York State Archives;
Wraxall, Abridgment, pp. 170-171. The Governor of New France
was trying to use this building of Oswego to drive a wedge
between the Kahnawakes and the New Yorkers.
Acting
administrator of the colony in 1727, Charles Le Moyne, Baron
de Longueuil, tried to take advantage of any League opposition
for his own purposes; there was not nearly as much opposition
within Iroquoia as he claimed.
However, in 1743, rumors
abounded in Albany that the Onondagas had become hostile to
the English presence at Oswego, and that they were recruiting
Sault and Mountain mission Iroquois, and French ammunition
supplies, to attack the post. (Colden Papers 3:9.)
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regular customers,
allied Indians.

along with other Canadians and FrenchSoon French interpreters were needed at

Oswego, so great was the volume of French-speaking traffic
there.

The French, even in a de facto sense at Oswego, were

defeating the English at the game of placing posts in Indian
country whether the contest is seen as a territorial-imperial
challenge or as a commercial one.81

During the Seven Years'

War, the Ottawa Indians helped the French take Oswego from the
English.

Later, however, the Ottawas came to regret their

decision to help the French because in French hands the post
was no longer a profitable shopping mecca.

The French did not

sell as many goods per skin as the English had, "tho' they
[Indians] had been disgusted with some ill treatment they had
received from some of the English," and despite the fact that
the English were stingier with gifts.82
The French responded to the building of Oswego with the
building of a post at Crown Point at the south end of Lake
Champlain in 1731.
later.

Fortification was completed four years

The French were attempting to ward off the English who

81New York Colonial Manuscripts 78:115; Minutes of the
Indian Commissioners 1:185a; Johnson Papers 9:128-129.
In
1749, one day's count of canoes from Kahnawake at Oswego was
43, and the number of packs of furs was 301. (NYCD 6:538.)
One indication that the French were seriously undermining
English efforts in the fur trade-imperial alliance game was
that French interpreters were regular customers at Oswego,
buying goods which they in turn traded for furs in Seneca
villages, thereby strengthening French-Seneca relations.
(Wraxall, Abridgment. p. 197.)
“ NYCD 7:233-234.
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had become bolder with each passing year by travelling farther
north of Albany to trade with Indians coming down the Lake
Champlain corridor.

Fort St. Frederic was also meant to curb

the smuggling trade in general by serving as a mandatory
customs house at which all passing canoes were to stop for
inspection.

However, Indians could get around the customs

check by sending empty canoes past the fort, while the furs
were portaged around behind the fort where no one was looking.
And French officials could not prosecute Indians even if they
caught them.83

The effect of this fort as a deterrent to

smuggling was so negligible that, by 1751, Cadwallader Colden
suspected that it may even have facilitated the illegal trade,
serving as an entrepot for the shipments going back and
forth.84
The customs house at Fort St. Frederic was not the first
French effort to curb the extralegal commerce.

Canadian

officials had made innumerable efforts to stop the trade
almost as soon as it became noticeable.

Claude de Ramezay was

assigned to crack down on it after 1700.

He assured the

Minister of Marine that he was doing everything possible to
check the trade, but the extent of his efforts could not have
been great, since some of the merchants most heavily engaged
^NYCD 9:1021; Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade out of New
France," p. 82; C11A 93:170-172. Kahnawake Indians were at
times so brazen as to announce to the Canadian governorgeneral that they were leaving for Albany to buy strouds.
(NYCD 9:1069)
^Colden Papers 4:286.
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in the trade with Albany were also his personal creditors.
1707

In

he suggested bringing in heavily subsidized trade goods

(underwritten by the Ministry of Marine) to lure customers,
but this would have cost the French government a great deal of
money at a time when it was carrying out an expensive war in
Europe.85
In

1708,

concerning

the

French

officials

smuggling

and

Kahnawake involvement in it.

wrote

about

a

series

how best

to

of memos
prevent

Around that time, Canadians who

left New France in canoes with bundles of pelts bound for
Albany were arrested, had their cargo seized, and were often
imprisoned for a few months for the offense.

But such arrests

did not last long, since Frenchmen interested in the business
could always hire Indians, who were not bound by French laws.
Montrealers could not prevent Kahnawakes from leaving with a
load of furs for shipment to another colony.86 Moreover, New
France officials found it politically suicidal to raise the
ire of Indians, since the latter could always threaten to
emigrate to New York, where the English were waiting with open
arms and land grants for the Kahnawakes and other Mission
Iroquois.87

Or even if they did not leave New France, these

Indians could withhold needed military support in time of war
85Yves F. Zoltvany, "Claude de Ramezay," Dictionary of
Canadian Biography Vol. 2, p. 546.
86RAPO 1939-40, pp. 418,433, 458-460;
RAPO 1939-40, pp. 355, 360, 459-460.

C11A 67:186-195;

87C11A 69:74-80.
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if French officials harassed them too much.88
Officials at Chambly, where another customs post was
placed, could demand of New France habitants to see official
documentation allowing them to leave the colony for New York,
but they could not demand this of Indians.

Indians were free

to cross all frontiers, and there was nothing that officials
could do to prevent this.89
authorized,

every

home

this

was

unenforceable at Kahnawake and other mission villages.

One

suspected

by
of

an

edict

holding

of

New France officials were also
1719,

contraband

to

search

goods,

but

official attempted to establish a garrison and fortification
at the new Kahnawake village site in 1719, expressly to keep
the

Indians

from trading with Albany,

politically unpopular,
Jesuits in the village.

but besides

being

the plan was also thwarted by the
They pointed out that in the past,

when the mission had been occupied by a garrison during war,
the officers of the garrison themselves had been some of the
worst offenders in contraband trade.
Desauniers

sisters

had

set

up

a

Later on, when the
provisioning

shop

at

Kahnawake, they complained about a plan for fortification of

“ d l A 75:206-219.
89NYCD 9:908-909; C11A 70:48-59, 69:74-80, 67:188-192,
55:181-183?
Arrets et Ordonnances Rovales (Quebec: 1854),
Volume 1, p. 489 cited in E. J. Devine, Historic Cauohnawaga
(Montreal: Messenger Press, 1922), p. 209; Eccles, "The Fur
Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism," p. 349.
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the village because it would hinder their trade.90

These

women and the Jesuits carried on their trade with impunity at
Kahnawake for many years.
Attempts by the Minister of Marine to prevent the Jesuit
missionaries at Kahnawake from allowing the French to have
shops at the village and to prevent Jesuits themselves from
giving the Indians merchandise for trade were unsuccessful.91
Kahnawake Indians, through their Jesuit spokesmen, responded
to official requests that the smuggling trade cease by saying
that they would be happy to stop as soon as the officials also
demanded that others cease the trade as well.

Involvement in

the trade was too widespread for this to happen,

as the

Kahnawakes well knew.92
On one occasion, a few miles south of Montreal, a cache
of over three hundred beaver pelts was found in the woods near
an

Indian

woman

who

was

apparently

guarding

it.

The

Kahnawakes claimed the cache, arguing when challenged that
officials would not be able to prove it was the property of
any French or English person.

The governor of Montreal

finally had to give the pelts to the Kahnawakes,

at the

instructions of the governor and intendant of the colony.
^CllA 69:74-77, 70:48-59; Devine, Historic Cauahnawaqa.
p. 189; Louis Franquet. Voyages et Memoires sur le Canada [J.
Cohen, ed.] (Montreal: Editions Elysee, 1974), p. 120.
91RAP0 1941-42, p. 236;

NYCD 9:938-939;

C11A 55:181-183.

92Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and
Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows, 1896-1901),
67:77 (hereafter cited as Jesuit Relations.)
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Despite the official sanction against carrying around large
bundles of pelts outside of Montreal, and particularly in the
direction of New York,

Kahnawakes were able to evade the

prohibition and act at will.93
It took many years for New France officials to enforce
their

own

rules

against

French

offenders

at

Kahnawake.

Suspicion that the Jesuit missionaries there were involved in,
or at least cognizant of, the transport of peltries south
arose as early as 1698.

In 1705 authorities in New France

accused them of being directly involved in the fur trade.
Nothing was done about the charge, however, and there was no
further mention of suspicions of Jesuits until the late 1720s,
when Father Lauzon was accused of being involved

in the

smuggling trade.94
In the early days of the mission, the Jesuit missionaries
had attempted to prevent French businessmen
stores within the Indian village,

from opening

mainly because of the

inevitability that they would peddle alcohol to their Indian
customers.

However, by the 1720s, the Jesuits were glad to

lease space within their compound adjacent to the longhouses
to nearby merchants interested in setting up a dry goods shop.

93RAPO 1939-40, pp. 459-460.
94Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres. memoires et
autres documents historioues relatifs a la Nouvelle-France 4
vols. (Quebec: Cote, 1883-1885), Vol. 1, p. 604;
CllA
22:314v-315 (original); Camille Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites et
la Nouvelle-France au XVIIIe siecle 2 vols. (Paris: Alphone
Picard, 1906), Vol. 2, p. 245; CllA 69:224.
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In the late 1750s, they were leasing store space to a Mr. de
Musseaux,

probably

the

same

facility

which

had

been

established by three famous - or infamous - sisters in 1727.
The "desmoiselles Desauniers" secured a concession of land in
that year adjacent to the chapel, and had a shop built on the
site.95

[See Map 5]

Magdelaine

Desauniers,

merchant family,

These women, Marguerite, Marie,
belonged

to

a

prominent

and

Montreal

so they came by their chosen livelihood

naturally.96 There was no disputing their involvement in the
smuggling trade with Albany based at Kahnawake; they sold
goods at a much cheaper rate than the going price in Montreal
just a few miles away and still made healthy profits (and, it
seems, paid their Kahnawake carriers well too) .97

It was

commonly believed that the Desauniers women gave the Jesuits
large donations and that the Jesuit college in Quebec was
built with Desauniers "Albany trade" money.

236;

So lucrative was

95RAPO 1923-24, p. 50; Devine, Historic Cauahnawaaa. p.
Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, p. 253.

96Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin
18:71-72; Personal communication with Louise Dechene, 26 Nov
1990;
Cameron Nish, Les Bourgeois-Gentilshommes de la
Nouvelle-France 1729-1748 (Montreal: Fides, 1968), pp. 46, 74,
178; CllA 69:60-66; Jacqueline Roy, "Thomas-Ignace Trottier
Dufy Desauniers," Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Vol. 4,
pp. 739-740.
97Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin
18:72; Devine, Historic Caucrhnawaqa. p. 236; NYCD 9:1096;
Edward P. Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars (New York:
1962), p. 63; Edward P. Hamilton, "Unrest at Caughnawaga, or
The Lady Fur Traders of Sault St.-Louis," Bulletin of Fort
Ticonderoqa Museum XI (1963), pp. 155-160;
[Anon.] "Les
Malignites du Sieur de Courville," Bulletin des Recherches
Historioues L (1944), p. 72.
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the

sisters*

trade

at

Kahnawake

that

prominent Montreal

businessmen envied them greatly and would have paid handsomely
to rent commercial space at the village in order to be at the
hub of the smuggling trade with Albany.98
Kahnawake was the acknowledged center of the illegal
trade, where the three French women had a unique partnership
with their Kahnawake carriers.

Governor Beauhamois lamented

in 1741 that the village had "become a sort of Republic, and
it is only there that foreign trade is carried on at present."
Although Indians who bought merchandise at the Desauniers
store

used

Beauhamois'

beaver

pelts

attention

to

in

pay

for

them,

1741 that the

it

came

to

sisters had not

brought a single fur to the Compaqnie des Indes1 office in the
fifteen years that they had been at Kahnawake.

Not only that,

but furs were actually being carried covertly out of Montreal
(presumably having been brought in from the upcountry) to the
Kahnawake store.

The Desauniers women, besides sending furs

obtained in exchange for goods at the store, also were acting
as middlemen for Montreal merchants

(perhaps even corrupt

officers of the Company) to exchange furs coming into Montreal
for the woolens and other manufactured goods from Albany and
probably

to

make

the

connections

for

these

Montreal

98NYCD 9:1071; Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, pp.
252-253; J.F. Bosher, The Canada Merchants. 1713-1763 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 182. (The Desauniers
women also donated land to the Jesuits in 1742. RAPO 1973, p.
53.)
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businessmen with Kahnawake carriers."
Kahnawake women were hired to smuggle the pelts out of
Montreal in baskets to their mission village and both male and
female Sault Indians hired themselves out to transport the
cargo down to Albany.100
shrewd

dealers

The Kahnawake Indians, known to be

themselves,

may

even

have

initiated

an

independent branch of the trade;101 Governor Beauharnois was
under the impression that they carried this "foreign trade"
into habitant villages near the Sault.

By 1750, Governor La

Jonquiere noted that there was hardly a house in the entire
area which was not furnished with linens and calicoes from the
English.102

And even guards posted on the outskirts of the

colony cooperated with the transport of their goods.103
Governor Beauhamois

attempted to put the Desauniers

sisters out of business when he became fully aware of the
situation in 1741, but although they were ordered to close
their store, they remained at Kahnawake, and in fact continued

"NYCD 9:1071;

CllA 73:129-130, 77:403-406.

100NYCD 9:1071.
101When Governor La Jonquiere visited the Kahnawake
village, he noted that "many of their stores are filled with
English goods, and they are very shrewd in their dealings."
CllA 97:120; Devine, Historic Cauqhnawaaa. p. 249.
102NYCD 9:1096;
Collections
Society of Wisconsin 18: 62, 72.

of the State Historical

103Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, p. 252: "No beaver
will go to Albany or Oswego unless these same guards want to
let them go." (Rochemonteix quotes from CllA.)
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to trade, notwithstanding government orders.104

This half

hearted enforcement of the law, resulting only in a temporary
cessation of trade and the need to be more clandestine about
their operations,

was politically motivated.

New France

authorities, as those in New York, could not afford to offend
the Kahnawakes too much lest they turn their backs on the
colony.

Intendant Gilles Hocquart did not even want to

investigate the Desauniers operation, let alone shut it down,
for fear of antagonizing the Indians.105
The

Desauniers

sisters

had

a

close

and

positive

relationship with the Kahnawake people; they treated them well
as employees (sometimes almost as partners) and customers and
gave charitably to the poor and sick of the village.

They

also knew the Mohawk language fluently, better than many of
the official interpreters hired by the colonial government.
When Claude de Ramezay was stationed at the Sault as commander
of the garrison, he was indebted to them for their services as
translators.106
missionaries,
worked

The

women were well-liked by the Jesuit

and the latter were

hand-in-glove

with

them

implicated with having

when

they

were

finally

104NYCD 9:1095-96; CllA 77:13-14, 89-91, 386-388, 79:188192.
The Minister of Marine decreased the amount of money
spent on gifts and supplies for the Kahnawake people in 1741,
presumably as a punishment. (Devine, Historic Cauahnawaqa. p.
217; Rochemonteix, Les Jesuites. Vol. 2, pp. 249-250.)
105C11A 54:148-154, 76:26-28, 97:277-281;
NYCD 9:1071;
S Dale Standen, "Politics, Patronage and Imperial Interest,"
Canadian Historical Review LX (1979), p. 26.
106C11A 97:287-288.
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apprehended.107
In

1750,

shortly

after

taking

office,

Governor

La

Jonquiere decided that the Desauniers sisters and* Father
Tournois, the Jesuit priest at Kahnawake at the time, were to
be tolerated no more in their flagrant violation of the law.
He succeeded in having them removed from the village and
deported

to

France.108

The

Jesuit

order

protested

his

removal, and the Desauniers women rallied forces to protest
their removal as well.

The ship which the women boarded for

France overturned on the way back across the Atlantic, but
they

survived,

having

lost

some

of

their

belongings.109

107C11A 95:145-147, 157-161.
108Jesuit Relations 69:237. 286? CllA 95:131-144, 97:191201;
RAPO 1934-35, pp. 132, 145, 147.
Despite Father
Tournois' involvement with illegal commerce, it was evident
that he was an effective missionary, as colleagues commended
him (Father Nau told his mother in a personal letter in 1743
that Tournois "had much merit and [was] very amiable." RAPO
1926-27, p. 328). A contemporary account claimed that "they
say it's a pity to see that village [now that he is gone]:
there is no more mass and no sermons.
One only knows that
liquor is given in abundance." (RAPO 1934-35, p. 145.)
Governor Duquesne, La Jonquiere's successor, petitioned the
French minister to allow the return of Father Tournois to
Kahnawake, "because no one of his successors there had been
able to manage the Indians of that mission as he had done."
This appeal was unsuccessful, fJesuit Relations 69:286? CllA
99:286-287, 316-317.) Duquesne claimed that Tournois ran the
mission very well — better than anyone else — and that they
needed him back, particularly because the mission was growing
rapidly.
Duquesne also told the Minister of Marine that he
believed that La Jonquiere had made a bad judgment about
Father Tournois. (For a biography of Tournois, see Jean-Marie
LeBlanc, "Jean-Baptiste Tournois," Dictionary of Canadian
Biography Vol. 3, pp. 627-628.)
109RAPO 1934-35, pp. 145, 147.
The Desauniers women
gathered six witnesses, some of whom were prominent members of
the Montreal elite, to testify to their good character. (CllA

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

275
Nevertheless,
nerve.

their bad luck continued,

matched by their

They returned to New France not long after having been

expelled, and attempted, by sneaking past the notice of the
governor and the intendant, to return to Kahnawake.

They even

resorted to claiming that they had the king's permission to
re-open their store, but could furnish no proof of this claim.
After La Jonquiere died in office in 1752, they convinced the
interim governor to allow them to visit the village for
twenty-four hours, but so blatantly took advantage of this
allowance that finally they were physically removed.110
The Indians at Kahnawake, it seems, were not at all happy
about the turn of events, as they told La Jonquiere flatly
that

they would rather be dead than go without

goods.111

English

This was brazen behavior, since La Jonquiere had

warned them that Indians found to be involved in the smuggling
trade would also be banished from the village.112

But the

threat was not carried out and the Kahnawakes who wanted to,
continued their involvement in the transport business between

97:289-295.)
110C11A 97:191-196,277-281, 282-286, 98:36-39.
111C11A 97:139.
112Collections of the State Historical Society of
Wisconsin 18:62.
This indicates that the number of Sault
Indians directly involved in the trade may have been small.
(Sanders mentioned only five or six carriers by name.)
(Also, other French officials had tended to blame the
Kahnawakes' involvement in the trade on the Desauniers women
or the Jesuits, absolving the Indians themselves. (See for
example, NYCD 9:1071; CllA 97:191-201.)
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New France and New York, trading at Oswego as well as Albany
on a regular basis,

and casting their net even wider to

procure the furs to be sent to the English.

They travelled

all the way up to Lake Huron for shipments of peltries in the
years after the Tournois-Desauniers fiasco.113
self-sufficient, highly motivated people.

These were

They also became

agents for Robert Sanders of Albany and various merchants in
Montreal who needed Indians to carry their shipments and make
the connections.

Sanders' trade records indicate that he

became involved in this commerce just after the demise of the
Desauniers women, and had direct connections with Montreal
merchants.

But women remained prominent in the trade, since

about half, and some of Sanders' most frequent, carriers were
women from Kahnawake.

Relations were close enough between

this Albany wholesaler and the Kahnawake community for one of
the Jesuit missionaries in charge at the reserve community in
1754 to request Sanders' help in purchasing a bell for the
church at Kahnawake.114
By the 1750s, men such as Sanders were an exception.

Not

nearly as many Albanians were involved in the trade with
Indians as had been formerly.

Albany was no longer the fur

mecca it had been before Oswego was established.
113NYCD 9:953?

Instead, it

New York Colonial Manuscripts 80:51.

114Robert Sanders Letter Book, pp. 26, 31, 44, 51, 62.
About half of his Sault carriers were women. In 1753, a woman
named Susanna from Kahnawake was visiting Albany by herself.
She knew Sanders and may have been a carrier. (NYCD 6:795796.)
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had become primarily a wholesale clearing house for strouds
and other English woolens,

sold to Kahnawakes or Montreal

merchants.115

The few Indian Commissioners who were still

involved

the

in

Kahnawakes.116
town was

fur

trade

dealt

almost

solely

with

The presence of these mission Indians in the

so commonplace as not to arouse any particular

concern; it did not seem unusual for them to be there, as a
group of them casually mentioned to William Johnson on one
occasion that they had stopped by his house in Albany to speak
with him.117
however.

Larger numbers of them could be a problem,

In the summer of 1751, sixteen large canoes brought

almost two hundred Kahnawakes to Albany, an indication that
the trading ties between these Indians and the people of this
city had grown to outsized proportions.

The booming nature of

this wholesale trade became a problem in the 1750s, as the
number of Kahnawakes visiting the city became unwieldy.118
The situation also became a problem in New York-Six
Nations relations, since the latter were jealous that their
Catholic cousins had usurped such a profitable aspect of the

115By 1731, some trading houses of Montreal were
"Considerable Indebted" to Albany merchants. (Minutes of the
Indian Commissioners 1:332a.)
116NYCD 10:19.
117Johnson Papers 1:634. Johnson mentioned to some Cayuga
Indians in 1755 the casual and regularized nature of relations
between Kahnawakes and Albanians. (NYCD 6:980).
118New York Council Minutes, Old Vol. 21, pp. 430, 436;
Norton, Fur Trade, p. 185.
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fur

trade.

The

League

Iroquois

resented

the

Albany

commissioners for their cultivation of close relations with
the Kahnawakes, and for New York’s hypocritical policy of
discouraging them from developing ties with the French.

Some

Mohawks pointed out to Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian
agent,

that

it was

unfair

for New York

to

allow close

relations between Kahnawakes and New Yorkers, while censuring
League Iroquois delegations from visiting Montreal.119 Peter
Wraxall noticed this problem in New York-Six Nations relations
as well, blaming the Albany commissioners for wrecking the
province's

good

working

relationship

with

their

western

neighbors because of their greed in promoting the trade with
Canada.

(He even claimed that they lost control of Indian

affairs to Johnson because of their single-minded pursuit of
the trade with Kahnawakes.)
Indian

ill will

toward New York could have

serious

consequences in 1755 and after because the colony needed
Iroquois military support in the unfolding conflict with the
French.

Acting as William Johnson's cheerleader,

Wraxall

noted that since taking over the post of sole superintendent
for Indian affairs in the northern colonies, the latter had
managed to repair some of the damage done by Albanians to the
colony's relations with the Six Nations.

Johnson had managed

119Journal of Conrad Weiser's journey to Albany, 1751,
quoted in Paul A. W. Wallace, Conrad Weiser: Friend of
Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1945), p. 326.
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to convince at least the eastern tribes of the League that
they were more important to the New Yorkers than their mission
counterparts and that favored status for the Kahnawakes would
end.120
A

delicate balance was required, however, because the

League people still had close ties with their Kahnawake kin,
and there was concern in 1754 that Kahnawakes were encouraging
large numbers of League Mohawks to emigrate to New France and
become

military allies

of

the

French.

The need

for a

balancing act indicates both that relations between the two
groups were still good, so that Johnson could not speak too
strongly against the Kahnawakes for fear of offending Six
Nations people, and that the English had better treat League
Iroquois people well, so as not to encourage them to emigrate
to a colony whose officials were wooing them with lavish gifts
and respectful, deferential speeches.

Johnson had to ensure

some League sachems in 1755 that, although he disapproved of
the Albany-Kahnawake stroud trade (especially since it smacked
of disloyalty at a time when the French and English were going
to war), the Kahnawakes who came to Albany would be treated
well.

This was also a strategy to keep the Kahnawakes neutral

in the

impending

war; Johnson and others inNewYork did not

expect

that the Kahnawakes would join theFrench in doing

120NYCD 7:19-20. Also Col den Papers 9:425, 430.
League
resentment against the Albany-Kahnawake trade went back as far
back as 1712. (New York Colonial Manuscripts 58:5; Wraxall,
Abridgment. p. 120.)
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battle with English forces, since these Indians had such firm
and long-standing trade ties in New York.121
The Kahnawakes surprised Johnson, however, inasmuch as at
least some of them joined the French in the Battle of Lake
George in 1755 and in the attack on Fort William Henry two
years later.
in

New

Immediately after the 1755 battle, the reaction

York

Kahnawakes,

was
a

emphatically

trade

which

to
was

outlaw
now

any

trade

routinely

with

called

"pernicious," and to scorn the Albany merchants, who were now
labelled "mercenary."122

Arguments came out

in a torrent

about how that "pernicious" trade did nothing but support the
French empire at the expense of the English.

But at the same

time,

hope that

Johnson

in particular held

out

the

the

Kahnawakes could still be won over from the French and perhaps
even convinced to return to live within New York.123

This

hope, and the extreme caution which Johnson used with Indians
who had fired on his own troops at Lake George, indicates the
importance of the Kahnawakes to the balance of power as well
as trade in the Northeast.
As in military affairs, in trade relations the Kahnawakes
could make their own policy, beholden to neither the French
nor the English, and both powers were forced to make the best
121Johnson Papers 9:127-130;
122Johnson Papers 2:52, 76;
7:77, 278.

NYCD 6:980.
DHNY 2:407;

NYCD 6:1012,

123DHNY 2:408; New York Council Minutes, Old Vol. 25, p.
45 (Calendar, p. 418.)
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of the situation, even if it was detrimental to their long
term interests.

The Kahnawake Iroquois had managed a position

in which they could defy the usual laws of mercantilism and
imperial rivalry.

Seeing themselves courted by both powers,

they realized the value of remaining independent of both.124
But for the elimination of the French as a power in North
America in 1760, officials in both New France and New York
would have continued to shake their heads at the "sort of
Republic"

on

the

banks

of

the

St.

Lawrence

outside

of

Montreal.

124Most seemed to remain independent of the profit motive
as well.
For a discussion of this and related issues, see
Chapter VIII below.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE KAHNAWAKE IROQUOIS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Kahnawake people diverged from the course of cultural
and political history taken by their League Iroquois relatives
because they inhabited a different space geopolitically in the
Northeast.
had

Living in a Jesuit mission village, even if they

complete

political

control

(and

it

was

not

always

complete), they were physically closer to Europeans for most
of the first half of the eighteenth century than were their
League counterparts.

Iroquoia was a sovereign territory, even

if the eastern boundary separating it from white settlement
was eroded in the 1740s and after.

The Kahnawake village was

a piece of land within a European colony.

The land was owned

by the Jesuit order for the Kahnawake people; the Jesuits were
considered the

seigneurs

of

the

land until

1762.

This

geographical reality, as well as the constant presence and
influence

of

the

Jesuits

and

their

church,

shaped

the

diverging paths which the League and the Sault Iroquois took.
By 1700 the Kahnawakes saw themselves as no longer part
of the League but as a separate people, despite the League's
insistence up to 1760 that their Catholic cousins were "a part
of themselves.1,1

But the Kahnawakes did not see themselves

1The Sault men adopted a distinct hairstyle, perhaps to
distinguish themselves from their League cousins, since they
were otherwise indistinguishable in appearance and language.
The men raised the hair of the crown in a bunch and held it
there with mixture of wax and vermilion. They allowed three
or four hairs to protrude above, to which they fastened a bead
or exotic feather.
(Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit
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as French, as subjects of the French king, or as subject to
French

control;

independence,

they

consistently

demonstrated

their

earning the reluctant admission by Governor

Beauhamois that their community was "a sort of Republic."
When Frenchmen married Kahnawake women, they were adopted into
Kahnawake families and clans, even though their marriages took
place in the Catholic Church.

Marriage in the church did not

preclude traditional ways of courtship and the arrangement of
marriages by matrons, nor did it preclude traditional economic
arrangements associated with the institution.
Catholic

character

of

the

community

and

the

Despite the
fact

that

Christian ceremonies covered the important passages of life,
men still went to join their wives' households and contributed
to a communal economy within the extended family controlled

Relations and Allied Documents 73 vols. (Cleveland: Burrows,
1896-1901) (hereafter cited as JR) 68:265; Paul A. W. Wallace,
Conrad Weiser: Friend of Colonist and Mohawk (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945), pp. 17, 398; Carl F.
Klinck and James J. Talman, eds., The Journal of John Norton
1816 (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), p. 266; James Thomas
Flexner, Mohawk Baronet: A Biography of Sir William Johnson
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1989), p. 64.)
Apart from the hairstyle, whites confused League and Sault
people with each other because they looked and spoke so much
alike. (New York Council Minutes, 1668-1783, New York State
Library, Old Vol. 23, p. 104 (Calendar p. 389) ; Edmund B.
O'Callaghan, ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History
of the State of New York 15 vols. (Albany: Weed and Parsons,
1853-1887) (hereafter cited as NYCD) 4:871; James Sullivan et.
al., eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson 14 vols. (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1921-1965) (hereafter
cited as JP) 2:740.)
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completely by the women, as was the extended family dwelling.2
Every member of the community still belonged to one of the
three clans: Turtle, Wolf, or Bear.3
Despite their proximity to whites, this situation did not
change extensively in the eighteenth century, although by the
later part of the century there was evidence that a few of the
Kahnawakes were starting to change their dwelling patterns,
abandoning the extended family longhouse built of trees and
bark,

for

windows.4

single-family

cabins

of

squared

timber

with

This shift would suggest that the women of these

2Isaac Weld, Travels through the states of North America
and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada Purina the Years
1795. 1796. and 1797 (London: John Stockdale, 1799), p. 259;
William Henry Atherton, Montreal. 1535-1914 2 vols. (Montreal:
S.J. Clarke, 1914) 1:351; Louis Franquet, Voyages et Memoires
sur le Canada J. Cohen, ed. (Montreal: Editions Elysee, 1974),
p. 37; Joseph Franqois Lafitau, Customs of the American
Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive Times 2 vols.,
William N. Fenton and Elizabeth Moore, ed. and trans.
(Toronto: Champlain Society, 1974-77) 1:338-349.
3Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 37.
4Franquet, visiting in 1752-53, saw mostly longhouses in
the traditional style, but also indicated that some Kahnawakes
were beginning to build "houses in the French style, with
squared timber and even masonry," and claimed that the Jesuits
encouraged this new trend in construction. (Franquet, Voyages
et Memoires. pp. 37-39)
Louis Antoine de Bougainville and
Pierre Pouchot, who both visited Kahnawake during the Seven
Years' War, spoke of longhouses, but Pouchot said that they
also had some rooms furnished for visiting whites, implying
European-style construction.
(Louis Antoine [comte] de
Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness; the American
journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville. 1756-1760 Edward P.
Hamilton, ed. and trans. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1964), p. 124; Pierre Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war
in North America between the French and English. 1755-60 2
vols., Franklin B. Hough, trans. (Roxbury, Ma: Woodward, 1866)
2:186-187). When the St. Regis-Akwesasne mission was being
organized in 1753, the king donated money for a saw-mill to
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families were no longer in control of the family economy.

The

fur trade might have had something to do with this, if the
Kahnawakes became involved in the trade in order to make
profits and acquire concentrated wealth, and if the trade were
controlled by men.

If as a result some Kahnawakes were no

longer depending directly on food produced by the community,
then they no longer depended specifically on women to be the
economic mainstays.

If profits from the fur trade meant that

men involved in it bought corn and other agricultural products
from the women who produced them, then they were no longer
dependent
livelihood.

within

their

family

unit

on

women

for

their

This could have spurred a break from extended- to

single-family living arrangements.

However, women who were

help with building houses, an indication either that the
French were strongly encouraging assimilation of the mission
Iroquois, or that this was a logical extension of trends in
housing style being pursued by Indians at Kahnawake. (NYCD
10:266-267.)
Curiously, John Long, an English trader who
lived at Kahnawake for a while around 1770, reported that
there were "about two hundred houses, chiefly built of stone"
at the village. (Milo Milton Quaife, ed., John Long’s Vovaaes
and Travels Tin the Years! 1768-1788 (Chicago: Lakeside Press,
1922), p. 9) This high number of dwellings suggests single
family units, as does stone construction, but no other
visitors mention predominantly stone dwellings, and Long's
description contradicts later as well as earlier accounts. In
about 1796, Isaac Weld described the village as consisting of
fifty log houses. (Quaife, ed., p. 259) While "log" houses is
ambiguous —
it could have meant either log cabins or
longhouses — the number suggests extended family dwellings,
since the total population was around 1,000 in the 1750s, and
even after the Seven Years' War, with both smallpox epidemics
and war casualties having taken their tolls, the population
was said to be rising. (Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 119;
Quaife, ed., John Long's Vovaaes. p. 9; Collections of the
State Historical Society of Wisconsin (hereafter cited as
CSHSW) 17:175; NYCD 10:838; JP 3:291, 9:412.)
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involved in the fur trade (and there is plenty of evidence of
their involvement) may have been able to accumulate wealth in
the same way.5
Nevertheless, there is little evidence that the fur trade
had such an effect at Kahnawake up to 1760.

One reason for

this is that extended family longhouses remained the norm
throughout this period.
that

Furthermore, there is no evidence

individuals were accumulating wealth.

Property had

always been held communally, and it seemed to continue in this
way since extended family dwelling was still prevalent.
If there were significant profits being made in the fur
5Iroquoian women had traditionally been as active as men
in economic (subsistence) pursuits as well as politics.
Therefore, it was perfectly logical for them to be actively
involved in the fur trade as carriers.
The example of the
Desauniers women running the shop at Kaihnawake probcibly did
not seem odd there. Women at Kahnawake continued to be active
in agriculture, in family control (since women decided which
prisoners, and how many, would be adopted), and in politics.
It has been mentioned earlier that observers at Kahnawake
noticed the control of matrons over political decisions such
as the waging of war.
And a woman who was active as a
diplomatic messenger was mentioned by Conrad Weiser. When the
Pennsylvania Indian agent was visiting Albany in 1753, he met
Susanna, a Kahnawake who was visiting the Albany Indian
commissioners.
(She was a personal acquaintance of Robert
Sanders, perhaps because of involvement in trade.)
She had
brought a letter with her from a prisoner being held at
Kahnawake, and attempted to smooth over ruffled feathers in
New York over this captive, unfairly taken in peacetime. She
engaged in some diplomacy, assuring Weiser and other English
notables that virtually everyone at Kahnawake had disapproved
of the actions of the warriors who took the Englishman
prisoner, and was given a wampum belt to deliver to the Sault.
Weiser mentioned that she was considered "a noted Woman" and
was "very intelligible," as if most women were not.
His
comments may have reflected her behavior; she was probably
confident, self-assured, and as well-spoken publicly as any
Kahnawake man and this would have been strikingly noticeable
to a non-native. (NYCD 6:795-796.)
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trade (and there is no way to determine this) much of it was
being spent on liquor and on lavish dress.

As early as 1718,

Father Lafitau complained of heavy debt among the Kahnawakes
because of their copious comsumption of alcohol.

In 1732

another mention is made of extensive Kahnawake debt to John
Lydius, a Dutch trader living at this time on the New York
frontier.

This may also have been for liquor.6

Lavish dress and body decoration were features of preColumbian native cultures and continued to be after contact.
The Kahnawake people were no exception; with the availability
of new materials from Europe, they brought high fashion to a
new level, one which was characterized by a generous mixing of
Iroquois and European materials as well as by its lavishness.
As early as the 1710s the Sault Iroquois had developed a
reputation for being well-clothed; a nun commented a few years
later that "they are as vain of dress as any Frenchman."7
Louis

Franquet,

the

engineer,

noted

that

the

Kahnawakes

appeared to be wealthy because of their elaborate dress.

In

6NYCD 9:882; The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden
(New-York Historical Society Collections. L-LVI [New York,
1917-1923]) (hereafter cited as Colden Papers) 4:202-203.
Liquor was consumed in great quantity by some Kahnawakes, and
it constituted the major social problem at the community
throughout the eighteenth century. (JR 66:171, 67:39; Pouchot,
Memoir upon the late war 2:225; Rapport de L'Archiviste de la
Province de Quebec (hereafter cited as RAPQ) 1922-23, p. 184,
1934-35, p. 145; Pierre F.-X. de Charlevoix, History and
General Description of New France 6 vols., John G. Shea, ed.
and trans. (New York: Harper, 1866-1872) 5:204; NYCD 10:232,
301.)
7NYCD 9:887; Atherton, Montreal 1:350 (quote).
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particular, he noted that "they wear good quality fabric with
braids

of

gold

and

silver

that

they

usually

get

from

[Albany]." And John Long concurred that the Sault people were
"extravagantly
expensive kind."

fond of dress,

and that too

of the most

There is no doubt that if there were profits

being made in the fur trade,

much of it was going into

clothing.8
White observers described Kahnawake people as wearing
bracelets of both silver and wampum, gold and silver brocade,
necklaces of various materials, "the value whereof sometimes
reach 1,000 francs."

They wore traditional mocassins of

smoke-dried deerskin, but also donned European-style shirts
(only the mission Indians wore these, and it distinguished
them from "non-domiciliated" Indians, as did the crucifixes
they wore).
the seams.

Kahnawakes preferred their shirts with lace on
They wore leggings decorated with ribbons from

Europe, but also with flowers embroidered in dyed elk-hair.
In cold weather or for special ceremonies they wore mantles
which were often trimmed with eight or nine bands of lace.
Some wore silk stockings and some French-made shoes with

8Franquet, Vovaaes et Memoires. p. 38; Quaife, ed., John
Long's Vovaaes. p. 10. Long stated of the Sault people (in
about 1770) that the extravagant clothing and adornment was
financed by income from the land they leased out to
neighboring habitants. This was a decade after the MontrealAlbany smuggling trade ended. (In 1762, the Kahnawake people
had been awarded sole possession of at least a portion of the
original 1680 royal grant of land, and evidently were renting
out parts of it not occupied by their own people. JP 10:376379.)
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silver buckles instead of mocassins.9
When Franquet made his official visit to the village, the
sachem he met was wearing "a red outfit laced with gold and
silver" given to him by the king.
European

influences

too;

most

Franquet noted other

of the other Indians were

wearing "silver medals hanging from their necks," as well as
wool blankets (strouds, no doubt) which they wore as jackets.
But Peter Kalm, visiting only one or two years earlier, noted
the traditional touches —

faces painted with vermilion, a dye

which was also used to mark their shirts across the shoulders.
Another traditional feature which struck Kalm was that "most
of them had great rings in their ears, which seemed to be a
great inconvenience to them.1,10

All the accounts over many

decades indicate both the cultural mixing of styles and the
extravagance of dress.
important

to

The Kahnawake people considered it

use

lavish

outlet

for

materials

to

adorn

themselves

properly.
Another

spending

surplus

income

was

the

tithing expected by the Catholic Church of its members and, in
this case, collected by the Jesuit priests in the village.
But parishioners paid in the form of pelts taken in hunting
9Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 124;
Atherton, Montreal 1:350; JR 68:263-265; RAPO 1922-23, p. 37;
Cadwallader Colden, History of the Five Indian Nations of
Canada —
2 vols. (New York: Allerton, 1922, reprinted from
the 1747 edition) 2:39.
10Franquet, Vovaaes et Memoires. pp. 36-37; Peter Kalm,
Travels into North America John R. Foster, trans. (Barre, Ma:
Imprint Society, 1972), p. 364.
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and c o m from the harvest.11
that most Kahnawakes,
subsistence

Payment in commodity suggests

if not all,

economy wherein money

were

still tied to a

did not

circulate

surpluses were not large or converted into currency.

and

Indeed,

despite the Kahnawakes' continued involvement in the fur trade
even after the British conquest of New France, they still
tilled the soil, and to a lesser extent, raised domesticated
animals and hunted for meat for their own consumption, as the
main modes of maintaining the communal livelihood.
A 1757 memoir on the state of the colony claimed that the
Kahnawakes

made

their

livestock and poultry.

living

from

farming

and

raising

John Long recounted a decade or more

later that they did not depend mostly on hunting to make a
living, since there were far fewer deer in the woods than
previously, but that the main economic occupation was sowing
com.

Long also mentioned their involvement in the fur trade,

but clearly saw it as a secondary, even tertiary, occupation.
The skins procured when men were out hunting were taken to
Montreal to sell for money or barter for goods, according to
Long, but he clearly did not characterize this as the way they
made their living.

It was an occupation undertaken as a way

to obtain certain desired goods which they could not produce
themselves.

The predominant livelihood remained the female-

11Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war 2:225;
Vovaaes et Memoires. p. 37.

Franquet,
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centered

farming

of

traditional

Iroquoia.12

The

market

economy of the French colony had intruded somewhat into the
mission village; Bougainville noted that the Kahnawakes "sell,
buy, and trade just like Frenchmen," but since at the same
time tithe payments were being made with their subsistence
products rather than cash or trade goods, the European trade
nexus

could

not

have

completely

overtaken

the

Sault

economy.13
There was community pressure against the intrusion of the
European economy and its values into Kahnawake as late as the
turn of the nineteenth century.

Isaac Weld, a British visitor

to North America in the 1790s, met a Sault man named Thomas
whose chief occupation seemed to be that of a trader.

When

Weld met him, he was on his way south to Albany with thirty
horses and "a quantity of furs" to sell there.
Canadian who knew Thomas said he was

A French

"a very rich man" and

had "a most excellent house, in which ... he lived as well as
a seignior."

Thomas was not a typical Kahnawake resident.

12RAP0 1923-24, p. 50; Quaife, ed., John Long's Vovaaes.
pp. 9-10.
(After 1760, with the British in charge of
Montreal, one could take furs there to buy strouds or other
inexpensive English goods. There was no longer a need to go
to
Albany.)
Also
JR
68:275;
JP
3:970,
10:372-373;
Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, pp. 124-125.
Colden's 1725 claim that the Kahnawakes made their living
solely from the fur trade could not have been true. Colden
never visited their village, and those who did clearly saw the
"industrious" farming activity which went on there. (Colden,
History 2:53). Long described the Kahnwakes as "industrious"
(Quaife, ed., John Long's Voyages, p. 9.)
13Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p. 125.
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Another indication that he was not was his insistence that
"his people ... had but very few wants."

He explained to Weld

that this was because he took care of their needs and that in
return they kept him supplied with

furs for his trading

business, they took care of his horses, and "voluntarily"
accompanied him on his commercial trips to Albany.

(Thomas'

emphasis on the voluntary condition of their joining him is
curious and even suspicious.)

Weld speculated that Thomas'

profits were "immense" and he later heard that Thomas could
get £500 worth of credit at any Montreal store.
The trader was notable also in his appearance.

Weld

noted that he "was dressed like a white man" but that all the
other people in his party were costumed "in the Indian habit."
Thomas was different from those accompanying him in another
respect; while "not one of his followers could speak a word of
English or French," Thomas could speak both languages fluently
and appeared as much at ease in French as in his own Mohawk
language.

Thomas instantly befriended Weld as he had the

Frenchman from whom Weld had first heard of him and invited
Weld and his party to stay with him at his home.

Thomas even

indicated that there were many beautiful Indian women at his
village who would make good wives for Weld and his travelling
companions.

While some of these traits appear consistent with

the profile we have seen of Kahnawake people who were adept at
dealing with outsiders and learning their languages,
individual

accumulation

of

wealth

and

unequal

the

power
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relationships

between

Thomas

and

his

"followers"

or

"attendants" does not seem consistent with Kahnawake behavior
up to 1760 •.
But even in the late 1790s when Thomas and Isaac Weld
met,

the

Kahnawake

people

had

not

yet

given

up

their

traditional communal values and equitable power relationships.
Weld later found out that his new friend from the Sault was
"not a man respected among the Indians in general.”

The

Indians, Weld discovered, "think much more of a chief that is
a good warrior and hunter, and that retains the habits of his
nation, than of one that becomes a trader, and assimilates his
manners to those of the whites."14
It

is

all

the more

remarkable

that

the

Kahnawakes

retained as many traditional ways and mores as they did with
the large influx of white adoptees they absorbed.
captivity

narratives,

observations

by

visitors

Numerous
to

the

community, and accounts by Jesuits attest to the significant
white additions to the families and clans of Kahnawake. Names
14Weld, Travels through the states.... p. 170-171. In the
1750s the Mountain mission Indians reacted similarly to a
Nipissing Indian who set up shop there. He was "dishonored"
in the eyes of his brethren at the mission because he dressed,
ate, and slept life a Frenchman. He went "neither to hunt nor
to war," which further discredited him in native eyes, and
they scorned him because he carried on a lucrative business at
his shop.
(Bougainville, Adventure in the wilderness, p.
123.) Both Mountain and Sault Indians saw nothing wrong with
involvement in the fur trade, when it was pursued within
certain parameters, namely, the desire to obtain certain trade
goods by bartering furs for them. But to set up shop oneself
crossed a line in behavior which most had not embraced —
undertaking the trade for the purpose of making profit, for
accumulating wealth.
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such

as

Powell,

Cook,

Williams,

Tarbell,

Naim,

Yort,

Philipson, Suitzer, and Volmer contributed to the population
of the community, although they were given Iroquois names and
identities in adoption ceremonies.15

White influences were

also introduced at Kahnawake from the troops garrisoned there,
whose commandants often had much to do with the Indians.16
Traders such as the Desauniers women and Monsieur Musseaux, to
whom the sisters' shop was subsequently leased, had frequent
contact with their customers and carriers in the village.
Periodically, whites came to live at the village; John Long
lived there for a time in order to learn the Mohawk language.
About the same time, a Frenchman named Clingancourt bought a
house at Kahnawake and probably lived in it.17 Even hostages
or

prisoners who

influence as well.

were

not adopted

into

famil ies had

an

In the early 1750s, two prisoners from

English colonies, Captain Robert Stobo and Jan Van Braam, "had

1sEmma Lewis Coleman, New England Captives Carried to
Canada between 1677 and 1760 during the French and Indian Wars
2 vols. (Portland, Me: 1925-26) 2:37; Samuel G. Drake, ed.,
Indian Captivities or Life in the Wigwam (Buffalo, N.Y.:
1854), pp. 110-112; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 38;
Lafitau, Customs —
2:171-172; JP 3:191; New York Colonial
Manuscripts, 1638-1800 (83 vols.) New York State Library,
78:115, 79:51; NYCD 10:214-215; Weld, Travels through the
states.... p. 259; John G. Shea, History of the Catholic
Missions Among the Indian Tribes of the United States. 15291854 (New York: P.J. Kennedy, 1854), p. 332; E.J. Devine,
Historic Caughnawaga (Montreal: Messenger Press, 1922), p.
246.
16Commandant Douville was heavily involved in daily life
and political events at the Sault.
17NYCD 8:238.
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the run of our [mission Indian villages] with whom they have
had conferences," according to French officials.18
And of course, the Jesuits were a great influence, or
attempted
widespread

to

be,

but

cultural

they

change.

stopped

short

Indeed,

Iroquoian ways of doing things.

they

of

demanding

conformed

to

Any Jesuit who did not

succeed in learning the Mohawk language within a year would
not stay long at the Sault.

Priests who wanted to be taken

seriously by the Indians had to agree to be adopted, becoming
a member of the tribe.
use

only his

adoptive

Once that happened, the Jesuit would
name within the village,

Kahnawake people would not
him.19

Conversely,

many

recognize any

Kahnawakes

and the

other name

took baptismal

for

names

along with their Iroquois names, showing the hybrid IroquoisCatholic nature of the community.

Many men took the name

Francois-Xavier and many women names such as Marie, Madeleine,
and Marguerite.
Catholic

Christianity

became

part

of

the

Kahnawake

culture in many ways, despite the lack of piety among some of
the people there.

Father Nau claimed that although they were

not perfect, the Kahnwakes were much more virtuous in their
religious belief and practice than most other Indians, and
indeed than most Frenchmen.

Accounts of devout Kahnawake

18NYCD 10:308.
19JR 68:269? RAPO 1926-27, p. 268; Pouchot, Memoir upon
the late war 2:226; Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 37.
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worshippers in the church singing hymns, saying prayers, and
participating in mass were common.20

The village was much

better equipped for Christian worship than most surrounding
parishes.
of

In the 1720s Kahnawake was at the southwestern edge

settlement

in

New

France,

but

even

the

habitant

parishioners on their eastern side had to come to the church
at the Sault for mass on Sunday after the priest had said mass
for the Kahnawake people.

Three

quarters

of the white

population of the Montreal area heard mass said only four
times per year, and often without the sacraments; they were
not as well versed in their religion as were their native
counterparts.

Those who were often came to the Sault village

to pay homage to Kateri Tekakwitha, the saintly Kahnawake who
modeled herself after the Virgin Mary and inspired worship of
the mother of Jesus at Kahnawake for decades to come.21
There seemed to be many pious Sault Iroquois.

For

instance, a Protestant Deerfielder captured by Kahnawakes in
1704 was forced to cross himself and to kiss a crucifix which
his captor wore around his neck.

This prisoner reported that

other Puritan Deerfielders who were captured by Kahnawakes
were forced to say Catholic prayers and to attend mass rather
20JR 68:267-279; Sylvester K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, and
Emma Edith Woods, eds., Travels in New France by J.C.B.
(Harrisburg, Pa; Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), p.
24; Quaife, ed., John Long's Vovaaes. p. 10.
21Louise Dechene, Habitants et Marchands de Montreal au
XVIIe siecle (Montreal and Paris: Plon, 1974), pp. 452-453;
Devine, Historic Cauahnawaaa. p. 167; JR 68:271; Weld, Travels
through the states.... p. 259.
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than remain in the longhouses when the Kahnawake villagers
attended the daily ritual.22 And in 1770 a Sault sachem sent
wampum belts to Sir William Johnson, asking him to ensure that
the Kahnawakes could practice their Catholic faith without
disturbance by intruders in their village.23
However, not all Sault people felt this way.
said to be indifferent to the Christian belief.
Kahnawakes

were

walking

the

streets

of

Some were

While devout

Montreal

with

crucifixes and rosaries, others were "constantly abandoning
the mission" for reasons associated with religion.

Pierre

Pouchot observed this in the 1750s, adding that those who
remained were practicing Christians.24

In the same decade,

Franquet cynically surmised that the Kahnawake people were
attached to Catholicism only "in as much as their interests
dictate."25

Pouchot noted that even those who nominally

adhered to the faith and revered the priests, calling them
"Praying Fathers," still "have no very distinct idea of this
Infinite Being," the Christian God.

"They render to him no

22John Williams, The Redeemed Captive returning to Zion
Edward Clark, ed. (Amherst, Ma: University of Massachusetts
Press, 1976, first published 1707), pp. 62, 66, 69.
23NYCD 8:238.
24Quaife, ed., John Long's Voyages, p. 9; Pouchot, Memoir
upon the late war 2:224. No doubt many who left the mission
headed for the Kahnwake settlements in the Ohio country, since
James Smith told of Kahnawakes on the banks of the Muskingum
who were disillusioned with Catholicism. (Drake, ed., Indian
Captivities, p. 206)
25Franquet, Voyages et Memoires. p. 37.
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homage,

and

only designate

him as

the Master of

Life."

Pouchot witnessed the persistence of traditional spiritual
practices such as juggling, a type of vision guest in which a
person heated his or her body in order to receive visions and
prophesy coming events.

Pouchot concluded that the Kahnawake

people had not assimiliated to any great degree, claiming that
they "have lost none of their customs."26
Despite their proximity to and frequent contact with
whites,

the

Sault

people had

adapted

Iroquoian material

culture, life ways, and religious beliefs to a new situation
but had not assimilated.

They had changed but chose what to

change and consciously avoided some adaptations.

They were

distinct from the French-Canadian society around them while
finding ways of developing beneficial economic ties with the
surrounding whites into the nineteenth century.27

And much

more than their southern brethren, they managed throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to find new ways of making
a living from their considerable skills, but always on their
own terms, maintaining their independence from their white
neighbors.
hiring

By the turn of the nineteenth century, they were

themselves

out

as

river pilots

on

the upper St.

Lawrence and points west because of their skill in passing
rapids and rafting timber.

Some travelled as far as the Rocky

26Pouchot, Memoir upon the late war 2:226-228, 186.
27See David Blanchard, "Patterns of tradition and change:
the re-creation of Iroquois culture at Kahnawake" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1982), p. 171.
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Mountains and the west coast, and later to the Middle East, as
skilled boatmen.

In a late-nineteenth century stint in Egypt,

a group of fifty Kahnawake boatmen showed the natives how to
maneuver around the dangerous cataracts of the Nile River.

By

the end of the nineteenth century, with tall steel bridges
being built in their own backyard across the St. Lawrence
river, they found that unlike most workers, they could walk
fearlessly on construction scaffolding hundreds of feet from
the ground.

Many took advantage of this skill and became high

steel workers,

starting a tradition still alive today at

Kahnawake. Such work enabled them to take individual jobs all
over North America when they wanted to, always maintaining
independence

from

an

employer

and

from

boundaries of Canada and the United States.

the

political

Kahnawake men

could leave the village for a few months at a time, perform
tasks of skill and courage, and return home with money in
pocket and feats of bravery of which to brag.

In doing so,

they maintained the traditional rhythm and temperament of the
Iroquois warrior-hunter.28

Not all native groups were as

successful at finding occupations with which they could relate
28See Joseph Mitchell, "The Mohawks in High Steel," in
Edmund Wilson, Apologies to the Irocruois (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Cudahy, 1959) esp. p. 281; Blanchard, "Patterns of
tradition and change," pp. 211-214, 403; Bruce Katzer, "The
Caughnawaga
Mohawks:
Occupations,
Residence,
and
the
Maintenance of Community Membership" (Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University, 1972), pp. 48, 53, 61;
Devine, pp. 416-418; Louis Jackson, Our Caughnawaga Indians in
Egypt (Montreal: Drysdale, 1885); Alexander Chamberlain,
"Iroquois in northwestern Canada," American Anthropologist VI
(1904), pp. 459-463.
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traditional patterns of work and values.

Today, as a measure

of their success in surviving as a people, the Kahnawakes have
more native Mohawk speakers than any other Iroquois reserve or
reservation and the lowest unemployment rate, and they were
among the first to establish their own schools with a native
curriculum.

They

also

have

the

first

and

only

fully

functioning hospital on a reserve in Canada.29
The m o d e m success of the Sault Iroquois had its roots in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when they learned to
take advantage of their importance to both the English and
French colonial powers.

Although both powers tried to own

them and they were at times placed in a subordinate position,
particularly to the French, they used what leverage they could
to steer their own course.

In trade, they took advantage of

their unique position to be involved in a contraband commerce
by their own choice and maintained only as much involvement in
it as they wished.

The smuggling trade between Albany and

Montreal would not have existed without them.
In diplomacy and warfare,

the Kahnawakes sustained a

variety of opinions, but the net effect was almost always to
make the French and the English come running to them for
support.

This usually worked, as in the Seven Years' War when

their decision on whether or not to go to war for the French

29Katzer, "The Caughnawaga Mohawks," pp. 69, 172, 176;
Blanchard, "Patterns of tradition and change," p. 273; John
Beatty, Mohawk Morphology (Greeley, Co: University of Northern
Colorado Museum of Anthropology, 1974), pp. 4-8.
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determined whether Indians would fight on the English side.
Even if coerced into joining a war party, they could and did
sabotage war

efforts

which

went

against

their

interests

(particularly the desire not to fight against fellow Iroquois
warriors).

From

Denonville

to

Dieskau,

French military

leaders were duped and dumped by the Kahnawakes.

Although

many times they seemed to have become subordinate to the
French, they never gave up their autonomy and, within the
sometimes narrow framework in which to maneuver, they did so
with consummate skill.

They retained ties with the Albanians

so as to remind the French of their freedom to make policy.
The European powers had to consider what the Kahnwakes would
do when they were attempting to influence what the Iroquois
League would do, and the Five/Six Nations hesitated to make
policy without first consulting with their Kahnawake kin.
Their role in this struggle made it a much more complex
struggle than would at first appear.

The Sault Iroquois were

yet another variable in the equation of English, French, and
Iroquois Indians, often seen as a triangular power struggle.
But none of these three belligerents made policy without first
considering what effect the policy would have on Kahnawake
motivation.

The Sault Iroquois forced the French, English,

and the Iroquois League to deal with them as an independent
power, ever complicating the diplomatic machinations of the
colonial struggle for control of the Northeast.
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